Segovia vs. Noel

A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. The age limit of sixty-five years for justices of the peace under Act No. 3107 applies only to those appointed after the law took effect, not to those already holding office, because the law contained no express or implied indication of retroactive application.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907, under Act No. 1450, which provided for a two-year term. Shortly after his appointment, Act No. 1627 amended the law to provide that justices of the peace "shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." This tenure provision was later codified in section 206 of the Administrative Code. Act No. 3107 amended section 203 of the Administrative Code by adding a proviso that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace "shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years," while leaving section 206 on tenure during good behavior unchanged.

Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907, and continuously occupied the position until he passed the age of sixty-five. On July 1, 1924, the Secretary of Justice ordered him to vacate the office. Since that date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace, acted as justice of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.

Desirous of avoiding a public scandal and of opposing physical resistance to the occupancy of the office by the auxiliary justice, Segovia instituted friendly quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to inquire into Noel's right to occupy the office, to oust Noel therefrom, and to procure Segovia's reinstatement. Noel interposed a demurrer on the ground that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because Act No. 3107 was constitutional and because Segovia, being sixty-five years old, had automatically ceased to be justice of the peace. On the issue thus framed and on stipulated facts, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance overruling the demurrer and in favor of petitioner and against respondent.

The original provision pertinent to the appointment and term of office of justices of the peace was section 67 of Act No. 136, which provided that justices of the peace shall hold office during the pleasure of the Commission. Act No. 1450, in force when Segovia was originally appointed, amended section 67 by making the term of office two years from the first Monday in January nearest the date of appointment. Shortly after Segovia's appointment, Act No. 1627 provided that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue." Later amended by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2617, the law was ultimately codified in sections 203 and 206 of the Administrative Code. Section 1 of Act No. 3107 amended section 203 by adding a proviso that "justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years," while section 206, entitled "Tenure of office," was left unchanged.

• Abandonment of Unconstitutionality Claim: Petitioner abandoned the untenable position, assumed in one portion of his complaint, that section 1 of Act No. 3107 is unconstitutional in that it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner to an office.

• Applicability of Age Limit: Respondent argued that the trial judge erred in declaring that the limitation regarding the age of justices of the peace provided by section 1 of Act No. 3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law went into effect.
• Automatic Cessation of Office: Respondent contended that Segovia, being sixty-five years old, had automatically ceased to be justice of the peace under Act No. 3107.

• Retroactivity of Act No. 3107: Whether that portion of Act No. 3107 providing that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years should be given retroactive or prospective effect.

• Retroactivity of Act No. 3107: No. The proviso added to section 203 of the Administrative Code by section 1 of Act No. 3107 should be given prospective effect only and is not applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed without costs.

• Retroactivity of Act No. 3107: The Court applied the sound canon of statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court, the Court stated that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. The Court cited Article 3 of the Civil Code: "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided."

The Court noted that the same rule is followed by the courts with reference to public offices, citing the New York decision in People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green, which held that "though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated."

The Court distinguished the case from Chanco vs. Imperial, where the law under consideration not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years, but further provided "that the present judges of Courts of First Instance ... vacate their positions on the taking effect of this Act: and the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of Courts of First Instance." In that case, the intention of the Legislature to vacate the office was clearly expressed. Here, it was not expressed at all.

The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section 203 of the Administrative Code gives no indication of retroactive effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code which permits justices of the peace to hold office during good behavior. In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office.

• Prospective Application of Statutes — A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. The Court applied this canon to hold that Act No. 3107's age limit of sixty-five years for justices of the peace applies only to those appointed after the law took effect, not to those already in office.

• Public Office as Not Property or Contract — A public office cannot be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and a public office is not a contract. The Court noted this fundamental principle in rejecting the petitioner's abandoned claim that the law impaired his contractual right to an office.

• Clear Statement Rule for Removal from Office — Though there is no vested right in an office which may not be disturbed by legislation, the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office; if that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated. The Court applied this principle to find that Act No. 3107 did not clearly express an intent to remove existing justices of the peace.

• "A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication." — This is the controlling canon of statutory construction that forms the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing the presumption of prospectivity that the Court applied to Act No. 3107.

• "No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so. As our Civil Code has it in article 3, 'Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided.'" — This passage reinforces the presumption against retroactivity and anchors the ruling in the Civil Code provision, making the point that courts will not infer retroactive application absent clear legislative direction.

• "In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful public servants out of office." — This states the Court's conclusion on the absence of legislative intent to apply Act No. 3107 retroactively, emphasizing the policy concern against removing incumbent public servants without clear statutory authority.

• Chanco vs. Imperial, 34 Phil. 329 (1916) — Distinguished. In that case, the law not only provided that Judges of First Instance shall serve until age sixty-five but expressly vacated the positions of present judges and required new appointments, clearly expressing legislative intent to apply the law to incumbents. Here, no such intent was expressed.

• People ex rel. Ryan vs. Green, 58 N.Y. 295 (1874) — Followed. Cited for the principle that though there is no vested right in an office, the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office, and if that right is to be taken away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated.

• Farrel vs. Pingree, 5 Utah 443 (1888) — Cited in support of the canon that statutes are presumed prospective unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest.

• Greer vs. City of Asheville, 114 N.C. 495 (1894) — Cited in support of the canon against retroactive application of statutes.

• United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. vs. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306 (1907) — Cited in support of the canon that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them.

• Montilla vs. Agustinian Corporation, 24 Phil. 220 (1913) — Cited in support of the canon against retroactive application of statutes.

• In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil. 23 (1918) — Cited in support of the canon against retroactive application of statutes.

• People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb. 198 — Cited for the principle that a new constitutional provision as to the advanced age which should prevent the incumbents of certain judicial offices from retaining them was held prospective; it did not apply to persons in office at the time of its taking effect.

• Section 1, Act No. 3107 — Amended section 203 of the Administrative Code by adding a proviso that "justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." The Court held this proviso applies prospectively only.

• Section 203, Administrative Code — Provided for the appointment of justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace by the Governor-General. The Court noted that Act No. 3107 merely tacked a proviso onto this section.

• Section 206, Administrative Code — Entitled "Tenure of office," providing that "a justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be lawfully abolished or merged in the jurisdiction of some other justice." The Court noted this section was left unchanged by Act No. 3107, indicating no intent to disturb existing tenures.

• Article 3, Civil Code — Provides that "Law shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." The Court cited this provision in support of the presumption against retroactive application of statutes.

• Section 67, Act No. 136 — The original provision pertinent to the appointment and term of office of justices of the peace, providing that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Commission.

• Act No. 1450 — Amended section 67 of the Judiciary Law by making the term of office of justices and auxiliary justices of the peace two years from the first Monday in January nearest the date of appointment; in force when Segovia was originally appointed.

• Act No. 1627 — Provided that "all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall hold office during good behavior and those now in office shall so continue," establishing tenure during good behavior.

Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred. Johnson, J., concurred in the result.