Serrano vs. Court of Appeals

A money claim arising from employer-employee relations accrues, and the three-year prescriptive period begins to run, only upon the employer's definite denial of the employee's demand, especially where prior demands were warded off with indefinite promises of verification.

From 1974 to 1991, respondent Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. deployed petitioner Roberto R. Serrano as a seaman. From 1977 to 1978, Serrano instructed Maersk to send portions of his salary via money orders to his family in the Philippines. Maersk deducted the corresponding amounts totaling HK$4,600.00 and £1,050.00 Sterling Pounds from Serrano's salary, but the money orders were never transmitted to his family.

• Employment and Remittances: Respondent Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. deployed petitioner Roberto R. Serrano as a seaman to foreign vessels from 1974 to 1991. Between 1977 and 1978, Serrano authorized Maersk to deduct amounts from his salary and send them via money orders to his family in the Philippines. The deductions totaled HK$4,600.00 and £1,050.00 Sterling Pounds. Maersk also deducted amounts for the Danish Social Security System, welfare contributions, ship club, and SSS Medicare.
• Non-Receipt and Demands: Serrano's family never received the money orders. Upon discovering this in 1978, Serrano demanded payment from Maersk. The company assured him they would look into the matter and subsequently reassigned him to a vessel. Whenever Serrano returned to the Philippines, he followed up on his claims, but Maersk repeatedly told him to return after several weeks as they needed time to verify records and consult their principal, A.P. Moller. In the interim, Maersk would re-hire Serrano for another year-long deployment.
• Definite Denial: In October 1993, Serrano wrote to Maersk demanding immediate payment of the unsent money orders. On November 11, 1993, respondent A.P. Moller replied, claiming that accounting documents were only kept for a certain number of years, data on the claims were no longer available, and there were no outstanding money orders. A.P. Moller declined Serrano's demand for payment.
• Filing of Complaint: In April 1994, Serrano filed a complaint for collection of the unsent money orders and illegal salary deductions with the POEA, which was later transferred to the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the claim for illegal deductions, which dismissal became final, but ordered the refund of the untransmitted money orders. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on the money order claim, dismissing it on the ground of prescription.

• Procedural Timeliness: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on mere technicalities rather than on the merits of the case.
• Accrual of Cause of Action: Petitioner maintained that his cause of action accrued only in 1993 when respondent A.P. Moller categorically denied his money claims, asserting that the three-year prescriptive period should be counted from 1993, not 1978.

• Prescription: Respondents argued that the money claim had prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code, as the cause of action accrued in 1977-1978 when the deductions were made, and the complaint was filed only in 1994.
• Procedural Timeliness: Respondents contended that the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals was filed out of time under the prevailing computation of the 60-day reglementary period.

• Timeliness of Petition: Whether the petition for certiorari was filed out of time in light of the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
• Accrual of Cause of Action: Whether petitioner's money claim prescribed, considering the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code.

• Timeliness of Petition: The petition was deemed timely filed. The amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is counted from notice of the denial of a motion for reconsideration, applies retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. Procedural laws do not create new or take away vested rights and thus operate retroactively. Under this computation, petitioner had until June 7, 1999, to file the petition. Because June 7 fell on a Saturday, the period was extended to June 9, 1999, the date the petition was actually filed.
• Accrual of Cause of Action: The claim was filed within the prescriptive period. The cause of action accrued only in November 1993 upon respondent A.P. Moller's definite denial of the claim. Following the doctrine in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, where an employer wards off an employee's demands with indefinite promises, the cause of action does not accrue until the demand is categorically rejected. The three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code commenced from the definite denial in November 1993, rendering the complaint filed in April 1994 timely.

• Accrual of Cause of Action in Labor Cases — A cause of action requires: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant violative of that right. Where the employer wards off the employee's demands with indefinite promises, the third element is not present until the employer categorically rejects the demand. The prescriptive period begins to run only from the date of such definite denial.
• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. No vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws.

• "The earlier requests by him having been warded off with indefinite promises, and the private respondent not yet having decided to assert his right, his cause of action could not be said to have then already accrued. The issues had not yet been joined, so to speak. This happened only when the private respondent finally demanded reinstatement on May 2, 1980, and his demand was categorically rejected by the petitioner on May 10, 1980." — Quoting Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, establishing the rule that a cause of action accrues only upon the categorical denial of a demand, not from the mere occurrence of the incident giving rise to the claim.
• "Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes." — Rationale for applying the amended Section 4, Rule 65 retroactively.

• Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, 171 SCRA 250 (1989) — Followed. Established that the cause of action for reinstatement accrued only upon the employer's categorical rejection of the demand, not from the date of the accident that led to the suspension. Applied in the present case to rule that the cause of action for money claims accrued only upon the employer's definite denial of the demand in 1993.
• Systems Factors Corporation and Modesto Dean v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 143789, November 27, 2000 — Followed. Applied the retroactive application of the amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, counting the 60-day period to file certiorari from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

• Article 291, Labor Code — Provides that all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. Applied to determine that the claim filed within three years of the employer's definite denial was timely, as the cause of action accrued upon that denial.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court (as amended effective September 1, 2000) — Provides that the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari shall be counted from notice of the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration or new trial. Applied retroactively to deem the petition for certiorari timely filed.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.