Saulo vs. Cruz

An appeal in a habeas corpus case must be perfected within 24 hours from notice of judgment under Section 18, Rule 41; the period is jurisdictional, and a Court of First Instance to which the writ is made returnable has full authority to decide all issues of law and fact on the merits, so its decision becomes final if not timely appealed.

Alfredo B. Saulo was the person whose detention by the Philippine Constabulary was challenged in the habeas corpus proceedings against respondent Brig. Gen. Pelagio Cruz, its Commanding General. The habeas corpus rules permit a writ issued by the SC to be made returnable before a Court of First Instance, and Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act, punishes its violation with prision mayor to death and authorizes preliminary investigation.

Alfredo B. Saulo had successfully evaded arrest since September 1950 in connection with three criminal cases in the CFI of Manila — Nos. 13681, 19166, and 39253 — one of which was for inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies, and kidnappings. On November 12, 1958, he showed up at the Indonesian Embassy in Manila to seek refuge. After negotiations, the Indonesian Embassy surrendered him to the Philippine Government on November 18, 1958, and from that date he remained in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City.

One of the two criminal cases for rebellion was dismissed with respect to Saulo on motion of the prosecution, and he put up bail in the two remaining cases, Nos. 13681 and 39253. When the corresponding order for his temporary release was served, respondent Brig. Gen. Pelagio Cruz, Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, commanded one of his subordinates to withhold Saulo’s release on account of Criminal Case No. 46410 in the CFI of Manila.

That criminal case was a complaint against Saulo filed on November 19, 1958 by the Fiscal of Manila for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act, punishable by prision mayor to death, so that the CFI of Manila might conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation as provided in the Act. While the preliminary investigation was still going on, on December 23, 1958, Saulo applied for a writ of habeas corpus with the SC on the ground that his detention, without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410, was illegal and void.

• Illegality of Detention: Petitioner applied for habeas corpus on the ground that his detention, without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410, was illegal and void.
• Delegated Habeas Proceeding: Petitioner contended in his manifestation dated October 12, 1959 that because the habeas corpus case was heard by the Manila CFI “not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely by delegation,” the SC should have the final say regarding the issues raised and only its decision, not that of the CFI, should be regarded as operative.

• Jurisdiction of CFI Manila: Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that, because petitioner was confined in the Philippine Constabulary stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City, the Manila court was without jurisdiction under Section 2, Rule 102.
• Continuing Detention: Respondent pleaded that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410 for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 before the CFI of Manila was sufficient reason for continuing petitioner’s detention, in the absence of an order of the court for his discharge under that case.
• Timeliness of Appeal: The Solicitor General pointed out that petitioner’s appeal was filed out of time.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Whether petitioner’s appeal from the CFI of Manila’s denial of the habeas corpus petition was perfected within the 24-hour period under Section 18, Rule 41.
• Authority of Return Court: Whether the CFI of Manila, to which the writ was made returnable, was merely a delegated or recommendatory body whose decision required the SC’s approval, or had full authority to decide the merits so that its decision became final if not timely appealed.

