Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals

The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is counted from the day the offense is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, pursuant to Article 91 of the same Code. The registration of the bigamous marriage contract with the civil registrar does not constitute constructive notice to the world, and thus does not commence the running of the prescriptive period.

Petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975, while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained subsisting. The information was filed on May 26, 1992. Petitioner moved to quash, arguing his criminal liability had prescribed. He contended that since the second marriage contract was registered with the Civil Registrar in 1975, this constituted constructive notice to the world, including his first wife, thereby starting the fifteen-year prescriptive period at that time. The prosecution maintained that discovery occurred only in July 1991.

• Nature of the Charge: Petitioner was accused of bigamy for marrying Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975, while his marriage to Virginia C. Nievera was still valid and subsisting.
• Petitioner's Defense: Petitioner moved to quash the information, claiming prescription. He argued that the fifteen-year prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code began in 1975 upon the registration of the second marriage contract, making the 1992 filing time-barred.
• Prosecution's Position: The prosecution asserted that the offended party discovered the bigamous marriage only in July 1991, thus the filing in 1992 was within the prescriptive period.
• Key Factual Finding: The Court noted that petitioner indicated his civil status as "single" in the second marriage contract, concealing his existing marriage. The ceremony was held in a location where he was not known to be already married.

• Constructive Notice and Prescription: Petitioner argued that the registration of the marriage contract with the Civil Registrar in 1975 made it a matter of public record, constituting constructive notice to the whole world. Therefore, the prescriptive period commenced from the date of registration, and the 1992 information was filed beyond the fifteen-year period.
• Absence of Concealment: Petitioner contended there was no concealment because the marriage was publicly celebrated and the contract was registered and open for public inspection.

• Actual Discovery as the Trigger: The prosecution countered that the prescriptive period for bigamy starts from the time of its discovery by the offended party, which was in July 1991, not from the date of commission or registration.
• Inapplicability of Constructive Notice: Respondents maintained that the principle of constructive notice from property registration cannot be applied to bigamy, a crime typically committed in secrecy. Applying it would effectively immunize offenders and undermine the stability of marriage as a social institution.

• Prescription of Bigamy: Whether the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy commences from the date of registration of the subsequent marriage contract (constructive notice) or from the date of its actual discovery by the offended party.
• Applicability of Constructive Notice: Whether the civil law principle of constructive notice, applicable to registered land transactions, extends to documents recorded in the Civil Register for the purpose of commencing the prescriptive period for bigamy.

• Prescription of Bigamy: The prescriptive period for bigamy commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, pursuant to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of bigamy is generally committed in secrecy from the first spouse, and discovery is rendered difficult by the offender's concealment of the legal impediment.
• Applicability of Constructive Notice: The principle of constructive notice under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) does not apply to documents registered in the Civil Register. There is no statutory counterpart in Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law) or in Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code that provides for constructive notice from civil registry entries. Applying constructive notice to bigamy would place an unreasonable burden on spouses to constantly verify civil registries nationwide and would encourage violations of the marital institution.

• Prescription of Bigamy — The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is fifteen (15) years, as it is punishable by prision mayor. This period begins to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (Article 91, Revised Penal Code), not from the date of its commission or registration. The Court emphasized that bigamy is typically concealed, and discovery is not immediate.
• Inapplicability of Constructive Notice to Bigamy — The civil law principle of constructive notice, whereby registration of an instrument affecting registered land constitutes notice to the whole world, does not apply to the crime of bigamy. The Court distinguished land registration from civil registration, noting the absence of a legal basis for the latter and the impracticality of requiring spouses to routinely inspect civil registries to discover bigamous marriages.

• "The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor." — This passage underscores the Court's policy rationale for rejecting petitioner's argument to prevent the effective decriminalization of bigamy.
• "Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our society." — This excerpt highlights the Court's emphasis on protecting the sanctity and stability of marriage over a technical application of notice rules.

• People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597 — Cited by the petitioner in support of applying constructive notice. The Court of Appeals distinguished this case, noting it involved land disputes, not bigamy. The Supreme Court implicitly agreed with this distinction.
• People v. Dinsay, 40 SCRA 50 — Also cited by the petitioner. The Court of Appeals noted this case involved property disputes, and the Supreme Court's reasoning aligns with the view that such precedents are inapplicable to bigamy.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of bigamy as contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved or the absent spouse declared presumptively dead.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the crime of bigamy, punishable by prision mayor, prescribes in fifteen (15) years.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — States that the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
• Section 52, P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides for constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lien, etc., affecting registered land from the time of registration. The Court held this has no counterpart in laws governing the civil register.

• Justice Isagani A. Cruz
• Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
• Justice Ricardo J. Quiason