Secretary of Justice vs. Catolico

Administrative cases pending against a judge are dismissed as moot and academic when the President has accepted the judge's resignation without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits, consistent with the Court's established policy regarding similar situations.

Judge Alfredo Catolico presided over Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Cavite. Prior to his assignment in Cavite, he had served as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental and of Ilocos Norte. The administrative complaints arose from conduct spanning multiple jurisdictions and years, and were precipitated in part by the Supreme Court's own prior decisions in People vs. Catolico, Queto vs. Catolico, and Barrera vs. Barrera, in each of which the Court had directed that the judge's conduct be brought to the attention of the Secretary of Justice for appropriate administrative action. The Secretary of Justice filed the first three charges; Fermina Olaes, widow of a homicide victim, filed the fourth.

Judge Alfredo Catolico of Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Cavite faced four administrative charges, the first three filed by the Secretary of Justice and the fourth by Fermina Olaes. The charges arose from conduct spanning his service in different jurisdictions, including Misamis Occidental and Cavite, and were precipitated in part by prior Supreme Court decisions that had directed his conduct be brought to the Secretary of Justice's attention.

The first charge stemmed from the judge's actuations in October 1965, when he was acting as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. In over fifty naturalization cases, he declared motu proprio, without any petition from the Republic of the Philippines, that the oath-taking of the petitioners was null and void. Without priorly hearing the petitioner concerned, he delivered in open court a lengthy dissertation reflecting on the honesty and integrity of provincial and city fiscals appearing in naturalization cases, and singled out Chua Tuan, referring to him as a Chinese who had become a multi-millionaire through over-shipments of copra and who was "untouchable because he could buy his way out in Malacañang, in the Army, in the Foreign Affairs, in the Immigration, in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the Courts of Justice," of which the judge said he would take judicial notice. He further castigated Chua Tuan with epithets including "balasuba," ingrate, "hambug," animalistic, a danger and a disgrace to the community, and a dishonor to the Filipino people.

The second and third charges related to the judge's insistence that he lacked jurisdiction to continue trying any case, civil or criminal, that had not been tried for more than thirty days since the previous hearing, for which reason he ordered their dismissal. He refused to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court to authorize continuation of proceedings, and also refused to recognize the personality of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to transmit pertinent resolutions of the Court in the usual form. The Court had previously addressed these actuations in Queto vs. Catolico, Barrera vs. Barrera, and People vs. Catolico, in which the judge was admonished, reprimanded, and held in contempt, respectively.

The fourth charge was filed by Fermina Olaes, widow of the victim in a homicide case. The arraignment was held on October 3, 1973, and hearings were set on multiple dates from October 15, 1973 through January 4, 1974. The decision acquitting the accused was promulgated on January 10, 1974, two days before the judge reached the age of seventy years. Olaes charged that the judge hurried the trial, in preference to other cases in his sala that deserved earlier attention, with the intention of finishing and deciding the case favorably to the accused before retirement. During the hearing of December 26, 1973, the judge was so carried away by his emotions that for two hours he personally asked questions of the prosecution's witness, bullying, ridiculing, frightening, threatening, and humiliating the witness, including banging the table with his fist. He also displayed a propensity to ridicule the witness, asking whether the witness had been examined by a veterinarian. His order of December 26, 1973 reflected what the complainant characterized as a "wrapped-up decision" of acquittal.

In his answers, the judge claimed all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and the best interests of justice requiring speedy disposition of cases. Regarding the naturalization cases, he maintained that Supreme Court rulings sustained his view that the petitioners had not validly become Filipino citizens because they had taken their oaths prematurely, and since this was evident in the record, he could act motu proprio. He denied having improperly castigated Chua Tuan. Regarding the fourth charge, he maintained he had nothing to do with the preparation of the calendar and denied any bias or prejudice. As a general defense, he pleaded that "if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than of the heart."

