Sarigumba vs. Commission on Elections

A respondent's failure to file a counter-affidavit does not authorize the COMELEC to indefinitely toll the preliminary investigation; once the period to file the counter-affidavit lapses, the 20-day period under Rule 34, Section 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure begins to run, and unjustified delay beyond that period violates the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and warrants dismissal of the complaint. The right may be invoked even if the respondent did not follow up on the case, because the prosecutor bears the duty to resolve it promptly.

Petronilo Solomon Sarigumba was a candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Loboc, Province of Bohol, in the 2010 National and Local Elections. The Commission on Elections, through its Campaign Finance Unit, enforces election finance laws, including the prohibition on election overspending under Section 100 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7166, in relation to Section 262 of the same Code. Preliminary investigations before the COMELEC are governed by Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which prescribes periods for the conduct of the investigation and the rendition of a resolution.

On December 1, 2009, Petronilo Solomon Sarigumba filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of the Municipality of Loboc, Province of Bohol, for the 2010 National and Local Elections. He lost his bid in the May 10, 2010 elections. On June 10, 2010, he filed his Statement of Election Contributions and Expenditures with the local elections officer of Loboc. The SOCE showed total contributions received of PHP 143,000, consisting of PHP 28,000 from a political party and PHP 115,000 from other persons, and total expenditures incurred of PHP 143,000, consisting of PHP 28,000 paid out of personal funds and PHP 115,000 paid from contributions received. In the SOCE, Sarigumba certified under oath on June 9, 2010 that the statement and supporting documents were supported by receipts, vouchers, and other documents reflecting the full, true, accurate, and complete election contributions and expenditures; that the expenditures were for lawful purposes; and that the contributions were not received from persons or entities prohibited by law from giving contributions.

For the 10,272 registered voters of Loboc, Bohol, the expenditure limit for a candidate belonging to a political party was PHP 3.00 per registered voter, or PHP 30,816. The COMELEC later alleged that Sarigumba's reported expenditures of PHP 143,000 exceeded this limit. On November 3, 2014, Sarigumba received a letter dated October 1, 2014 from Atty. Ferdinand T. Rafanan, head of the Campaign Finance Unit, requiring him to submit a written explanation under oath regarding his alleged overspending during the 2010 National and Local Elections within ten days from receipt. Sarigumba submitted his Explanation dated November 27, 2014. According to Sarigumba, the Campaign Finance Unit filed a Complaint against him with the COMELEC on February 10, 2015. The COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolution, however, quoted the Law Department's timeline stating that the motu proprio Complaint was filed on December 20, 2014.

Subpoenas were thereafter served on the parties, setting the case for preliminary investigation on April 14, 2015. Only the complainant's representative appeared on that date. Also on April 14, 2015, the Law Department received a formal notice of appearance with a very urgent motion for cancellation and resetting filed by Atty. Josie Vida Corre-Sempron, Sarigumba's counsel, who requested that the hearing be reset to May 12, 2015 at 3:00 p.m. because Sarigumba was unfit to travel due to "COPD in exacerbation R/O" and because counsel had to attend a hearing on April 15, 2015. The investigating officer granted the motion. On May 12, 2015, the Law Department received another motion from Atty. Corre-Sempron entitled "Manifestation with Omnibus Motion for Cancellation of Setting and Motion for the Delegation of the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation to the Provincial COMELEC Officer." Acting on this motion, the Investigating Officer issued an Order dated June 11, 2015 denying the motion and directing Sarigumba to subscribe his counter-affidavit before a public prosecutor and to send a copy to the Law Department through registered mail or courier service. Sarigumba failed to submit his counter-affidavit.

On July 27, 2021, the COMELEC Law Department found probable cause to hold Sarigumba for trial and recommended the filing of an Information against him for violation of Section 100 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7166, in relation to Section 262 of the same Code. The Law Department relied on Sarigumba's SOCE, noting that he was a candidate for mayor during the 2010 National and Local Elections; that as a member of a political party he was allowed to spend only PHP 3.00 for every voter; and that he spent PHP 143,000, exceeding the PHP 30,816 limit for the 10,272 registered voters of Loboc, Bohol. It also noted that the SOCE was notarized and enjoyed the presumption of regularity, and that Sarigumba failed to overcome that presumption. On July 28, 2021, the COMELEC En Banc adopted the recommendation, found probable cause, and resolved to file an Information before the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The Minute Resolution was attached to a Notice dated July 5, 2022, and Sarigumba alleged that he received it on August 18, 2022. He then filed the instant Petition for Certiorari.

