Seagull Maritime Corp. vs. Dee

A seafarer's injury is compensable as permanent total disability where it disables him from earning wages in the same or similar work he was trained for or accustomed to perform, even if confined to one body part and rated as partial by the company-designated physician, whose assessment is not final and conclusive and is subject to the seafarer's right to seek a second opinion under the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

Seagull Maritime Corporation acted as local manning agent for Seagiant Shipmanagement Co. Ltd., the foreign principal employing Filipino seafarers for service on board ocean-going vessels. Such employment was governed by the POEA-prescribed Standard Terms and Conditions, including its Section 20 on compensation and benefits for work-related injury or illness and its Schedule of Disability or Impediment with corresponding grades and rates. The contract scheme also assigned the company-designated physician to assess the degree of permanent disability while preserving a procedure for disagreement through a seafarer-appointed doctor and a jointly agreed third doctor.

Sometime in 1999, Jaycee Dee was employed as an able-bodied seaman by Seagiant Shipmanagement Co. Ltd. through Seagull Maritime Corporation and assigned to the vessel M/V Castor. On May 3, 2000, while M/V Castor was berthed in Hamburg, Germany, a passing ship collided with it, causing its portable gangway to jam between the other ship's walls and the shore rail and then suddenly move back to the berth. Because of these rapid movements, Dee's left foot was pinned between two metal beams of the ship and crushed.

After initial treatment in a German hospital, Dee was repatriated to the Philippines for further treatment in several hospitals and clinics. He underwent two operations on the foot, application of a pin in May 2000 and removal of the pin in August 2000, followed by eight months of physical therapy. Despite treatment, he continued to suffer severe pain and difficulty in moving and bearing weight on the left foot while ambulating.

Thereafter, Dee filed an NLRC complaint for permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000. Petitioners resisted full payment, contending his condition remained remediable by a proposed triple arthrodesis operation which he rejected, and that company-designated physician Dr. Albert M. Manalang rated the injury as closest to complete immobility of an ankle joint in normal position, Impediment Grade 11 compensable by US$7,465 under the POEA contract. Dr. Manalang diagnosed traumatic arthritis of the subtalar joint of the left foot with severe pain and difficulty in weight-bearing, while noting the proposed surgery might only permit walking for daily activities with a less painful foot and carried no guarantee of return to strenuous work. For his part, Dee relied on Dr. Norberto Meriales and orthopedic surgeon Dr. Rafael Bundoc of the Philippine General Hospital, who opined that whether operated on or not, he could no longer return to or be hired for his previous work as a seaman and that surgery was elective, variable in result, and intended merely to lessen pain.

The labor arbiter found the disability claim meritorious but limited recovery to US$7,465, reasoning that only Dr. Manalang gave an impediment grade and that Grade 11 corresponded to the closest listed injury. On appeal, the NLRC factually credited Drs. Meriales and Bundoc that return to sea duty was no longer possible with or without further surgery, rendering refusal of the triple arthrodesis immaterial to compensability.

• Company-Designated Physician: Petitioner argued that the labor arbiter correctly followed German Marine Agencies vs. NLRC in treating the company-designated physician as the one who must assess the nature and extent of an injured seafarer's disability, and that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in disregarding Dr. Manalang's Grade 11 assessment.
• POEA Contract Application: Petitioner maintained that the POEA-prescribed Standard Employment Contract and its Schedule of Disability or Impediment governed, such that Dee's ailment fell under complete immobility of an ankle joint in normal position, Grade 11, compensable by US$7,465 (US$50,000 x 14.93%).
• Partial Nature of Injury: Petitioner argued that because complainant's injury was confined only to his left foot, his disability was not total but only partial, precluding a US$60,000 permanent total disability award.

• Company-Designated Physician: Whether the company-designated physician's assessment of the nature and extent of disability is final and conclusive, such that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in relying on the seafarer's chosen physicians.
• POEA Schedule: Whether the POEA Standard Employment Contract schedule limits Dee's left-foot injury to Impediment Grade 11 and US$7,465 compensation.
• Total vs. Partial Disability: Whether an injury confined to the left foot can constitute permanent total disability warranting US$60,000.

• Company-Designated Physician: No. The company-designated physician's assessment is not final and conclusive, as the POEA contract preserves the seafarer's prerogative to seek a second opinion and resort to a jointly agreed third doctor whose decision is final and binding.
• POEA Schedule: No. The schedule was not exclusive and was not correctly applied to defeat the claim, since serious doubt on the company physician's grade justified resort to other competent medical prognosis and liberal construction in favor of seamen.
• Total vs. Partial Disability: Yes. Permanent total disability was established because the left-foot injury destroyed Dee's capacity to earn wages as a seaman, disability being measured by loss of earning capacity rather than mere medical significance.