The investigation of the fourth charge, referred to Justice Buenaventura de la Fuente of the Court of Appeals, yielded a report submitted on August 1, 1975, finding that the actuations complained of were not due to any improper or personal motive but were the result of the judge's eccentricities and odd ways, not categorizable as serious misconduct and deserving no heavier sanction than admonition. While the Court awaited the report, the judge informed the Court by letter dated April 17, 1975, that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under retirement and other existing laws.

• First Charge — Naturalization Cases: The Secretary of Justice charged that the judge declared motu proprio, without any corresponding petition of the Republic of the Philippines, that the oath-taking of over fifty naturalized citizens was null and void, and that he delivered in open court a lengthy dissertation reflecting on the honesty and integrity of provincial and city fiscals, singling out Chua Tuan with derogatory epithets, all without priorly hearing the petitioner concerned.
• Second and Third Charges — Dismissal of Cases and Disrespect to the Court: The Secretary of Justice charged that the judge insisted he lacked jurisdiction to continue trying cases not tried for more than thirty days since the previous hearing, ordered their dismissal, and refused to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court to authorize continuation of proceedings, as well as the personality of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to transmit pertinent resolutions.
• Fourth Charge — Hurried Trial and Intemperate Conduct: Fermina Olaes charged that the judge hurried the homicide trial in preference to other cases deserving earlier attention, with the intention of finishing and deciding the case favorably to the accused before retirement, and that during the December 26, 1973 hearing, he bullied, ridiculed, frightened, threatened, and humiliated the prosecution's witness for two hours, manifesting a "wrapped-up decision" of acquittal.

• Good Faith and Compliance with Law: Respondent claimed that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice requiring speedy and expeditious disposition of cases.
• Naturalization Cases: Respondent averred that Supreme Court rulings sustained his view that the petitioners had not validly become Filipino citizens because they had taken their oaths of allegiance prematurely, and since this fact was evident in the record, he could act motu proprio to require them to validate their oaths. He denied having improperly castigated Chua Tuan.
• Fourth Charge — No Bias or Prejudice: Respondent maintained he had nothing to do with the preparation of the calendar and denied having been actuated by any bias or prejudice either in his questioning of witnesses or in acquitting the accused.
• General Defense — Error of the Mind: Respondent pleaded that "if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than of the heart."

• Mootness: Whether the administrative complaints should be dismissed as moot and academic in light of the President's acceptance of respondent judge's resignation without prejudice to retirement benefits.
• Serious Misconduct and Gross Disregard of Law: Whether respondent judge's actuations in the naturalization cases, in the dismissal of cases, in his disrespect toward the Supreme Court, and in the hurried trial and acquittal of the homicide case constituted serious misconduct and gross disregard of law warranting disciplinary action.

• Mootness: Yes. The cases were dismissed as moot and academic, the President having accepted respondent's resignation effective January 11, 1974, without prejudice to retirement benefits, in line with established policy regarding similar situations.
• Serious Misconduct and Gross Disregard of Law: The Court had already admonished, reprimanded, and held respondent in contempt in prior decisions addressing the first three charges. The investigation of the fourth charge found the actuations were not due to improper or personal motive but to eccentricities, deserving no heavier sanction than admonition. However, the cases were rendered moot before any final disciplinary sanction was imposed.

• Mootness: The established policy of the Court is that when the President has accepted the resignation of an official without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits, administrative cases pending against the official concerned are rendered moot and academic. Respondent informed the Court by letter dated April 17, 1975, that President Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, "without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the retirement and other existing laws." Accordingly, the Court resolved to dismiss the cases, there being no live controversy to adjudicate.

