Sherbert vs. Verner

A state may not deny unemployment benefits to a claimant whose refusal to work on their Sabbath is based on sincere religious belief, unless the state demonstrates a compelling interest that cannot be achieved through less restrictive means.

South Carolina’s Unemployment Compensation Act required claimants to be "available for suitable work." The Employment Security Commission interpreted this to disqualify individuals who, for personal reasons (including religious observance), limited their availability for work.

• Filed with SC Employment Security Commission (denied benefits).
• Appeal to Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County (affirmed Commission).
• Appeal to SC Supreme Court (affirmed lower court).
• Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court (reversed).

• Appellant (Sherbert) was a Seventh-day Adventist whose faith prohibits work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.
• Her employer instituted a 6-day workweek including Saturdays. She was fired for refusing Saturday work.
• She sought employment at three other local mills but found no suitable 5-day work.
• She filed for unemployment benefits. The Commission denied her claim, holding her refusal to accept Saturday work rendered her unavailable for "suitable work" without good cause.
• SC courts upheld the denial, finding no infringement on religious freedom.

• Denying benefits solely due to religiously motivated refusal to work Saturday violates the Free Exercise Clause.
• The state law imposes an unconstitutional burden by forcing a choice between religious practice and essential benefits.
• No compelling state interest justifies this burden.

• The statute neutrally applies to all claimants unavailable for work for personal reasons, not just religious ones.
• Granting benefits would constitute state support for religion, violating the Establishment Clause.
• The state has a compelling interest in preventing fraudulent claims and maintaining the unemployment compensation fund.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  1. Whether disqualifying appellant from unemployment benefits for refusing Saturday work based on religious belief violates the Free Exercise Clause.
  2. Whether any compelling state interest justifies this burden.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  1. Yes. The disqualification imposed a substantial burden on free exercise by forcing appellant to choose between her religion and benefits. This constituted coercion equivalent to a fine for practicing her faith.
  2. No. The state failed to show a compelling interest (e.g., preventing fraud) that could not be addressed by less restrictive means. The speculative risk of fraudulent claims did not justify the burden.

• Compelling Interest Test (Strict Scrutiny for Free Exercise): When a law imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise, it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Applied here: SC found no compelling interest outweighed the burden on Sherbert.
• Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: The government may not deny a benefit (even a privilege, not a right) based on a person’s exercise of constitutional rights. Applied here: Denying unemployment benefits because of Sherbert’s religious practice penalized free exercise.

• "Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." (Brennan, J.)
• "Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." (Brennan, J., quoting Thomas v. Collins)

• Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961): Distinguished. While Sunday closing laws indirectly burdened Sabbatarians, they served a compelling state interest in a uniform day of rest. No similar interest existed here.
• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940): Followed. Established Free Exercise applies to states via 14th Amendment.
• Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961): Followed. State cannot compel affirmation of belief or penalize for religious views.
• NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963): Followed. Incidental burdens on fundamental rights require compelling state interest.
• Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947): Cited. States cannot exclude individuals from public benefits based on religion.

• First Amendment (Free Exercise Clause): Prohibits laws prohibiting free exercise of religion. Applied via 14th Amendment to states.
• Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause): Incorporates First Amendment protections against states.
• South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, § 68-113(3) & § 68-114(3): Required claimants to be "available for suitable work" and disqualified those refusing work without "good cause." SC held application to religious refusal unconstitutional.

• Justice Douglas (Concurring): Emphasized the Free Exercise Clause protects diverse religious practices from majoritarian coercion. The burden here was direct and unconstitutional.
• Justice Stewart (Concurring in Result): Agreed with reversal but argued the Court’s Establishment Clause precedents (e.g., Schempp) conflicted with this Free Exercise ruling. Would overrule Braunfeld.

• Justice Harlan (joined by Justice White) (Dissenting): Argued the state law neutrally denied benefits to anyone unavailable for work for personal reasons. Granting an exemption for religion would itself violate Establishment Clause neutrality. The burden was indirect and minimal compared to Braunfeld.