• Company-Designated Physician: While the company-designated physician must declare that the seaman suffered permanent disability during employment, German Marine Agencies vs. NLRC nowhere made that assessment final and conclusive on both parties or deprived the seafarer of a second opinion. Section 20(B)(3) expressly provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees, a third doctor may be jointly agreed upon with final and binding effect. Reliance on Drs. Meriales and Bundoc was therefore not erroneous, especially as their conclusions were reached after consideration of Dr. Manalang's own findings, which admitted severe pain, difficulty in weight-bearing, and no guarantee of return to strenuous work.
• POEA Schedule: Dr. Manalang's findings did not materially differ from those of Dee's doctors that triple arthrodesis might at most allow walking for daily living with a less painful foot, insinuating permanence and inability to perform rigorous seaman duties. The variance between his factual findings and his low compensation conclusion was viewed in light of his status as company-designated physician, underscoring why the contract allows a second opinion. Where serious doubt exists on the company physician's declaration of nature and grade, resort to other competent professionals is proper, and the POEA contract, designed for protection of Filipino seamen, must be construed fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor rather than assumed to list every injury rendering a seafarer unfit for sea duty.
• Total vs. Partial Disability: Disability is intimately related to earning capacity, with gravity tested by impairment or loss of capacity to earn and not mere medical significance. Permanent total disability was defined as disablement to earn wages in the same or similar work trained for or accustomed to, or any work of comparable mentality and attainment, meaning inability to do substantially all material acts of gainful occupation without serious discomfort, pain, or danger, not absolute helplessness. Although confined to the left foot, the injury rendered Dee incapable of performing the same or similar seaman work, with no profit-minded employer expected to hire him, so compensation for incapacity to work, not the injury per se, supported the US$60,000 award. Mere variance in evidentiary assessment between labor arbiter and NLRC, supported by substantial evidence, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion warranting certiorari.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion for Certiorari — Abuse justifying certiorari must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, with judgment rendered capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. Applied to deny certiorari because the NLRC's reversal rested on evidence of record and judicious reasoning, and mere variance in evidentiary assessment from the labor arbiter, if substantially supported, deserves respect.
• Company-Designated Physician vs. Second Opinion in Seafarer Claims — While the company-designated physician declares permanent disability during employment, his assessment of nature, extent, and grade is not final and conclusive; the seafarer may consult a physician of choice, and upon disagreement a jointly agreed third doctor decides finally and bindingly. Applied to uphold reliance on Drs. Meriales and Bundoc over Dr. Manalang's Grade 11 rating.
• Disability as Loss of Earning Capacity — In disability compensation, what is compensated is incapacity to work, not the injury itself; gravity is tested by impairment or loss of capacity to earn, not mere medical significance. Applied to treat a left-foot injury preventing sea duty as compensable beyond its localized medical rating.
• Permanent Total Disability — Permanent total disability means disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature trained for or accustomed to, or any kind of work a person of his mentality and attainment can do; it does not require absolute helplessness but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life. Applied to hold Dee permanently and totally disabled despite ability to walk for daily activities if operated on.
• Liberal Construction of POEA Standard Employment Contract — The POEA standard contract for seamen, designed primarily for protection and benefit of Filipino seamen given the perilous nature of sea work, must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor, and its schedule does not contain all possible injuries rendering a seafarer unfit. Applied to reject confinement of Dee's claim to Grade 11 and to approximate benefits to risks braved on board.

• "If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties." — States the POEA contractual basis for the seafarer's right to a second opinion and defeats the claim that the company-designated physician's grade is conclusive.
• "Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of a similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment can do. It does not mean state of absolute helplessness but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to the prosecution of a gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life." — Provides the canonical definition used to hold a localized foot injury totally disabling.
• "In disability compensation, it is not the injury per se which is compensated but the incapacity to work." — Anchors the shift from medical grading of the foot to loss of capacity to work as a seaman.

• German Marine Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 142049, 30 January 2001, 350 SCRA 629 — Invoked by petitioners as requiring deference to the company-designated physician; clarified as holding only that such physician must declare permanent disability, not that his assessment is final and conclusive or bars a second opinion.
• J.L. Bernardo Construction vs. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 25 (2000) — Cited for the standard that certiorari requires patent and gross abuse amounting to evasion of duty or capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic action.
• Sanchez vs. NLRC, 371 Phil. 649 (1999) — Cited for the rule that mere variance in evidentiary assessment between labor arbiter and NLRC does not automatically require full factual review if the NLRC decision has substantial support.
• Bejerano vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 84777, 30 January 1992, 205 SCRA 598 — Source of the permanent total disability definition based on disablement to earn wages and inability to perform material acts without serious discomfort or danger.
• Philippine Transmarine Carriers vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123891, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 47 — Cited for liberal construction of the POEA standard contract in favor of Filipino seamen.

• Section 20(B)(3), POEA Standard Employment Contract — Governs employer liability for work-related injury or illness, sickness allowance until fitness or assessment by the company-designated physician within 120 days, mandatory post-employment reporting, and the second-opinion and third-doctor mechanism; applied to validate reliance on Dee's chosen physicians and to reject finality of Dr. Manalang's Grade 11 rating.
• Section 32, Appendix A, POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered on Lower Extremities, No. 18) — Lists complete immobility of an ankle joint in normal position as Grade 11 (US$50,000 x 14.93% = US$7,465); applied by the labor arbiter but held non-exclusive and inapplicable to defeat permanent total disability on these facts.

REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice, Chairperson, ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, Associate Justice, ADOLFO S. AZCUNA, Associate Justice, CANCIO C. GARCIA, Associate Justice