Sarmiento vs. COMELEC

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must first be heard and decided by a Division of the COMELEC; the Commission en banc has no authority to hear and decide them at first instance, and only motions for reconsideration of Division decisions may be decided by the Commission en banc.

The petitions arose from the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections, in which various candidates for local elective positions filed pre-proclamation controversies before the COMELEC, appealing rulings of municipal and provincial boards of canvassers on the inclusion or exclusion of election returns and related canvass matters. The constitutional framework governing the COMELEC's internal organization had shifted between the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions: the former permitted election cases to be heard and decided by divisions, with contests involving Batasang Pambansa members heard en banc, while the latter requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration reserved for the en banc. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure classify pre-proclamation controversies as Special Cases and assign them to the two Divisions pursuant to this constitutional mandate.

The nine consolidated petitions arose from the May 1992 synchronized national and local elections. Petitioners were candidates for various local elective positions who filed pre-proclamation controversies before the COMELEC, appealing from rulings of municipal and provincial boards of canvassers. The appeals concerned the inclusion or exclusion of election returns, the composition of boards of canvassers, objections to certificates of canvass, and other canvass-related matters across several municipalities and provinces, including Virac and Catanduanes, Iriga City, Jose Panganiban in Camarines Norte, Cabusao in Camarines Sur, Gen. Natividad in Nueva Ecija, Davao Oriental, Upi Nuro in Maguindanao, and Ternate in Cavite.

The COMELEC, sitting en banc, resolved these appeals directly. In some cases it granted or reversed the rulings of the boards of canvassers; in others it dismissed the appeals or affirmed the boards' rulings. In all instances, the Commission en banc took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to either of its two Divisions.

Petitioners challenged the COMELEC resolutions as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, arguing that the constitutional requirement mandating that election cases first be heard and decided by a Division had been violated. Comments were filed only in G.R. No. 105727 and G.R. No. 105797; the Court dispensed with comments in the remaining cases. The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases commenced at noon on June 30, 1992, a fact that would prove decisive in the disposition of the petitions.

• Jurisdictional Defect: Petitioners impugned the challenged COMELEC resolutions as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, in that the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Whether the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it heard and decided pre-proclamation controversy appeals at first instance without first referring them to a Division.
• Mootness: Whether the petitions were rendered moot by Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, which deems pending pre-proclamation cases terminated at the beginning of the term of office involved.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction. Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all election cases including pre-proclamation controversies must first be heard and decided by a Division; the en banc may decide only motions for reconsideration of Division decisions. The challenged resolutions are null and void.
• Mootness: Yes. The terms of office involved commenced at noon on June 30, 1992. Pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, all pending pre-proclamation cases were deemed terminated, rendering the petitions moot and a directive to refer the cases to a Division an exercise in futility.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration of decisions to be decided by the Commission en banc. This differs from the 1973 Constitution, which permitted election cases to be heard and decided by divisions but reserved contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa for the en banc. The constitutional language is clear: election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, in compliance with this mandate, classify pre-proclamation controversies as Special Cases and vest the two Divisions with authority to hear and decide them. Section 9 of Rule 27 specifically provides that appeals from rulings of boards of canvassers are cognizable by the Division to which they are assigned, and Rule 19 provides the mechanism for motions for reconsideration to be certified to the en banc. Because the COMELEC en banc resolved the appeals without first referring them to a Division, it acted without jurisdiction, and its resolutions are null and void.

• Mootness: Although the nullification of the COMELEC resolutions would logically require referral of the appeals to a Division for proper disposition, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before the COMELEC shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved, with the rulings of the boards of canvassers deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest. The statute carves out two exceptions: where the COMELEC determines on the basis of evidence thus far presented that the petition appears meritorious and issues an order for proceedings to continue, or where an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. Neither exception applies here. The terms of office involved commenced at noon on June 30, 1992, pursuant to Section 2, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The cases were thus rendered moot, and a resolution directing the COMELEC to assign the Special Cases to the Divisions would be an exercise in futility. The petitions were accordingly dismissed without prejudice to the filing of regular election protests, with the period to file such protests deemed suspended by the pendency of the cases before the COMELEC and the Supreme Court.

