Seriña vs. Court of First Instance of Bukidnon

A petition for certiorari and mandamus must be dismissed as moot and academic where the relief sought has already been accomplished and the principal proceeding below has been dismissed, leaving no occasion for supervisory intervention.

Arturo Seriña was the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Kibawe, Bukidnon and a candidate for reelection to the same office in the November 14, 1967 election. Ernesto Villalon was a rival candidate for municipal mayor in that election. The Revised Election Code governed judicial recounts under Sections 163 or 168 and prescribed the form and contents of election returns under Sections 142 and 162.

Arturo Seriña was the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Kibawe, Bukidnon and a candidate for reelection in the November 14, 1967 election, with Ernesto Villalon as a rival candidate for the same office. As the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kibawe was about to convene to canvass the municipal results, Seriña received a report that the election returns of Precinct No. 20 had been tampered with, altered and falsified, particularly the copies for the Provincial Treasurer, Municipal Treasurer and Commission on Elections. Thereupon he filed with the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon a petition for judicial recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 20.

According to the petition, the Commission on Elections copy credited Villalon with 525 votes while the Municipal Treasurer's copy showed 2,525 votes opposite his name. On both the Commission on Elections and Municipal Treasurer copies, the spaces on Page 1 regarding the number of voters registered, the number of voters who actually voted, the number of ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots, and others, had not been filled up by the Board of Inspectors of Precinct No. 20. Seriña moved to permit the Municipal Treasurer to open the ballot box solely to retrieve the ballot-box copy therein, but by order of December 14, 1967 the respondent court denied the motion; by order of December 19, 1967 it granted Villalon's motion to proceed with canvass without first requiring the Board of Inspectors to fill the omissions complained of under Section 162 of the Revised Election Code.

While the certiorari petition was pending, the ballot box for Precinct No. 20 was opened on January 17, 1968 in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon before the presiding judge and the lawyers and representatives of both parties. When the election returns were retrieved on January 19, 1968, comparison with the Municipal Treasurer's copy and the Commission on Elections copy showed uniformity of votes, to wit, five hundred twenty-five (525) votes, in words and figures, for Villalon. Petitioner later admitted in his February 17, 1968 memorandum that the respondent court had reconsidered and authorized the opening for retrieval, rendering the propriety of the earlier order academic and moot. Respondent thereafter alleged that the principal petition for judicial recount below had itself been dismissed, a claim petitioner never denied by pleading.

• Tampering and Retrieval: Petitioner argued that the Precinct No. 20 returns were tampered with, altered and falsified, as shown by the 525-vote entry for Villalon in the Commission on Elections copy against the 2,525-vote entry in the Municipal Treasurer's copy, warranting permission for the Municipal Treasurer to open the ballot box solely to retrieve the ballot-box copy therein.
• Mandatory Omissions: Petitioner maintained that the unfilled spaces on Page 1 of the Commission on Elections and Municipal Treasurer copies concerning registered voters, actual voters, ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots and others were substantial, material and requisite omissions under Section 162 of the Revised Election Code that the Board of Inspectors must first complete before the Municipal Board of Canvassers could proceed to canvass, not mere clerical omissions to be disregarded.
• Continued Justiciability: Petitioner conceded that the retrieval issue had become academic and moot after reconsideration and opening, but opposed dismissal because the correctness of allowing canvass without completion of the omitted information remained to be resolved.

• Mootness by Retrieval and Uniformity: Respondent Villalon argued that the issues had been rendered moot and academic because on January 17, 1968 the ballot box was opened before the respondent judge and both parties' lawyers and representatives, and on January 19, 1968 the retrieved returns upon comparison with the Municipal Treasurer's and Commission on Elections copies uniformly showed 525 votes in words and figures for Villalon.
• No Need for Completion: Respondent maintained that in a petition for judicial recount there was no necessity for directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to observe and comply with Section 150 of the Revised Election Code as to the alleged omissions.
• Dismissal of Principal Case: Respondent argued that the main petition for judicial recount in the court below had already been dismissed, so that as a legal and logical consequence the ancillary relief to require observance of the Commission on Elections resolution and Section 162 must also be denied, the petition being for utter lack of merit.

