Sea Lion Fishing Corporation vs. People of the Philippines

A third-party claiming ownership of an instrument or tool used in the commission of a crime must first establish, by competent evidence, its ownership of the property and that it is not liable for the offense; absent such proof, the confiscation and forfeiture of the property in favor of the government is proper. The claim cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the alleged owner was not charged in the same case.

Sea Lion Fishing Corporation is the alleged owner of F/V Sea Lion, a fishing vessel apprehended off Mangsee Island, Balabac, Palawan, by a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard, and barangay officials acting on fishermen's reports of poaching. The vessel's captain and crew were exculpated by the Provincial Prosecutor, while seventeen Chinese fishermen found aboard were charged with violations of Republic Act No. 8550 (The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) and Republic Act No. 9147 (Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act). The dispute concerns the confiscation of the vessel as an instrument of the crime, and turns on the interplay between Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which excepts property of a third person not liable for the offense, and the forfeiture provisions of RA 8550.

Acting on fishermen's reports of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac, Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard, and barangay officials conducted search and seizure operations in the area. The team found F/V Sea Lion anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island, with five boats beside it and a long fishing net already spread over the water. Boarding the vessel, the team apprehended her Filipino captain and a crew composed of three Filipinos and three Chinese, and also arrested seventeen Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion.

Several charges followed. A violation of Section 97 of Republic Act No. 8550 was filed against all those arrested and docketed as I.S. No. 2004-032; a violation of Section 90 of the same law was filed against the captain, the Chief Engineer, and the President of the corporation owning the vessel, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-061; and violations of Section 27(a) and (f) of RA 9147 and Section 87 of RA 8550 were filed against all those arrested and the corporation's President, respectively docketed as I.S. Nos. 2004-68, 2004-69, and 2004-70. The Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed I.S. Nos. 2004-61, 2004-68, and 2004-69, but found probable cause for the remaining charges against the seventeen Chinese fishermen only. This was after it was found that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the illegal acts of the seventeen Chinese fishermen, who had been rescued by the crew from a distressed Chinese vessel; the prosecutor concluded that the crew, unarmed, outnumbered, and hampered by a language barrier, acted only out of uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their lives and property. Corresponding Informations were accordingly filed against the seventeen Chinese fishermen.

With the crew exculpated, Sea Lion Fishing Corporation filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor an Urgent Motion for Release of Evidence, alleging that it owned the vessel. The Office issued a Resolution dated August 25, 2004, recommending the release of F/V Sea Lion to the movant upon a proper showing of evidence of ownership and the posting of a bond double the value of the vessel as appraised by the MARINA, conditioned on the owner making the vessel available for inspection during trial. A Supplemental Resolution dated September 10, 2004 added that the release required the approval of the Provincial Committee on Illegal Entrants, which had jurisdiction over all apprehended vessels involved in poaching. Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with these Resolutions.

The case for violation of Section 97 of RA 8550 was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18965, while that for violation of Section 87 of the same law was docketed as Criminal Case No. 19422. The Chinese nationals initially entered separate pleas of not guilty for both offenses, but later, in Criminal Case No. 18965, changed their pleas to guilty for the lesser offense of violation of Section 88, sub-paragraph (3) of RA 8550. On May 16, 2005, the RTC of Puerto Princesa City, Branch 52 sentenced them to imprisonment of five years to six years, six months, and seven days, and ordered the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion together with the fishing paraphernalia and equipment in favor of the government, placing the confiscated items under the temporary custody of the Philippine Coast Guard. On the same date, in Criminal Case No. 19422, the RTC found the seventeen accused guilty of violation of Section 87 of RA 8550 (Poaching), sentenced them to pay a fine of US$100,000.00, and likewise ordered the confiscation of the vessel and its paraphernalia in favor of the government.

It was only after the issuance of these Sentences that petitioner again made its move by filing a Motion for Reconsideration on June 24, 2005, praying that the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion be deleted. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Opposition, and after receipt of petitioner's Reply, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals.

• Ownership of the Vessel: Petitioner contended that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the registered owner of the vessel and because her captain and crew members were not among those accused of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422.
• Article 45, Revised Penal Code: Petitioner invoked Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner claimed that it was denied its right to due process of law when it was not notified of the judicial proceedings relative to the confiscation of the fishing vessel, arguing that such notification was necessary considering that the provincial prosecutor had been duly informed of its claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion.