• Constitutional Mandate on COMELEC Division-En Banc Structure — Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions. All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must first be heard and decided by a Division. Only motions for reconsideration of Division decisions are to be decided by the Commission en banc. The en banc has no authority to hear and decide election cases at first instance. This requirement is jurisdictional. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the COMELEC en banc's direct resolution of pre-proclamation controversy appeals, without referral to a Division, was void for lack of jurisdiction.

• Termination of Pre-Proclamation Cases Upon Commencement of Term — Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, all pre-proclamation cases pending before the COMELEC shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved, and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. Proceedings may continue only when (1) the COMELEC determines on the basis of evidence thus far presented that the petition appears meritorious and issues an order for proceedings to continue, or (2) an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. The Court applied this provision to render the petitions moot, as the terms of office commenced at noon on June 30, 1992.

• "It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi, defining the scope of the constitutional requirement and the jurisdictional boundary between the COMELEC's Divisions and the en banc.

• "Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside." — This is the direct conclusion on the jurisdictional defect, establishing that the COMELEC's procedural error rendered its resolutions void.

• "All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party." — Quotation of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, the statutory provision that rendered the cases moot and shaped the dispositive.

• Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions; all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, with motions for reconsideration of decisions to be decided by the Commission en banc. This was the controlling provision holding that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in deciding the appeals at first instance.

• Section 3, Article XII, 1973 Constitution — Contrasted with the 1987 provision; allowed election cases to be heard and decided by divisions, except contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa, which were heard en banc. Cited to highlight the shift in constitutional policy.

• Section 16, R.A. No. 7166 — Provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before the COMELEC shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of office involved, with the rulings of the boards of canvassers deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest. Applied to render the petitions moot since the terms commenced at noon on June 30, 1992.

• Section 9, Rule 27, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that appeals from rulings of boards of canvassers are cognizable by the Division to which they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Cited to confirm that the COMELEC's own rules implement the constitutional mandate.

• Section 2, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in footnote 7 as the basis for the commencement of terms of office at noon on June 30, 1992, which triggered the mootness of the pre-proclamation cases.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ. concur.

Cruz, J., filed a separate concurring opinion agreeing with the majority that the constitutional provision is jurisdictional and mandatory. He acknowledged that the provision may be "ill-considered" in view of the practical difficulties it may spawn, but emphasized that a mandatory provision of the Constitution must be observed unless amended, drawing an analogy to the Supreme Court's own inability to exercise original jurisdiction over matters within the exclusive original jurisdiction of lower courts.

• Feliciano, J. (concurring and dissenting) — Concurred in the result (dismissal of the petitions) but dissented from the holding that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He advanced several arguments: (1) the term "election cases" in the second sentence of Article IX-C(3) should be read as referring only to election contests or election protests, not pre-proclamation controversies, since the first sentence of the provision distinguishes the two categories; (2) the COMELEC Rules themselves do not establish a rigid wall of separation between the Divisions and the en banc, as the Rules authorize the Commission to intervene in ordinary actions and to hear certain pre-proclamation controversies directly en banc under Rule 27, Section 4; (3) since all members of the en banc (and therefore all members of each Division) were present when the appeals were resolved, the constitutional requirement was literally and effectively complied with, making the majority's position an exaltation of form over substance; (4) most if not all of the 700-plus proceedings disposed of by the COMELEC were not genuine pre-proclamation controversies, as the grounds raised were insubstantial and appeared initiated merely to delay proclamation; and (5) the second sentence of Article IX-C(3) should be read as directory rather than mandatory, to preserve the COMELEC's flexibility in carrying out the constitutional mandate to expedite disposition of election cases and pre-proclamation controversies.