Secretary of Health vs. Court of Appeals

Jurisdiction over an administrative case is determined by the statute in force at the time the action is commenced; once acquired, it continues until final disposition unless the law provides otherwise. Accordingly, the Secretary of Health retained jurisdiction over the administrative case against Fe Sibbaluca, which was commenced in 1991, despite the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 on January 1, 1992. Certiorari and prohibition may also be allowed, despite the availability or loss of appeal, where the lower court’s orders were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Fe Sibbaluca served as Administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan, a position within the administrative structure of the Department of Health. Before January 1, 1992, the disciplinary authority of the Secretary of Health over department personnel was governed by the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119. The Local Government Code of 1991, by its Sec. 536, was to take effect on January 1, 1992, and the RTC relied on Sec. 102 thereof to hold that the provincial health board headed by the governor had authority over matters of grievance and personal discipline. The dispute concerned which statutory regime governed an administrative case already commenced in 1991.

Fe Sibbaluca was the Administrative Officer III of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan. An administrative complaint was filed against her for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and other charges, docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 of the Department of Health, Manila. As a consequence of the administrative case, she was placed under preventive suspension for ninety days per order dated December 17, 1991 issued by the Secretary of Health.

Fe Sibbaluca sought the lifting of her suspension through a motion dated January 8, 1992. Pending resolution of that motion, she instituted an action for prohibition, mandamus, and injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 4379 and 4397. She sought the nullification of the order of preventive suspension and of the entire administrative proceedings. Her action was anchored on her contention that when the New Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his disciplinary power and authority over her, considering that such power to discipline the personnel of the Provincial Health Office was now vested in the Provincial Governor.

Finding merit in the ancillary remedy sought by private respondent, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order on January 15, 1992, restraining the Secretary of Health and his representatives from enforcing the preventive suspension order and from conducting further proceedings in the administrative case against Fe Sibbaluca. On February 3, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed an omnibus motion to dismiss private respondent’s action and to quash the temporary restraining order, with opposition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, contending among other things that private respondent had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the New Local Government Code did not divest the Secretary of Health of his disciplinary jurisdiction over her. During the hearing of the omnibus motion and the application for a preliminary injunction, counsel for the Secretary of Health manifested that they were not participating in the proceedings. Private respondent then presented her testimony and was cross-examined by counsel for the other two petitioners, Dr. Orlando Pua, the Director of the Regional Health Office No. 2, and Dr. Jose Cabrera, the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Health Office of Cagayan. After the hearing, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda.

In a decision dated March 25, 1992, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondent and against petitioners. The RTC stated that ordinarily it should not interfere with the prosecution of an administrative complaint based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum shopping. It nevertheless held that, with the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992, the provincial health board headed by the governor was empowered to create committees which shall advise local health agencies on matters of grievance and complaints, personal discipline, and that the Secretary of Health ceased to have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and consequently the power and authority to issue the order of suspension under Sec. 102 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The RTC restrained petitioners from enforcing the order of preventive suspension dated December 17, 1991 until the administrative case is investigated and resolved by the provincial health board, and dismissed the contempt charge for insufficiency of evidence.

Private respondent, in a motion dated April 3, 1992, sought clarification of the decision and also moved for its execution. Acting on the motion, the RTC issued an order dated April 14, 1992, ordering the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the March 25, 1992 decision. The order further stated that, considering the finding that the Secretary of Health ceased to have jurisdiction to discipline the petitioner, necessarily the order of suspension and all other orders emanating thereafter are null and void and of no further effect. Copies of the March 25, 1992 decision and the April 14, 1992 order were received by petitioners on April 10, 1992 and April 15, 1992, respectively.

On April 27, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 25, 1992 decision and the April 14, 1992 order, insisting that the Secretary of Health has jurisdiction over the administrative case. Petitioners also contended that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to nullify all orders issued by the Secretary of Health, they being of equal rank. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated May 28, 1992. On the same date, the Secretary of Health filed a Notice of Appeal with the court a quo, giving notice that he was appealing the March 25, 1992 decision to the Court of Appeals on both questions of fact and law. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Health filed another motion to stay the execution of the assailed decision. Both the notice of appeal and the motion to stay execution were denied upon the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time and that the assailed decision had already become final and executory. The denial was contained in a decision dated June 26, 1992 which convicted co-petitioner Dr. Jose Cabrera of indirect contempt of court for refusing to comply with the writ of execution.

• Certiorari and Prohibition: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not giving due course to their special civil action for certiorari and prohibition and in not touching on the merits of the petition.
• Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Health: Petitioners maintained that the RTC erred in finding that the Secretary of Health had ceased to have administrative jurisdiction over Fe Sibbaluca by virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991 effective January 1, 1992.
• Lower Court’s Jurisdiction: Petitioners contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction to nullify all orders issued by the Secretary of Health, they being of equal rank.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: In the lower court, the Secretary of Health contended that private respondent had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
• Effect of the Local Government Code: The Secretary of Health contended that the New Local Government Code did not divest him of disciplinary jurisdiction over private respondent.

• Loss of Disciplinary Jurisdiction: Fe Sibbaluca contended that when the New Local Government Code took effect on January 1, 1992, the Secretary of Health had lost his disciplinary power and authority over her, considering that such power to discipline the personnel of the Provincial Health Office was now vested in the Provincial Governor.

• Certiorari and Prohibition: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that appeal was the plain and adequate remedy.
• Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Health: Whether the Secretary of Health retained administrative jurisdiction over Fe Sibbaluca despite the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 on January 1, 1992.
• RTC’s Injunctive Orders: Whether the RTC properly enjoined the Secretary of Health’s preventive suspension order and declared all orders emanating thereafter null and void.

• Certiorari and Prohibition: Yes. Although certiorari generally does not lie as a substitute for a lost appeal, it is available when the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, and the circumstances warranted giving due course to the petition.
• Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Health: Yes. Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action; the administrative case began in 1991 under the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119, and the Secretary’s jurisdiction continued until final disposition unless the law provided otherwise.
• RTC’s Injunctive Orders: No. Because the Secretary retained jurisdiction, the RTC’s decision and orders restraining the suspension and nullifying the Secretary’s orders were annulled and set aside.

• Certiorari and Prohibition: The general rule is that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not lie as a substitute for an available or lost appeal, as held in Sy vs. Romero. Nevertheless, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, the Supreme Court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction, as held in PNB vs. Florendo. In this case, the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was not filed as a mere substitute for appeal. The lower court issued a writ of execution of its March 25, 1992 decision; the motion to stay execution filed by the Secretary of Health was denied; the notice of appeal filed by the Secretary was also denied; and in the same order, Dr. Jose Cabrera was found guilty of indirect contempt and a penalty of three months imprisonment was imposed upon him for allegedly refusing to comply with the writ of execution. Most importantly, petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court in enjoining the order issued by the Secretary of Health preventively suspending and subsequently dismissing private respondent and declaring that the said department does not have jurisdiction to issue the said order. The facts and circumstances thus warranted the filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing it.
• Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Health: The resolution of the main issue called for the determination of the date of effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991. Sec. 536 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the Code shall take effect on January 1, 1992, unless otherwise provided, after its complete publication in at least one newspaper of general circulation. It is explicit in the law that the Code shall take effect on January 1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction, as held in Allarde vs. Commission on Audit. Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, as held in Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation vs. NLRC. In this case, Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before the petitioner department in 1991. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was issued by the Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the time of the commencement of the administrative action, the operative laws were the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119. Under those laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction, and supervision over his subordinates, which include private respondent. Consequently, since jurisdiction had been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continues until the final disposition of the administrative case. The Court already ruled in a number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary, as held in Bueno Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Enage. Private respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice as a shield to prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions of executive against erring public servants.
• RTC’s Injunctive Orders: The RTC relied on the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 on January 1, 1992 and on Sec. 102 thereof to hold that the Secretary of Health ceased to have jurisdiction over private respondent and to declare the suspension order and all orders emanating thereafter null and void. Since the administrative case was commenced in 1991 and the Secretary of Health had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent before the Code’s effectivity, the Local Government Code did not divest that jurisdiction. The RTC’s decision and orders restraining the enforcement of the preventive suspension and nullifying the Secretary’s orders were therefore annulled and set aside.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal; Exception for Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction — The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie as a substitute for an available or lost appeal. However, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, certiorari may be allowed when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition as a mere substitute for appeal, because petitioners challenged the RTC’s jurisdiction and other circumstances warranted giving due course to the petition.
• Jurisdiction Determined by Statute in Force at Commencement of Action — Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the administrative action against Fe Sibbaluca commenced in 1991 under the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119, so the Secretary of Health had jurisdiction over her person.
• Continuity of Jurisdiction Until Final Disposition — Once jurisdiction is acquired by a court over a case, it remains with it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the Secretary of Health’s jurisdiction, acquired before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, continued until the final disposition of the administrative case.
• Effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991 — Sec. 536 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the Code shall take effect on January 1, 1992, unless otherwise provided, after its complete publication in at least one newspaper of general circulation. Because the words of the statute are not obscure or ambiguous, there is no room for construction. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the Code did not divest the Secretary of Health of jurisdiction over an administrative case already commenced in 1991.
• Civil Servants Cannot Use Courts as Shield — A civil servant cannot use the courts of justice as a shield to prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions of the executive against erring public servants. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that private respondent’s action could not bar the Secretary of Health’s administrative case and preventive suspension order.

• "In a long line of cases we held that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not lie as a substitute for an available or lost appeal (Sy v. Romero, 214 SCRA 187 [1992]). Nevertheless, even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, this Court has allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (PNB v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992])." — States the general rule and the exception on certiorari as a substitute for appeal, which the Court applied to allow the petition despite the lost appeal.
• "It is explicit in the abovestated law that the local Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on January 1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993])." — States the effectivity of the Local Government Code and the statutory construction principle used to reject the RTC’s contrary interpretation.
• "Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continues until the final disposition of the administrative case." — States the ratio decidendi on the continuity of the Secretary of Health’s jurisdiction.
• "At this juncture, it bears stressing that private respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice as a shield to prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions of executive against erring public servants." — States the policy against using judicial remedies to block administrative sanctions against erring public servants.

• Sy vs. Romero, 214 SCRA 187 [1992] — Cited for the rule that the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie as a substitute for an available or lost appeal.
• PNB vs. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992] — Cited for the exception that certiorari may be allowed even when appeal is available and proper when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction.
• Allarde vs. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993] — Cited for the principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction.
• Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation vs. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993] — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
• Bueno Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Enage, 104 SCRA 600 [1981] — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary.

• Sec. 536, Local Government Code of 1991 — The effectivity clause provides that the Code shall take effect on January 1, 1992, unless otherwise provided, after its complete publication in at least one newspaper of general circulation. The Court used this provision to determine the date of effectivity of the Local Government Code.
• Sec. 102, Local Government Code of 1991 — Cited by the RTC in holding that the provincial health board headed by the governor was empowered to create committees which shall advise local health agencies on matters of grievance and complaints, personal discipline. The Supreme Court did not adopt the RTC’s conclusion because the Secretary of Health’s jurisdiction had attached before the Code’s effectivity.
• Administrative Code of 1987 — Under this law, together with Executive Order No. 119, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction, and supervision over his subordinates, including private respondent. It was the operative law at the commencement of the administrative action in 1991.
• Executive Order No. 119 — Together with the Administrative Code of 1987, it governed the disciplinary authority of the Secretary of Health over his subordinates at the time the administrative action was commenced in 1991.
• Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court — The special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The Court discussed that it will not lie as a substitute for an available or lost appeal, but may be allowed when the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.