Sarmiento III vs. Mison

The Court held that the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required only for appointments to the positions expressly enumerated in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution (i.e., heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, armed forces officers from the rank of colonel/naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution). Appointments to all other government offices, including bureau heads like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, may be made by the President alone without such confirmation.

The petitioners, as taxpayers and constitutional law professors, challenged the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's direct appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. They contended that the appointment was invalid for not having been submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, as allegedly required by the Constitution. The respondents maintained the appointment's validity, arguing the Constitution did not require confirmation for such position. The Commission on Appointments intervened, supporting the petitioners' view.

Petitioners Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla filed a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondent Salvador Mison from performing as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Guillermo Carague from disbursing Mison's salary. They alleged Mison's appointment was unconstitutional for lacking confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents countered that the 1987 Constitution did not require confirmation for the Commissioner of Customs. The Commission on Appointments intervened, arguing confirmation was required. The Court treated the case as a justiciable controversy involving a conflict between the Executive and Legislative departments.

• Petitioners maintained that the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, as a bureau head, required confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
• They argued that the second sentence of Section 16 (pertaining to officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law) must be read in conjunction with the first sentence, implying that appointments under the second sentence also require confirmation.

• Respondents argued that the plain language of Section 16, Article VII, shows that only the officers enumerated in the first sentence require confirmation.
• They contended that the second and third sentences of Section 16 create separate categories of officers whose appointments do not require confirmation, and the Commissioner of Customs falls within these categories as an officer appointed by the President pursuant to law (Tariff and Customs Code).
• The Solicitor General argued the word "also" in the second sentence means "in addition," not "in like manner," stressing the President can appoint those officers without confirmation.

• Procedural Issues: Whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right to office and whether the petitioners have standing to sue. (The Court set these aside due to public interest.)
• Substantive Issues: Whether the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

• Procedural: The Court resolved to give due course to the petition notwithstanding the procedural infirmities, citing the demands of public interest and the need for stability in public service.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the appointment did not require confirmation. It held that Section 16 creates four groups of officers. Only the first group (enumerated in the first sentence) requires confirmation. The Commissioner of Customs is not in the first group but falls under the second or third group (officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or whom the President is authorized by law to appoint), which the President may appoint without confirmation. The Court based this on textual analysis, historical comparison with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, and the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, which showed a deliberate intent to limit the confirmation requirement.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The Court applied this principle of statutory construction, holding that the express enumeration of officers requiring confirmation in the first sentence of Section 16 implies the exclusion of all others not enumerated.
• Intent of the Framers — The Court emphasized that the primary source for ascertaining constitutional intent is the language of the Constitution itself, aided by historical background and the records of the Constitutional Commission. It cited the 1986 ConCom debates showing a deliberate move to reduce the scope of required confirmations compared to the 1935 Constitution.
• Executive Nature of the Power to Appoint — The Court noted that the power to appoint is fundamentally executive in character. Limitations on this power should be strictly construed and must be clearly stated in the Constitution.

• "The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves." — Cited from Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez and applied as the guiding principle.
• "The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide." — The Court's statement of its interpretive stance.
• "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition." — Attributed to Judge Learned Hand, used by the Court to underscore that the different language used in the first and second sentences of Section 16 signifies a difference in meaning.

• Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez — Cited for the fundamental principle that constitutional construction must give effect to the intent of the framers as embodied in the provisions themselves.

• Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution — The central provision interpreted. The Court analyzed its three sentences to delineate which presidential appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
• Section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution — Cited for historical comparison, showing that under the 1935 Charter, almost all presidential appointments required confirmation.
• Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution — Cited for historical comparison, showing that under the authoritarian 1973 Charter, the President had absolute appointing power with no legislative check.
• Section 601 of Republic Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 34 — Cited as the law authorizing the President to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, which, when read in harmony with the 1987 Constitution, does not require confirmation.

• Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — Concurred on the ground of paramount public interest and exigencies of public service. He emphasized that the Court's ruling was based on the issues joined and did not address pending legislation (Senate Bill No. 137) that might affect future appointments.
• Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino (Melencio-Herrera) — Concurred, adding that the deliberate use of the word "appoint" in the second sentence, as opposed to "nominate and... appoint" in the first sentence, clearly indicated the framers' intent to exclude those appointees from confirmation.
• Justice Isagani A. Cruz — Authored a separate concurrence focusing on the system of checks and balances. He argued that the Commission on Appointments acts as a restraint on abuse but not as a means to hold the Executive hostage, and that in case of doubt, the appointing power should be resolved in favor of the Executive.

• Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin (Gutierrez, Jr.) — Dissented, arguing that the majority interpretation leads to absurd results (e.g., a consul requiring confirmation but not his superior, an undersecretary). He contended that the third sentence of Section 16 specifying that Congress may vest appointment of "officers lower in rank" in the President alone implies that higher officers not covered by the first sentence require confirmation.
• Justice Isagani A. Cruz — Authored the main dissent, arguing that the second sentence of Section 16 is a continuation of the first and that all officers appointed by the President, except those expressly exempted (like judges and the Ombudsman), require confirmation. He warned that the majority interpretation creates irrational discrepancies and undermines the constitutional intent to check presidential power. He voted to grant the petition.