Senador vs. People

In offenses against property, an erroneous designation of the offended party in the information is immaterial and does not violate the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, rather than generic.

Rita Jaime and her daughter-in-law Cynthia Jaime were partners in a jewelry business. Sometime in September 2000, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador obtained jewelry from them on a consignment basis under a Trust Receipt Agreement, obligating her to remit the proceeds or return the unsold items within fifteen days. When Senador failed to comply, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed against her.

Rita Jaime and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime, were partners in a jewelry business. In the first week of September 2000, Ramoncita O. Senador visited Rita at her home in Cebu City to view jewelry for sale. On September 10, 2000, Cynthia delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth PhP 705,685.00. Senador signed a Trust Receipt Agreement undertaking to sell the jewelry on commission and to remit the proceeds or return the unsold items within fifteen days. Senador failed to turn over the proceeds or return the unsold jewelry within the stipulated period.

Rita sent a demand letter on October 4, 2001, but Senador ignored it, prompting Rita to file a criminal complaint for estafa. During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered a Keppel Bank check for PhP 705,685.00 as settlement, but the check was dishonored because it was drawn against a closed account. Senador did not testify and instead relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven during trial differed. The Information named Cynthia Jaime as the offended party, but Rita Jaime was the one who made the demand and filed the complaint, and Cynthia was never presented as a witness. Senador argued this variance violated her constitutional right to be informed of the accusation. The trial court found Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt, a finding upheld by the appellate court.

• Right to be Informed: Petitioner argued that the variance between the offended party named in the Information (Cynthia Jaime) and the private complainant who testified and filed the case (Rita Jaime) violated her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, warranting her acquittal.

• Variance in Offended Party's Designation: Whether an error in the designation of the offended party in the Information for estafa violates the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, entitling her to an acquittal.

• Variance in Offended Party's Designation: No. An erroneous designation of the offended party in a crime against property is a mere formal defect and is immaterial when the subject matter of the offense is sufficiently described and identifiable.

• Variance in Offended Party's Designation: A variance between the allegations in the information and the prosecution's evidence does not automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal, especially if the variance relates to the designation of the offended party. In crimes against property, the proper designation of the offended party's name is not indispensable; what is necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged. Rule 110, Section 12 of the Rules of Court mandates correction of the information, not dismissal, if the true name of the offended party is later disclosed. The materiality of the error depends on whether the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described. If the subject matter is generic (like money), the identity of the offended party is essential to identify the offense, making an error fatal (as in Lahoylahoy and Uba). However, if the subject matter is specific and identifiable (like a warrant or a check), the error is immaterial (as in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze). Here, the subject matter was "various kinds of jewelry" specifically enumerated in the Trust Receipt Agreement, making the offense sufficiently identified regardless of the offended party's name. Furthermore, Senador's offer to pay via a dishonored check served as an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27.

• Variance Doctrine in Crimes Against Property — In offenses against property, an erroneous designation of the offended party is immaterial and does not violate the right to be informed of the accusation if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable. If the subject matter is generic and cannot be identified without reference to the owner, the erroneous designation is fatal and warrants acquittal.
• Offer of Compromise as Implied Admission — Under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases (except quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised) may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

• "in offenses against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, establishing the test for when a variance in the offended party's name is fatal versus immaterial.
• "The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is immaterial and did not violate Senador’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her." — This applies the established doctrine to the facts of the case, concluding that the specifically described jewelry sufficiently identified the offense.

• People vs. Uba — Distinguished. The Court held it was inapplicable because Uba involved oral defamation, a crime against honor where the identity of the offended party is a material element, unlike estafa which is a crime against property.
• United States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog — Distinguished. The Court noted that Lahoylahoy supports the doctrine that if the subject matter is generic (money), an erroneous designation of the offended party is material. However, this case involved specific jewelry, so Lahoylahoy does not apply.
• United States vs. Kepner — Followed. The Court applied Kepner's ruling that an erroneous designation of the person injured is immaterial when the subject matter (a warrant) is sufficiently identified.
• Sayson vs. People — Followed. The Court applied the principle that an erroneous allegation as to the person injured is immaterial when the subject matter (a check) is specific and sufficiently identified.
• Ricarze vs. Court of Appeals — Followed. Reiterated the doctrine that an erroneous designation is immaterial because the subject matter (a check) was sufficiently identified.

• Article 315, par. 1(b), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa by misappropriating or converting money, goods, or personal property received in trust or on commission. Senador was charged and convicted under this provision.
• Rule 110, Section 12, Rules of Court — Governs the name of the offended party in a complaint or information. It provides that in offenses against property, if the true name of the offended party is later disclosed, the court must cause it to be inserted, rather than dismissing the case.
• Rule 130, Section 27, Rules of Court — States that an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Senador's tender of a dishonored check was considered an implied admission.
• Article 2229, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The Court used this to justify reducing the exemplary damages award.

Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad, Jose Catral Mendoza, Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen.