Sebastian vs. Bajar

A lawyer’s willful disobedience of lawful orders of the Supreme Court and abuse of court processes through forum-shopping constitute gross misconduct warranting suspension; disbarment is not automatic where a lesser penalty suffices.

Atty. Emily A. Bajar served as counsel for Fernando Tanlioco, an agricultural lessee of land owned by complainant Manuel S. Sebastian’s spouse and sister-in-law. The landowners had filed an ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order changing the land use from agricultural to residential. The disciplinary proceedings implicated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Supreme Court’s authority over lawyers under Rule 138 and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Complainant Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint on 18 October 1991 against Atty. Emily A. Bajar, a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Respondent represented Fernando Tanlioco, an agricultural lessee of land owned by complainant’s spouse and sister-in-law. The landowners had filed an ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order changing the land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court ordered Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to payment of disturbance compensation, and the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment.

According to complainant, respondent thereafter filed another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, raising the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. Complainant alleged that respondent violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by misusing the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.

After the Supreme Court required respondent to comment, she submitted a Comment alleging that complainant was not the real party-in-interest and was not authorized to prosecute the disbarment suit; that she had fulfilled her Attorney’s Oath and duties under Section 20 of Rule 138; and that Tanlioco merely availed of all legal remedies. Complainant filed a Reply. The Court required a Rejoinder within 10 days, but respondent did not timely comply. On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered her to show cause why she should not be disciplined and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation. On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation claiming substantial compliance and stating that she had transferred to the Public Attorney’s Office, making the cases moot and academic. On 1 March 1993, the Court ruled that the administrative case was not moot, imposed a fine of P500 or five days imprisonment, and required compliance. After further noncompliance, the Court on 29 September 1993 ordered her arrest and five-day detention at the National Bureau of Investigation; she was arrested on 20 October 1993, detained for five days, and released on 25 October 1993. She filed her Rejoinder on 11 November 1993, again claiming that complainant lacked legal personality and that she was merely protecting Tanlioco’s interest.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose submitted a report finding violations: appealing a case for purposes of delay amounting to obstruction of justice; abusing the right of recourse to the courts through duplication of suits tantamount to forum-shopping; and using disrespectful language and shouting during the 25 May 1995 hearing. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30 March 1996, adopted the recommendation of indefinite suspension for unethical practices and an incorrigible character; Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended outright disbarment. The Supreme Court noted the resolution on 20 January 1997, and on 13 April 1999 directed the Office of the Court Administrator to circularize it; OCA Circular No. 30-99 dated 7 June 1999 informed all courts of the indefinite suspension.

On 30 January 2003, respondent moved to consider the case closed and terminated, apologized for her demeanor, and prayed that the suspension be lifted. The Court referred the matter back to the IBP. At hearings before Investigating Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval on 29 August 2003 and 19 September 2003, respondent claimed she did not receive notice of the OCA Circular and believed that the Court’s notation did not implement the IBP resolution; she admitted continuing to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City despite the suspension. She requested that her five-day detention at the National Bureau of Investigation be converted into a five-year suspension. Complainant argued that she was flaunting defiance of the Supreme Court and prayed for disbarment. Respondent reiterated that complainant was not the real party-in-interest, that she never betrayed her client, and that the complaint was harassment. The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-229 dated 16 April 2004, adopting the recommendation to disbar respondent for manifest flagrant misconduct in disobeying the Supreme Court’s order of indefinite suspension. The Court, noting that its earlier “noted” resolution had not attained finality, gave final action on the complaint.

• Obstruction and Dilatory Tactics: Complainant alleged that respondent obstructed, disobeyed, resisted, rebelled against, and impeded final decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, and submitted those final decisions for review and reversal by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, an administrative body, through contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics.
• Forum-Shopping: Complainant alleged that respondent violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by misusing the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the administration of justice.
• No Ground to Lift Suspension and Continuing Practice: Complainant posited that respondent’s motion did not state valid grounds to lift the suspension order and that by continuing to practice law, she was flaunting her defiance of the Supreme Court and showing that she could hoodwink another branch of government; he prayed for disbarment due to the gravity of the offense.

• Lack of Real Party-in-Interest and Authority: Respondent alleged that complainant was not the real party-in-interest and was not authorized to prosecute the disbarment suit; she also asserted that the property litigated was owned by complainant’s wife, so the complaint should have been dismissed outright.
• Fulfillment of Professional Duties: Respondent claimed that she fulfilled her Attorney’s Oath and performed her duties in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, that Tanlioco merely availed of all legal remedies, and that she never betrayed her client’s cause or was unfaithful to her oath.
• Mootness: Respondent alleged that her transfer to the Public Attorney’s Office and her status as no longer a BALA lawyer made the cases involved in the proceeding moot and academic.
• Harassment and Lack of Merit: Respondent asserted that complainant filed the case for harassment and prayed that the case be considered closed and terminated due to lack of merit.
• No Notice of Suspension and Belief That Notation Was Not Implementation: Respondent claimed that she did not receive notice of the OCA Circular on her indefinite suspension, that the Court Resolution merely noted the IBP Resolution, and that she believed the notation did not mean implementation; she requested that her five-day detention at the National Bureau of Investigation be converted into a five-year suspension.

• Willful Disobedience and Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent’s failure to comply with the Supreme Court’s 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions constituted willful disobedience of lawful orders and gross misconduct warranting disciplinary sanction.
• Forum-Shopping and Abuse of Court Processes: Whether respondent violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and abused her right of recourse to the courts by filing cases with identical issues despite the final ejectment judgment.
• Real Party-in-Interest in Disbarment: Whether complainant’s alleged lack of real party-in-interest or authority barred the disbarment complaint.
• Finality of IBP Resolution: Whether the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ recommended indefinite suspension attained finality when the Supreme Court merely noted it.
• Penalty: Whether respondent should be disbarred or suspended for three years, considering the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ recommendation and the circumstances.

• Willful Disobedience and Gross Misconduct: Yes. Failure to comply with the Court’s resolutions requiring a rejoinder and a comment constituted willful disobedience under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and gross misconduct.
• Forum-Shopping and Abuse of Court Processes: Yes. Filing Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession cases with identical issues despite the final ejectment judgment abused court processes and violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Real Party-in-Interest in Disbarment: No. The real-party-in-interest requirement in ordinary civil actions does not apply to disbarment; any interested person or the Court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.
• Finality of IBP Resolution: No. The Court’s mere notation of the IBP resolution did not amount to approval or finality; the Court retained final action under Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
• Penalty: Three-year suspension, not disbarment. Although gross misconduct and willful disobedience warranted discipline, disbarment is not imposed where a lesser penalty suffices.

• Willful Disobedience and Gross Misconduct: Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis; they are neither civil nor criminal but investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers, intended to protect the administration of justice. Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify suspension or disbarment. The records showed two instances of noncompliance: respondent failed to file a rejoinder within 10 days from the 25 March 1992 Resolution and only filed it on 11 November 1993 after her detention at the National Bureau of Investigation; and she failed to comment on complainant’s Manifestation as required by the 7 October 1992 Resolution, filing instead a Manifestation on 3 February 1993, almost four months later, claiming substantial compliance that the Court rejected on 1 March 1993. These acts constituted willful disobedience of lawful orders under Section 27, Rule 138 and gross misconduct. A Court resolution is not a mere request and must not be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Failure to comply with a directive to comment constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, as held in Bernal Jr. vs. Fernandez; Cuizon vs. Macalino likewise treated failure to comply with Court resolutions as an infraction meriting disbarment.
• Forum-Shopping and Abuse of Court Processes: Respondent, as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed a Specific Performance case to produce the conversion order and a Maintenance of Possession case with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board despite the final ejectment decision involving the same issues of conversion and disturbance compensation. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the Specific Performance case on res judicata and lack of cause of action. An important factor in forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. While lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Canon 19 requires zealous representation within the bounds of law. The filing of other cases to thwart execution of the final ejectment judgment violated Canon 19.
• Real Party-in-Interest in Disbarment: The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. The person who calls the Court’s attention to a lawyer’s misconduct is in no sense a party and generally has no interest in the outcome. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer. Under Heck vs. Santos, any interested person or the Court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings; the right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients, nor is it necessary that the complainant suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. Thus, respondent’s defense that complainant was not the real party-in-interest failed.
• Finality of IBP Resolution: The Court had merely noted IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 recommending indefinite suspension. The term “noted” means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter; it does not imply agreement or approval. Hence, the penalty of indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors had not attained finality. Under Section 12, Rule 139-B, when the Board determines that a respondent should be suspended or disbarred, it issues a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the record, are transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. The Court therefore gave its final action on the complaint.
• Penalty: The evidence on record was sufficient to support the IBP’s findings, but the Court disagreed with the penalty imposed. Suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the court. Respondent showed a great propensity to disregard court orders; her wanton disobedience showed utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. Her acts constituted gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders, and she violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; a three-year suspension was warranted.

• Administrative proceedings against lawyers are sui generis — They are neither civil nor criminal actions but investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers. They involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance; their purpose is to protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its officers. The Court applied this doctrine to treat the complaint as a disciplinary matter despite respondent’s claim that complainant was not the real party-in-interest.
• Real party-in-interest rule does not apply in disbarment proceedings — Any interested person or the Court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. The right to institute disbarment is not confined to clients, nor is it necessary that the complainant suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, and the only basis for judgment is proof or failure of proof of the charges. A compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate the administrative complaint. The Court applied this to reject respondent’s defense that complainant lacked personality to file the case.
• Willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court — Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. The Court applied this to respondent’s failure to comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions requiring a rejoinder and a comment.
• Gross misconduct — Defined as any inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause; it is conduct generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional purpose. The Court applied this to respondent’s repeated noncompliance with Court directives.
• Forum-shopping and abuse of the right of recourse to the courts — An important factor in determining forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. While a lawyer owes fidelity to the client’s cause, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates zealous representation within the bounds of law. The Court applied this to respondent’s filing of Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession cases despite the final ejectment judgment.
• Clear preponderant evidence in disbarment or suspension proceedings — Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings. The Court found the evidence sufficient to support the IBP’s findings.
• Effect of the Court’s notation of an IBP resolution — The term “noted” means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter; it does not imply agreement or approval. The Court applied this to hold that the IBP’s recommended indefinite suspension had not attained finality.
• Proportionality in disciplinary penalties — The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. The Court applied this to impose a three-year suspension instead of disbarment.

• "The term ‘noted’ means that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter — it does not imply agreement or approval." — This passage defines the effect of the Court’s notation of the IBP resolution and is the basis for holding that the recommended indefinite suspension had not attained finality.
• "These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment." — This states the ratio decidendi for respondent’s disciplinary liability based on her failure to comply with the Court’s resolutions.
• "The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases." — This passage states the controlling rule on standing in disbarment proceedings and rejects respondent’s defense that complainant lacked personality to file the complaint.
• "However, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end." — This passage articulates the proportionality principle that justified the imposition of a three-year suspension instead of disbarment.

• Bernal Jr. vs. Fernandez, A.M. No. P-05-2045, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 29, 33 — Followed for the rule that failure to comply with the Court’s directive to comment on a letter-complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination, or disrespect.
• Cuizon vs. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 479, 484-485 — Cited for the rule that a lawyer’s failure to comply with the Court’s Resolutions requiring him to file his comment was one of the infractions that merited disbarment.
• Heck vs. Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 823 (2004) — Followed for the rule that any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.
• Suzuki vs. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 129, 140 — Followed for the rule that lawyers owe entire devotion to their clients but are first and foremost officers of the court, bound to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
• Foronda vs. Guerrero, A.C. No. 5469, 10 August 2004, 436 SCRA 9, 23 — Followed for the rule that an important factor in determining forum-shopping is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
• Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 310, 321 — Cited for the definition of the term “noted” as merely taking cognizance without exercising judicious deliberation or rendering a decision.
• Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 349 Phil. 7, 15 (1998) — Cited for the rule that administrative proceedings involve no private interest and that the person who calls the court’s attention to a lawyer’s misconduct is in no sense a party.
• Pariñas vs. Paguinto, A.C. No. 6297, 13 July 2004, 434 SCRA 179, 184 — Cited for the rule that a compromise or withdrawal of charges does not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer.
• Navarro vs. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520, 582 (1998) — Cited for the rule that disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is proof or failure of proof of the charges.
• Berbano vs. Barcelona, 457 Phil. 331, 341 (2003) — Cited for the rule that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension proceedings.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — A member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, violation of the oath, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The Court applied this provision to respondent’s willful disobedience of its lawful orders.
• Section 12, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — If the Board of Governors, by a vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. The Court applied this provision to hold that the IBP resolution had not attained finality and that the Court would give its final action.
• Rule 10.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — A lawyer shall not use or misuse rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or to obstruct the administration of justice. Complainant alleged that respondent violated this rule through forum-shopping.
• Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility — Lawyers shall represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. The Court found that respondent violated this canon by filing other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment in the ejectment case.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.