The COMELEC's preliminary investigation and resolution of the Complaint lasted from December 20, 2014 until July 28, 2021, or six years and over seven months from the filing of the motu proprio Complaint. From the Order dated June 11, 2015, which directed Sarigumba to file his counter-affidavit, it took the COMELEC six years and over one month to resolve the Complaint. The COMELEC did not state when Sarigumba received the June 11, 2015 Order or the deadline for him to file his counter-affidavit, and it did not show that the case involved complex issues or voluminous records.

• Inordinate Delay: Petitioner argued that the COMELEC was guilty of inordinate delay and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict him for election overspending; he received the COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolution dated July 28, 2021 on August 18, 2022, almost eight years after the Complaint was filed.
• Peñas vs. COMELEC: Petitioner maintained that the case was on all fours with Peñas vs. COMELEC, where the Court found grave abuse of discretion when the COMELEC took six years to issue a resolution finding probable cause for election overspending.
• Dispensation with Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC could be dispensed with because there was urgent necessity for resolving the issue of inordinate delay, any further delay would prejudice his interests, and public interest was involved in the right of every Filipino citizen to speedy disposition of cases before the COMELEC under the 1987 Constitution.
• Preliminary Injunction: Petitioner prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the COMELEC from filing an Information and from prosecuting a criminal case against him, contending that he would suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury to his health, psychological well-being, business, and reputation; he was 76 years old and suffering from hypertension, diabetes, and rheumatism.

• Failure to File Motion for Reconsideration: Respondent argued that petitioner failed to demonstrate that his case fell within the exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari, and that the Petition should be dismissed for failure to resort to that plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Period to Resolve Never Began: Respondent maintained that the period for the investigating officer to resolve the case never began to run because the reckoning point was the submission of the counter-affidavit and other evidence, and petitioner never submitted a counter-affidavit; his Explanation dated November 27, 2014 was not the counter-affidavit contemplated by Rule 3, Section 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
• Concession and Advantage to Petitioner: Respondent argued that petitioner's right to submit a counter-affidavit was a concession made by the Investigating Officer due to petitioner's repeated failure to appear at the required hearings, and that the Law Department's refraining from immediate resolution allowed petitioner more time and opportunity to rectify deficiencies in his case.
• Waiver: Respondent contended that petitioner waived his right to speedy disposition of the case due to his failure to timely invoke the same and his complete lack of participation in the preliminary investigation despite multiple opportunities to do so.
• Probable Cause Based on Substantial Evidence: Respondent argued that the COMELEC's factual findings and ruling on the existence of probable cause against petitioner, being based on substantial evidence, should be upheld.
• Preliminary Injunction: Respondent argued that petitioner failed to establish the requisites for a writ of preliminary injunction; he had no clear legal right to the non-filing of the Information, there was no showing that he was in danger of being deprived of liberty or any other right, and injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted.

• Dispensation with Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the Petition for Certiorari may be entertained despite petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
• Speedy Disposition: Whether petitioner's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated by the COMELEC's delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause and ordering the filing of an Information against petitioner for election overspending.

• Dispensation with Motion for Reconsideration: Yes. The Petition was properly filed without a prior motion for reconsideration because the COMELEC proceedings were attended by inordinate delay, making a motion for reconsideration futile.
• Speedy Disposition: Yes. The right to speedy disposition of cases was violated; the preliminary investigation lasted six years and over seven months from the motu proprio Complaint and six years and over one month from the June 11, 2015 Order, beyond the periods under Rule 34, Sections 6 and 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and the COMELEC failed to justify the delay.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolution dated July 28, 2021 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; it was nullified and the motu proprio Complaint was dismissed.

