Saycon vs. Court of Appeals

Courts of Appeals cannot issue temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of Ombudsman decisions in administrative disciplinary cases, as such relief encroaches upon the Ombudsman's constitutionally granted rule-making power providing for the immediate executory nature of its decisions, and because public office is not a property right but a public trust under Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution that creates no vested interest entitling a respondent to injunctive protection against removal.

During his first term as Governor of Negros Oriental in 2012, Roel Degamo proposed a P10 million budget item for "Intelligence Expenses" in the provincial budget. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the appropriations ordinance for Fiscal Year 2013 but deleted the intelligence item and appropriated the amount instead for Gender and Development. Degamo vetoed the deletion, but the Sangguniang did not override the veto. Despite the absence of a valid appropriation for intelligence expenses, Degamo directed the provincial budget officer, treasurer, and accountant to release the P10 million funds, which they did under written protest. The Department of Budget and Management and the Commission on Audit subsequently found the disbursement violated budget laws, leading to an administrative complaint filed by Melliemoore Saycon charging Degamo with grave misconduct.

• The Administrative Complaint: Melliemoore Saycon filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Roel Degamo and provincial officers Marichu Alperto, Teodorico Reyes, and Danilo Mendez for causing the release of P10 million in public funds without corresponding appropriation in violation of budget laws.
• The Budget Controversy: In October 2012, Degamo submitted a proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2013 including P10 million for "Intelligence Expenses." The Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the appropriations ordinance on January 15, 2013, but excluded the intelligence item and appropriated the amount for Gender and Development instead. Degamo vetoed the deletion, but the Sangguniang did not override the veto. The approved budget was submitted to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Regional Office VII on March 22, 2013.
• The Unauthorized Release: On April 16, 2013, Degamo issued a memorandum directing the Provincial Budget Officer, Treasurer, and Accountant to release the P10 million for intelligence operations immediately. The officials complied but registered written objections on the same day, noting the absence of any available appropriation for the item.
• DBM and COA Findings: By letter dated May 17, 2013, the DBM Regional Office VII informed the Sangguniang that the Gender and Development appropriation was inoperative due to the veto, and that Degamo's veto on the Intelligence Fund could not operate to re-enact a non-existent item in the appropriations ordinance. The Commission on Audit Regional Office VII concurred, finding the disbursement violated Section 305(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 and Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1445.
• Ombudsman Proceedings: The Ombudsman found substantial evidence to hold Degamo liable for Grave Misconduct for directing the release of funds without appropriation, and dismissed him from service with accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. The co-respondents were exonerated for lack of substantial evidence, the Ombudsman finding no conspiracy in light of their written objections to the disbursement.
• Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals: Degamo filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals, praying for injunctive reliefs. The CA granted the TRO on January 11, 2018, and the WPI on March 7, 2018, enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's dismissal order. The CA applied the condonation doctrine, noting Degamo was elected for another term in 2013 and holding that this re-election should have condoned any administrative offenses committed during his first term.

• Lack of Vested Right: Saycon argued that no vested right exists to a public office, and therefore the Court of Appeals erred in granting injunctive relief to protect Degamo's position as governor.
• Inapplicability of Condonation Doctrine: Saycon maintained that Degamo was not elected to the governorship in 2011 but merely succeeded to the office by operation of law, rendering his subsequent election in 2013 not a "re-election" that would trigger the condonation doctrine.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Saycon contended that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and WPI because the Ombudsman's decision was supported by substantial evidence and the condonation doctrine had been abandoned by the Supreme Court in subsequent jurisprudence.