• Serious Misconduct and Gross Disregard of Law: The Court had already addressed the first three charges in prior decisions. In Queto vs. Catolico, Chief Justice Makalintal admonished that judges should not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and rules, lest there be confusion in the administration of justice and oppressive disregard of due process. In Barrera vs. Barrera, Justice Fernando reprimanded respondent for his adamant refusal to apply the Court's contrary ruling and for recklessly alleging that the Clerk of the Court exercised authority appertaining to the Chief Justice, calling it "gross disrespect" and speaking "with all the valor of ignorance." In People vs. Catolico, Justice Teehankee noted respondent's capricious dismissal of cases based on his personal interpretation of Rule 22, Section 3, notwithstanding his awareness of the Court's contrary ruling, and his continued misrepresentation that it was the Clerk rather than the Chief Justice who authorized continuation of proceedings. As to the fourth charge, the investigator's report found the actuations were not due to improper or personal motive but to the judge's eccentricities, not categorizable as serious misconduct and deserving no heavier sanction than admonition. The mootness of the cases, however, precluded the imposition of any further sanction.

• Policy on Mootness of Administrative Cases Upon Acceptance of Resignation — When the President accepts the resignation of a judge or official without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits, pending administrative cases against that official are rendered moot and academic and are dismissed in line with established policy. The Court applied this doctrine by dismissing the administrative complaints against Judge Catolico upon learning that President Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, without prejudice to retirement benefits.

• Duty of Lower Court Judges to Apply Supreme Court Rulings — Judges of lower courts must dispose of cases in accordance with the final authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. A judge's personal conviction that a doctrine of the Court fails to meet his approval does not justify disregard of that doctrine. The Court had repeatedly reminded respondent of this duty in Queto vs. Catolico, Barrera vs. Barrera, and People vs. Catolico.

• Authority of the Clerk of Court to Transmit Resolutions — Minute resolutions, summons, and processes of the Supreme Court, as well as official actions of the Chief Justice, upon being duly adopted and recorded, are transmitted to interested parties by and upon the signature of the Clerk of Court, who is duly authorized to do so. The situation is analogous to administrative decisions signed by the Executive Secretary "by authority of the President." It would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the Court if all such papers could be released only upon their own signatures.

• "Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure. If they arrogate unto themselves the authority allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence but confusion in the administration of justice and, in many instances, oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process." — Chief Justice Makalintal's admonition in Queto vs. Catolico, quoted in the decision to underscore the principle that judges must observe the boundaries of their authority.

• "He did speak with all the valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from such an indefensible stand in the face of his being informed that what the Clerk did was solely in accordance with what was previously decided by this Court, which certainly will not tolerate, anybody else, much less a subordinate, to speak and act for itself. This gross disrespect shown to this Court has no justification." — Justice Fernando's reprimand in Barrera vs. Barrera, quoted to illustrate the gravity of respondent's disrespect toward the Supreme Court and its Clerk.

• "Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS above-entitled cases." — The dispositive rationale, articulating the controlling policy that acceptance of resignation without prejudice to retirement benefits moots pending administrative cases.

• People vs. Judge Alfredo Catolico, 38 SCRA 389 — Prior Supreme Court decision in which the Court noted respondent judge's capricious dismissal of cases based on his personal interpretation of Rule 22, Section 3, and directed that his conduct be brought to the Secretary of Justice for administrative action. The decision was the immediate precipitant of the first three charges.
• Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 — Prior Supreme Court decision in which Chief Justice Makalintal admonished respondent for overstepping the limitations of his power, cited in the present decision to show that the Court had already addressed the first charge.
• Barrera vs. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98 — Prior Supreme Court decision in which Justice Fernando reprimanded respondent and held him in contempt for recklessly alleging that the Clerk of the Court exercised authority appertaining to the Chief Justice, cited to show the Court had already addressed the second and third charges.
• Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño, 21 SCRA 895 — Cited by analogy to support the proposition that administrative decisions signed by the Executive Secretary "by authority of the President" are given full faith and credit as decisions of the President, just as the Clerk of Court signs resolutions by authority of the Chief Justice.

• Rule 22, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural rule governing the period within which a trial judge must decide a case after the first day of trial on the merits. Respondent judge interpreted this provision to mean that upon the lapse of three months from the first day of trial, the trial judge lost control of the case and could only dismiss it, a interpretation the Supreme Court had rejected in prior rulings.

Makalintal, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concurred. Fernando, J., concurred in the result.