• Inapplicability of Article 45, Revised Penal Code: Respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that since the seventeen Chinese nationals were charged with violations of RA 8550, a special law, Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply, in view of Article 10 of said Code declaring that acts punishable by special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, which are only supplementary unless the special law provides otherwise.
• Forfeiture Under RA 8550: Respondent maintained that RA 8550 provides that the vessel used in connection with or in direct violation of its provisions shall be subjected to forfeiture in favor of the government without mention of any distinction as to who owns the vessel, so that the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion was proper.
• Failure to Timely Assert Third-Party Claim: Respondent contended that even if Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code were applicable, the petition must still fail due to petitioner's failure to present its third-party claim at the earliest opportunity.
• No Denial of Due Process: Respondent argued that petitioner was not deprived of its right to due process, having been given ample opportunity to be heard, particularly when its motion for release of F/V Sea Lion was granted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor subject to certain conditions, which it opted not to comply with while instead awaiting the trial court's final disposition of the case.

• Propriety of the Remedy: Whether a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy to challenge the trial court's twin Sentences ordering the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion.
• Validity of the Confiscation: Whether the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was valid.
• Due Process: Whether petitioner was denied its right to due process in the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion.

• Propriety of the Remedy: No. Certiorari under Rule 65 is limited to the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and is unavailing where appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Validity of the Confiscation: Yes. The confiscation was proper, petitioner having presented no evidence to support its claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion or to show that it was a third party not liable for the offense.
• Due Process: No. Petitioner was not denied due process, having been given ample opportunity to be heard and having failed to comply with the conditions imposed for the release of the vessel.

• Propriety of the Remedy: A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is limited to the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. No jurisdictional error attended the proceedings because, based on the Informations, the offenses were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, and the penalties imposable under the law were within its jurisdiction; as a necessary consequence, the trial court had the authority to determine how the subject fishing vessel should be disposed of. No grave abuse of discretion attended the order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion, given the absence of evidence showing that the vessel was owned by a third party. The trial court impliedly recognized petitioner's right to intervene when it pronounced that petitioner failed to exercise its right to claim ownership of the vessel; having been accorded that personality, petitioner should have filed an appeal instead of a petition for certiorari, since certiorari is unavailing when an appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The nature of the questions intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence; the jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its erroneous decision, and the orders and rulings of a court on all controversies pertaining to the case cannot be corrected by certiorari if the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person.

• Validity of the Confiscation: Even assuming that the Court of Appeals could resolve an error of procedure or judgment, none was committed. Petitioner's claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion was not supported by any proof on record; the only relevant document was a request for the release of the vessel based on petitioner's alleged ownership filed with the Provincial Prosecutor. While the latter authorized the release of the fishing vessel, this was conditioned upon petitioner's submission of proof of ownership and the filing of a bond, with which petitioner failed to comply. Even when judicial proceedings commenced, nothing was heard from petitioner — no motion for intervention or any manifestation came from its end during the period of arraignment up to the rendition of sentence. Petitioner's later explanation before the Court of Appeals that its inaction was brought about by its inability to put up the required bond due to financial difficulties was not a sufficient justification for it to deliberately not act at all. It was only after the trial court ordered the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion that petitioner was heard from again, filing a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 24, 2005, to which was attached a copy of an alleged Certificate of Registration issued by the MARINA. The lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership was not cured by that motion; at that point, evidence should have been adduced to support the claim, so that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed for rather than a mere motion for reconsideration. There was first the factual issue — to be proved by proper evidence — that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the accused, and Article 45 also required proof that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the admission by the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime, this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court. Although petitioner attached a copy of an alleged Certificate of Registration, the same cannot be considered by the trial court because it had not been formally offered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It had been established beyond reasonable doubt that F/V Sea Lion was used by the seventeen Chinese fishermen in the commission of the crimes, while petitioner presented no evidence at all to support its claim of ownership; the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was therefore proper.

• Due Process: Petitioner's contention that it was deprived of its right to due process in the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion had no factual basis. Petitioner did not intervene before the trial court to claim ownership of the fishing vessel, nor were there records before the court showing a third-party claim of ownership; the formal introduction of evidence that would have brought the third-party ownership of the vessel to light was prevented by the plea of guilt of the accused. There was therefore no third-party property right sought to be protected when the trial court ordered the confiscation of the vessel. Given the absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the failure to comply with the additional Article 45 requirement, the court's order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87 of RA 8550 cannot be incorrect to the point of being an act in grave abuse of discretion.

