Sayson vs. People

The right to be heard and to present evidence, though constitutionally guaranteed, is subject to waiver, and a valid waiver occurs where the accused's repeated and unjustified motions for postponement reveal a dilatory scheme. Additionally, in offenses against property, an erroneous allegation as to the name of the offended party is immaterial where the subject matter of the offense is described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.

Ramon F. Sayson was charged with estafa through falsification of a commercial document before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The charge arose from his alleged possession of a blank U.S. dollar check that he forged and falsified, making it appear to have been duly issued by the Bank of America, and his subsequent use of the forged instrument to induce Ernesto Rufino, Sr. to exchange it for a peso check. The case involved the constitutional rights of the accused to be heard, to counsel, and to present evidence, as well as the procedural rules governing motions for postponement and the sufficiency of allegations in criminal informations.

On March 22, 1972, Ramon Sayson y Fernandez was introduced by Vicente Jaucian, a former employee of Luzon Theatres, Inc., to Anselmo Aquiling, private secretary to Ernesto Rufino, Sr., General Manager of the corporation. Jaucian had known appellant as "Fiscal Perez" who wanted to exchange dollars for pesos. Upon being introduced to Aquiling, appellant showed an identification card indicating that he was Norberto S. Perez, a Prosecuting Attorney from Angeles City. Rufino said he was not personally interested in dollars but suggested his secretary inquire if Mever Films, Inc. needed dollars. When told that Mever Films needed dollars, Rufino authorized the transaction.

Appellant presented to Edgar Mangona, the assistant accountant of Mever Films, a Bank of America check in the amount of $2,250.00 payable to the order of Atty. Norberto S. Perez. The check appeared to be a bill of exchange or draft drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of the Bank of America on its San Francisco Branch, bearing serial number 605908142. Mangona prepared a check of the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of P14,850.00 at the exchange rate of P6.60 to a dollar. The check was signed by Mrs. Teresita Rufino Litton and countersigned by Mr. Rufino. The check was exchanged with appellant's Bank of America draft, and the latter signed the voucher for the peso check.

On the same day, appellant went to the Tayuman Branch of the Banco Filipino and informed its Branch Manager, Mrs. Maria Fe Relova, that he wanted to open a savings account. He filled up the application form with the name Norberto S. Perez. He presented the Manufacturer's Bank check, endorsed it, and it was posted in the passbook issued to him. Mrs. Relova, suspicious of appellant's actuations, called the PLDT to inquire if the telephone number appellant had given her was listed in Perez's name and was told it had not yet been issued. She then telephoned Mever Films, Inc. and was assured the check was genuine. She further tested her suspicions by sending a bank employee to deliver a brochure to the address given by appellant, but the messenger returned without locating the place.

Within a short time, officials of Mever Films, Inc. became doubtful of the genuineness of the Bank of America draft. On March 24, 1972, two days after the issuance of the Manufacturer's Bank check and one day after the check was cleared with the Central Bank, Mever Films, convinced that the draft was spurious, ordered its payment stopped. On the same day, Jaucian and Aquiling went to the National Bureau of Investigation and gave written statements. Also on the same day, the Assistant Manager of the Bank of America, Manila Branch, addressed a letter to the NBI certifying that the draft was one of the blank drafts surreptitiously taken from a shipment sent to them by their San Francisco Headquarters sometime in the latter part of 1970, and that its issuance was not authorized by the bank.

Jose R. Lopez, the assistant manager who issued the certification, testified that the draft was one of 900 blank drafts missing from a shipment received from their head office in the United States sometime in 1971. He declared that the words "Dania Branch" and "Dania, Florida" appearing on the face of the draft were superimposed to make it appear that the draft was drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch, when in fact the blank draft was for the exclusive use of the Manila Branch, as revealed by the first four code figures of the draft's serial number.

At the hearing of December 9, 1974, when the defense was scheduled to present its evidence, only the petitioner appeared. He said his counsel had another case in a different court. His lawyer also sent a telegram requesting cancellation of the hearing because he was sick. The court denied the motion for postponement and considered the case submitted for decision without petitioner's evidence. The trial court had previously issued an Order dated August 12, 1974 declaring the trial "DEFINITELY POSTPONED FOR THE LAST TIME" with a warning that the court would not entertain further delays and would proceed with or without counsel. The petitioner had secured seven prior postponements, which he admitted in his brief filed with the Court of Appeals.

• Due Process — Denial of Right to be Heard: Petitioner argued that the denial of his motion for postponement deprived him of his day in court and his constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence in his defense.
• Due Process — Right to Counsel: Petitioner claimed he was not waiving his right to counsel but was vigorously asserting it through his verbal motion for postponement due to the absence of his counsel de parte.
• Variance in Offended Party: Petitioner maintained that he could not be justifiably convicted under the information charging him with attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America because the evidence showed he allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a corporate entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr., in gross violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Duty to Appoint Counsel de Oficio: Petitioner argued that the trial judge was duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio when he appeared without his counsel.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the respondents beyond the Solicitor General's representation of the respondents in opposing the petition.

• Due Process — Denial of Motion for Postponement: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for postponement, thereby depriving him of due process, the right to counsel, and the right to present evidence.
• Variance in Offended Party: Whether the variance between the allegation in the information naming Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America as offended parties and the proof showing Mever Films, Inc. as the actual offended party entitled the petitioner to acquittal.

• Due Process — Denial of Motion for Postponement: No. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement. The petitioner validly waived his right to be heard and to present evidence through his dilatory conduct, and the denial of the motion did not constitute a deprivation of due process.
• Variance in Offended Party: No. The variance was immaterial. In offenses against property, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured is a mere formal defect where the subject matter of the offense is described with sufficient particularity to identify the offense charged.

• Due Process — Denial of Motion for Postponement: The right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence is a constitutional right, but it is not exempt from the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law, pursuant to Article 6 of the Civil Code. The grant or refusal of an application for continuance or postponement lies within the sound discretion of the court, and the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. In this case, the petitioner's motion was not seasonably filed, as the three-day notice required by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court was not complied with. The motion was not accompanied by an affidavit or medical certificate to support the alleged illness of counsel, contrary to Rule 22, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court. The conflicting stories advanced by petitioner and his counsel — that counsel had another case versus that he was sick — indicated the lack of good cause for postponement. The petitioner had secured seven prior postponements, and the trial court had warned him that no further delays would be entertained. The petitioner failed to present any meritorious defense. The Court applied the doctrine from U.S. vs. Ramirez that the trial court's discretion must be judicial and not arbitrary, and that it would take an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make the trial court's action a denial of due process. The Court also applied the two circumstances from Udan vs. Amon: the reasonableness of the postponement and the merits of the case of the movant. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is mandatory only at the time of arraignment under Rule 116, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, and is discretionary in situations like the present case, where the accused had proceeded with arraignment and trial with counsel of his choice. The Court applied People vs. Angco, holding that the trial court was not duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio where the accused was represented by counsel of choice at arraignment and trial, and his failure to appear with counsel despite repeated postponements and warnings was sufficient legal justification for the trial court to proceed and render judgment.

• Variance in Offended Party: The rule in this jurisdiction is that variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to acquittal, citing People vs. Catli. Under Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Court, in cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged. The Court applied U.S. vs. Kepner, which laid down the rule that when an offense is described in the complaint with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured is immaterial as a mere formal defect that does not prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. In this case, since the check, which was the subject matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it was immaterial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.

• Waiver of Constitutional Rights — The right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence, though constitutionally guaranteed, is subject to waiver as long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner's repeated and unjustified motions for postponement, despite warnings from the trial court, constituted a valid waiver of his rights, and he was deemed to have been extended the protection of due process.

• Discretion of the Court in Granting Postponements — Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which must be judicial and not arbitrary. The ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Two circumstances should be taken into account: (1) the reasonableness of the postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. The Court applied this doctrine to find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for postponement, given the petitioner's failure to comply with procedural requisites and his lack of a meritorious defense.

• Variance in the Name of the Offended Party in Offenses Against Property — When an offense is described in the complaint with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured is immaterial as a mere formal defect that does not prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. In offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act charged can be properly identified. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the variance in the name of the offended party did not entitle the petitioner to acquittal, since the check was described with sufficient particularity.

• "The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the accused. But while the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant, such right is not exempt from the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not controverted to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law." — This passage establishes the doctrine that constitutional rights of the accused are subject to waiver, which is central to the Court's due process analysis.

• "Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In this respect, it may be said that the discretion which the trial court exercises must be judicial and not arbitrary. It is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those of the people at large, and should not unduly force him to trial nor for fight causes jeopardize the rights and interests of the public." — This passage, quoted from U.S. vs. Ramirez, articulates the standard for reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for postponement.

• "The rule in this jurisdiction is that 'variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal.'" — This passage states the controlling rule on variance, which the Court applied to reject the petitioner's claim of a fatal variance in the name of the offended party.

• "In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information." — This passage states the Court's application of the variance doctrine to the facts of the case, forming the ratio decidendi for the second issue.

• U.S. vs. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919) — Controlling precedent on the sound discretion of the trial court in granting or refusing continuances, quoted with approval for the proposition that the discretion must be judicial and not arbitrary, and that it would take an extreme case of abuse of discretion to make the trial court's action a denial of due process.
• People vs. Mendez, G.R. No. L-27348, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 880 — Cited for the proposition that the factual background of Ramirez is very similar to the case at bar, supporting the application of the same standard.
• Udan vs. Amon, G.R. No. L-24288, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837 — Cited for the two circumstances to be considered in incidents of postponement: the reasonableness of the postponement and the merits of the case of the movant.
• De Cases vs. Peyer, G.R. No. L-18564, August 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1165 — Cited for the rule that if the movant does not present a meritorious claim or defense, denial of his motion for postponement may not be considered an abuse of the court's discretion.
• People vs. Angco, 103 Phil. 33, 39 (1958) — Controlling precedent on the discretionary nature of appointing a counsel de oficio where the accused had been represented by counsel of choice at arraignment and trial, and his failure to appear with counsel despite repeated postponements and warnings justified the trial court in proceeding to render judgment.
• People vs. Catli, G.R. No. L-11641, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642 — Cited for the rule that variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to acquittal.
• U.S. vs. Kepner, 1 Phil. 519 (1902) — Controlling precedent on the immateriality of an erroneous allegation as to the person injured where the offense is described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, applied to the facts of the instant case.

• Article 6, Civil Code — Applied to establish that the right to be heard and to present evidence is subject to waiver as long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
• Rule 15, Section 4, Revised Rules of Court — Applied to find that the petitioner's motion for postponement was not seasonably filed for failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.
• Rule 22, Section 5, Revised Rules of Court — Applied to find that the motion to postpone trial on the ground of illness of counsel was defective for lack of an affidavit showing that the presence of counsel at trial was indispensable and that the character of his illness rendered his non-attendance excusable.
• Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court (now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure) — Applied to hold that in cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged, and that if the true name is disclosed during trial, the court must cause the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information.
• Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court — Applied to hold that the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio is mandatory only at the time of arraignment, and is discretionary where the accused has proceeded with arraignment and trial with counsel of his choice.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, and Bidin, JJ., concurred. Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.