• Timeliness of Appeal: No. The notice of appeal was filed 11 days after service of the lower court’s decision, beyond the 24-hour period under Section 18, Rule 41; the period is jurisdictional and an appeal filed out of time may be dismissed at any stage.
• Authority of Return Court: It had full authority. The CFI to which the writ was returnable was not merely a recommendatory body; it had authority to examine all issues of law and fact and decide the merits, and its decision became final when not timely appealed.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Section 18, Rule 41 requires an appeal in a habeas corpus case to be perfected within 24 hours from notice of judgment. The lower court’s decision was served on petitioner’s counsel on May 12, 1959, as per sheriff’s return; the notice of appeal was filed 11 days later. The reglementary period for appeal is jurisdictional on the courts, and an appeal filed out of time may be dismissed at any stage. The SC therefore had no alternative but to dismiss the appeal.
• Authority of Return Court: Petitioner’s manifestation argued that because the Manila CFI heard the case “not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely by delegation,” only the SC’s decision should be operative. The SC rejected this. While the petition was originally filed with the SC, the only question immediately involved was the propriety of issuing a writ ordering respondent to show cause; the Rules authorize the writ, once issued, to be made returnable before a CFI under Section 2, Rule 102. The tribunal designated does not become merely a recommendatory body. By filing a notice of appeal with the lower court, appellant impliedly admitted that the decision appealed was not merely recommendatory or fact-finding. In its March 19, 1959 resolution, the SC stated that Sections 12 to 15 of Rule 102 give the return court or judge the authority and duty to inquire into the facts and law pertinent to the legality or illegality of detention and to order discharge if the prisoner is unlawfully imprisoned. In practice, when a writ is made returnable to a court other than the issuing court, that court possesses full authority to examine all issues raised and settle them; American jurisprudence provides that the court or judge to whom the return is made must pass upon all questions of law and fact and determine whether the prisoner is wrongfully restrained, including the weight and credibility of conflicting testimony. The court or judge to whom the writ is returnable takes the case for determination on the merits, and its findings, whether for release or continued custody, if not appealed on time, can become final as in an ordinary case.

• Habeas Corpus Appeal Period — An appeal in a habeas corpus case must be perfected within 24 hours from notice of judgment under Section 18, Rule 41. The period is jurisdictional, and an appeal filed out of time may be dismissed at any stage. Applied: Saulo’s notice of appeal was filed 11 days after service, so the SC dismissed the appeal.
• Authority of Court to Which Habeas Writ Is Returnable — When a writ of habeas corpus is made returnable to a court other than the issuing court, the return court has full authority to examine all issues of law and fact and decide the merits; it is not merely a recommendatory body. Its findings for release or continued custody, if not timely appealed, become final as in an ordinary case. Applied: the CFI of Manila’s denial of Saulo’s petition was a decision on the merits, not a mere recommendation.

• “An appeal in habeas corpus case shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals from the judgment rendered.” — Section 18, Rule 41, quoted by the SC; it sets the 24-hour period that Saulo missed.
• “In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made returnable to a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ is returned, or the judge thereof, possesses full authority to examine all issues raised in the case and to settle the same.” — The SC rejects the claim that the CFI of Manila was merely a delegated or recommendatory body.
• “In other words, the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination on the merits (See 39 C.J.S. p. 603, sec. 58 and case cited therein), and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his continued custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case.” — The SC explains why the CFI’s decision became final when Saulo failed to appeal on time.

• Garganta et al. vs. Court of Appeals et al., 105 Phil. 412 — Cited for the rule that the reglementary period for appeal is jurisdictional and an appeal filed out of time may be dismissed at any stage.
• Miranda vs. Guanzon et al. and the Court of Appeals, 92 Phil. 168 — Cited for the same rule on the jurisdictional nature of the appeal period.
• Clemente vs. H.E. Heacock Company et al., G.R. No. L-12786, October 29, 1959 — Cited for the same rule.
• Mallare et al. vs. Panahon et al., 98 Phil. 154 — Cited for the same rule.
• So Hong Chung vs. Collector of Customs, 60 Phil. 945 — Cited for the same rule.

• Section 18, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Requires an appeal in a habeas corpus case to be perfected within 24 hours from notice of judgment; applied to dismiss Saulo’s appeal filed 11 days after service.
• Section 2, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Authorizes a writ of habeas corpus issued by the SC to be made returnable before a Court of First Instance; applied to reject the claim that the CFI of Manila was merely a delegated body.
• Sections 12 to 15, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Give the return court or judge authority and duty to inquire into the facts and law and order discharge if the detention is unlawful; applied to hold that the CFI of Manila had full authority to decide the merits.
• Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) — Punishes violation with prision mayor to death and authorizes preliminary investigation; the complaint in Criminal Case No. 46410 was filed under this Act.