• Third-Party Claim Over Instruments of the Crime — When an instrument or tool used in a crime is claimed by a third party not liable to the offense, that third party must first establish its ownership over the same. Under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime are confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense. The Court held that this exception requires two factual matters to be proved by proper evidence: (a) that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the accused, and (b) that the third party is not liable for the offense. The second requirement cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case.
• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Appeal — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an independent action raising the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is unavailing when an appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The nature of the questions intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence; even if those questions treat exclusively of whether the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy is appeal, not certiorari.
• Jurisdiction Not Affected by Erroneous Decision — The jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its erroneous decision. The orders and rulings of a court on all controversies pertaining to the case cannot be corrected by certiorari if the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person.
• Formal Offer of Evidence — Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a document attached to a motion cannot be considered by the trial court unless it has been formally offered. A party seeking to introduce evidence of third-party ownership after conviction should move for a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect rather than file a mere motion for reconsideration.

• "When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party not liable to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership over the same." — This opening pronouncement states the ratio decidendi of the decision and the threshold burden imposed on any third-party claimant of an instrument of the crime.
• "Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed." — This is the Court's reproduction of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision invoked by petitioner and the textual basis of the exception on which its claim rested.
• "After the admission by the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime, we believe and so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court." — This passage, quoted from the Court of Appeals and adopted by the Supreme Court, defines the second element of the third-party exception and is the core holding on the evidentiary burden of a non-liable owner.
• "The jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its erroneous decision." — This states the settled rule underpinning the Court's rejection of certiorari as a substitute for appeal, even where the assailed order is alleged to involve an error of judgment.

• Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 139594-95, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 543, 551 — Cited as authority for the rule that a special civil action for certiorari is an independent action raising the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Pan Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 Phil. 521, 530-531 (1988) — Cited, through Herrera's Remedial Law, for the rule that the nature of the questions intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence; even if those questions treat exclusively of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, the remedy is appeal, not certiorari.
• Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 139 Phil. 158, 187-188 (1969) — Cited for the principle that the jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its erroneous decision.
• Paramount Insurance Corporation vs. Judge Luna, 232 Phil. 526, 534 (1987) — Cited for the rule that the orders and rulings of a court on all controversies pertaining to the case cannot be corrected by certiorari if the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person.

• Article 45, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed, which shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense. Petitioner invoked this provision; the Court held that its exception requires proof of both third-party ownership and non-liability for the offense.
• Article 10, Revised Penal Code — Declares that acts punishable by special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, which are only supplementary to such laws unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. Respondent invoked this provision to argue that Article 45 does not apply to violations of RA 8550.
• Section 87, Republic Act No. 8550 — Punishes poaching in Philippine waters by any foreign person, corporation, or entity, with a fine of US$100,000.00, in addition to the confiscation of its catch, fishing equipment, and fishing vessel. This was the basis of the conviction in Criminal Case No. 19422 and of the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion.
• Section 88, sub-paragraph (3), Republic Act No. 8550 — Punishes the actual use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, or electrofishing devices for illegal fishing with imprisonment ranging from five (5) to ten (10) years. The seventeen accused pleaded guilty to this lesser offense in Criminal Case No. 18965.
• Section 97, Republic Act No. 8550 — Makes it unlawful to fish or take rare, threatened, or endangered species as listed in the CITES and as determined by the Department, punishable by imprisonment and/or fine, forfeiture of the catch, and cancellation of the fishing permit. This was the charge in Criminal Case No. 18965.
• Section 90, Republic Act No. 8550 — Makes it unlawful to engage in fishing in municipal waters and in all bays as well as other fishery management areas using active fishing gears. This was the charge in I.S. No. 2004-061, which the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed.
• Section 27(a) and (f), Republic Act No. 9147 — Makes it unlawful to willfully and knowingly exploit wildlife resources and their habitats, including killing and destroying wildlife species and collecting, hunting, or possessing wildlife, their by-products and derivatives. This was among the charges filed against those arrested.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for certiorari lies when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this provision in holding that certiorari was not the proper remedy.
• Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Governs the offer of evidence. The Court held that the Certificate of Registration attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration could not be considered by the trial court because it had not been formally offered.

• Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice (Chairperson)
• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Associate Justice
• Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice
• Jose Portugal Perez, Associate Justice