• Mootness: Whether the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and mandamus had been rendered moot and academic by the subsequent opening of the ballot box, retrieval and comparison of returns, and dismissal of the principal recount petition below.
• Completion of Returns: Whether the respondent court correctly treated the omitted information on registered voters, actual voters, ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots and others as mere clerical omissions that could be disregarded, rather than substantial, material and requisite omissions that the Board of Inspectors must complete under Section 162 before canvass.

• Mootness: Yes. Dismissal was warranted, the acts sought to be enjoined having already been done and the principal recount petition below having been dismissed without denial by petitioner.
• Completion of Returns: No separate relief granted. The ancillary plea for completion under Section 162 fell with the dismissed principal petition, though mandatory election-code requirements must be obeyed without judicial distinction between material and immaterial omissions.

• Mootness: Supervisory intervention was no longer called for because the ballot box had in fact been opened and the ballot-box copy retrieved and compared, showing uniformity at 525 votes for Villalon, and because the motion for reconsideration alleged definitive dismissal of the principal judicial-recount petition below, which petitioner never denied by pleading. With the act sought to be enjoined already performed and the main case gone, the controversy no longer justified exercise of certiorari and mandamus powers.
• Completion of Returns: Since the principal petition for judicial recount had been dismissed, the ancillary request to compel compliance with the Commission on Elections resolution requiring observance of Section 162 could not survive independently. Nonetheless, disposition of matters under Sections 163 or 168 was required to be prompt and accurate to avoid delaying proclamation and to elicit the true result, and where Sections 142 and 162 were couched in mandatory form, obedience was peremptory with no room for courts to distinguish material from immaterial omissions.

• Mootness barring supervisory relief — A case becomes moot and academic when the act sought to be enjoined or set aside has already been done or the principal proceeding on which ancillary relief depends has been terminated, leaving no actual controversy for certiorari or mandamus. Applied here where the ballot box had been opened, the returns retrieved and compared, and the underlying recount petition dismissed without contradiction.
• Mandatory compliance with election-code formalities — Where provisions of the Election Code are couched in mandatory form, courts lack power to distinguish between material and immaterial omissions; what the law decrees must be obeyed. Invoked with reference to Sections 142 and 162 to admonish inferior tribunals, even though no separate relief was granted after mootness.
• Prompt disposition in election cases under Sections 163 or 168 — A court exercising limited jurisdiction over judicial recounts must dispose of the matter with promptness and dispatch so proclamation is not unduly delayed, and should not hesitate to grant pleas that would elicit the true and honest election result and enable accurate canvass in the shortest time.

• "There is therefore no occasion for the coming into play of the supervisory power of this Court over inferior tribunals, the matter having been rendered moot and academic." — States the ratio for dismissal, grounding the refusal of certiorari and mandamus on supervening mootness.
• "It is not amiss to state, however, that respondent court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction under either Section 163 or 168 of the Revised Election Code as the case may be, should dispose of the matter with promptness and dispatch." — Defines the expected conduct of trial courts in recount cases to avoid delaying proclamation.
• "Inferior tribunals must likewise hear in mind that where the provisions of the Election Code as in Section 142 and 162 are couched in mandatory form, the power does not exist for any court to distinguish between material and immaterial omissions." — Articulates the mandatory-compliance rule for election returns.
• "What the law decrees must be obeyed. It is as peremptory and as simple as that." — Provides the canonical closing formulation of the mandatory-obedience principle.

• Section 162, Revised Election Code — Requires accomplishment of specified data in election returns, including registered voters, actual voters, and ballots found in the compartment for valid ballots; petitioner invoked it to compel completion before canvass, respondent deemed the omissions clerical, and the Resolution treated the plea as ancillary to the dismissed recount case while stressing mandatory obedience.
• Sections 163 or 168, Revised Election Code — Confer limited jurisdiction for judicial recounts; cited to direct prompt and expeditious disposition so that proclamation would not be unduly delayed and the true result elicited.
• Sections 142 and 162, Revised Election Code — Cited as examples of provisions couched in mandatory form that inferior tribunals must enforce without distinguishing material from immaterial omissions.
• Section 150, Revised Election Code — Invoked by respondent Villalon to argue no necessity to direct the Municipal Board of Canvassers to observe and comply therewith as to the alleged omissions in a judicial-recount petition.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.