• Existence of Legal Right: Degamo countered that he possessed a legal right to the office of governor unless removed for cause, and that the implementation of the Ombudsman's decision would cause grave and irreparable injury by scandalizing government service in Negros Oriental.
• Applicability of Condonation Doctrine: Degamo argued that the condonation doctrine properly applied to his case because he was elected for another term in 2013, which should have operated to condone any administrative offenses committed during his first term.
• Urgency of Injunctive Relief: Degamo maintained that the Court of Appeals correctly found urgency and necessity in preventing the implementation of an irregular and persecutory decision.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing Injunctive Relief: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's decision dismissing Degamo from service.
• Vested Right to Public Office: Whether a public officer possesses a vested right to office that would entitle him to injunctive relief against an administrative dismissal order.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in granting the injunctive writs. The immediate execution of Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases is mandated by the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, which constitute a valid exercise of constitutionally granted rule-making power under Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution that supersedes the general procedure under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Citing Ombudsman v. Samaniego, the issuance of injunctive relief to stay Ombudsman decisions constitutes an encroachment on the Ombudsman's rule-making authority.
• Absence of Vested Right: No vested interest or absolute right exists to a public office. The Constitution declares that public office is a public trust, and public service cannot be considered a property right. Consequently, injunctive relief cannot issue to protect a right not clearly founded on or granted by law.
• No Irreparable Injury: The enforcement of the Ombudsman's decision would not result in grave and irreparable injury. During the pendency of an appeal, a respondent in an administrative case who has been dismissed is considered under preventive suspension and, should the appeal succeed, is entitled to receive the salary and emoluments not received by reason of the removal. This remedy negates any claim of irreparable damage.
• Limited Scope of Resolution: The Court's resolution was limited to the propriety of the injunctive relief and did not pre-empt the Court of Appeals' resolution of the underlying petition for review on the merits, including the applicability of the condonation doctrine.

• Immediate Executory Nature of Ombudsman Decisions: The Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. This special rule, promulgated pursuant to the Ombudsman's constitutionally granted rule-making power under Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution, supersedes the general rule under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court regarding the stay of execution pending appeal. The requisites for preliminary injunction—(a) the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage—cannot be satisfied where the applicant seeks to enjoin an immediately executory Ombudsman decision, as no right to the office exists and the applicant is protected by the preventive suspension and back-pay provisions during the pendency of the appeal.
• Public Office as Public Trust: Public office is not a property right but a public trust under Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. No vested interest exists in an office that would entitle a public officer to injunctive relief against removal, and an injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse or merely contingent.

• "A right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law." — Cited from City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., articulating the standard for injunctive relief.
• "The Court has recognized in Ombudsman v. Samaniego that providing for the immediate execution of OMB decisions in administrative cases is a valid exercise of the OMB's constitutionally-granted rule-making power. As a special rule that specifically applies to the OMB's administrative cases, it supersedes the general procedure under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court." — Establishing the supremacy of the Ombudsman's procedural rules regarding immediate executory effect.
• "There can be no vested interest or absolute right to an office. No less than the Constitution dictates that 'public office is a public trust.' As such, public service or office cannot be considered a property right." — Affirming the non-proprietary nature of public office as basis for denying injunctive protection.

• Ombudsman v. Samaniego, 646 Phil. 445 (2010) — Controlling precedent establishing that the immediate execution of Ombudsman decisions is a valid exercise of rule-making power and that courts cannot enjoin such execution without encroaching on constitutional authority.
• City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 651 Phil. 37 (2010) — Cited for the definition and requisites of preliminary injunction.
• Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, 560 Phil. 702 (2007) — Cited for the principle that public office is not a property right.
• Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, 811 Phil. 378 (2017) — Cited for the rule that respondents under preventive suspension during appeal are entitled to back pay if exonerated, negating claims of irreparable injury.

• Article XI, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — "Public office is a public trust." Establishes that public office is not a property right.
• Article XI, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Grants the Office of the Ombudsman the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure.
• Section 12, Rule 43, Rules of Court — General rule on the effect of appeal; held superseded by the Ombudsman's special rules regarding immediate executory nature of decisions in administrative cases.
• Section 3, Rule 58, Rules of Court — Requisites for preliminary injunction.
• Section 305(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Prohibition against disbursement of funds without appropriation; basis for Ombudsman's finding of grave misconduct.
• Section 4(1), Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code) — Prohibition against disbursement of public funds without valid appropriation.
• Rule III, Section 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman — Provides that decisions in administrative cases are immediately executory and that appeal does not stay execution; also provides for preventive suspension and entitlement to back pay.

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, and Hernando, JJ., concur.
Inting, J., on official business.