• Dispensation with Motion for Reconsideration: Rule 65 generally requires a motion for reconsideration before a petition for certiorari may be filed, but the rule admits exceptions, including where there is an urgent necessity for resolution and further delay would prejudice the petitioner, where public interest is involved, and where a motion for reconsideration would be useless. Petitioner invoked the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, a matter of public interest, and the Court found that inordinate delay attended the COMELEC proceedings. Because the violation of the right to speedy disposition warranted dismissal, a motion for reconsideration of the Minute Resolution would have been futile. The Court cited Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals for the exceptions and Daep vs. Sandiganbayan for the principle that the Court will not hesitate to dismiss a case when the constitutional right to speedy disposition is violated.
• Speedy Disposition: Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of all persons to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The right may be invoked in preliminary investigation proceedings before the COMELEC. In Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down the framework: the right to speedy disposition is distinct from the right to speedy trial; a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to preliminary investigation; courts must determine which party bears the burden of proof; if the delay occurs beyond the prescribed time periods and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay; the prosecution must prove that it followed the prescribed procedure, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable, and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused; the determination of the length of delay is never mechanical; and the right must be timely raised. Exceptions include malicious prosecution and waiver. The timeline showed that the motu proprio Complaint was filed on December 20, 2014, and the COMELEC En Banc resolved the case on July 28, 2021, or six years and over seven months later. From the June 11, 2015 Order directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit, six years and over one month elapsed before resolution. Under Rule 34, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, if the respondent does not submit a counter-affidavit within the ten-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Under Rule 34, Section 8, the preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and the resolution must be made within five days thereafter. The Court harmonized these provisions: in the event of failure to file a counter-affidavit, the twenty-day period to conclude the preliminary investigation must be counted from the time that the period to file the counter-affidavit lapsed without one being filed. The failure to file a counter-affidavit does not give the COMELEC an unbridled license to indefinitely toll or delay the investigation and resolution. The COMELEC argued that the period never began to run because petitioner did not file a counter-affidavit, but the Court rejected this. Both petitioner and the COMELEC were silent as to when petitioner received the June 11, 2015 Order, and neither contended that he did not receive it. The COMELEC failed to mention the date of receipt and the deadline for the counter-affidavit, and it took six years and one month to resolve the case from the June 11, 2015 Order. These circumstances led the Court to conclude that any discussion of the receipt date and deadline would be prejudicial to the COMELEC's position. It was therefore reasonable to conclude that the COMELEC failed to observe the twenty-day period to conclude the preliminary investigation and the five-day period to render a resolution. Following Cagang, the burden shifted to the COMELEC to justify the delay. The COMELEC failed to do so. Nothing in the records showed that it dealt with complex issues or voluminous records. The Law Department relied only on petitioner's SOCE as basis for probable cause. The issue was simple: whether petitioner exceeded the expenditure limit, which required only a mathematical computation. There was no extraordinary complication or external event that stymied the prosecution's normal work. Thus, the delay was inordinate. The Court found that Peñas vs. COMELEC and Peralta vs. Commission on Elections applied. In Peñas, the COMELEC filed a motu proprio complaint against a 2010 mayoral candidate for election overspending; the Court nullified the resolution finding probable cause and dismissed the complaint because of inordinate delay of about six years and the COMELEC's failure to justify it. The issue was not complex or intricate and did not require voluminous records; the lone issue was whether the candidate spent beyond the prescribed campaign expenditure limit, and there was only one respondent. In Peralta, the Court likewise found inordinate delay in a COMELEC preliminary investigation that lasted more than six years and dismissed the complaint, reiterating Peñas. Although the petitioners in Peñas and Peralta filed counter-affidavits while Sarigumba did not, the Court held that the failure to file a counter-affidavit is not a blanket excuse for the COMELEC to unduly delay the resolution of the motu proprio Complaint. From the time the period to file the counter-affidavit lapsed, the investigating officer had the duty to resolve the case based on the available evidence. Petitioner's filing of motions for resetting and cancellation did not substantially cause the delay. From the time the period to file his counter-affidavit lapsed, the delay was attributable to the COMELEC. Petitioner could not be faulted for invoking his right to speedy disposition only after the COMELEC En Banc promulgated its Minute Resolution on July 28, 2021. As held in Peñas, a respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation is not duty bound to follow up on his or her case; it is the governing agency that is tasked to promptly resolve it. Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, reiterated in Peñas, provides that it is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence, provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him. Here, from the time the period to file the counter-affidavit lapsed, the COMELEC should have timely resolved the motu proprio Complaint, and any delay in its resolution could only be attributed to the COMELEC.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The COMELEC committed inordinate delay in conducting the preliminary investigation. The issuance of the COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolution dated July 28, 2021 was therefore tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the assailed Minute Resolution was nullified, and the criminal action filed against petitioner, if any, was dismissed.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees all persons the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The right may be invoked in preliminary investigation proceedings before the COMELEC. In this case, the Court found that the COMELEC violated this right when it took six years and over seven months to resolve the motu proprio Complaint.
• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan Framework — The Court in Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan clarified the mode of analysis for speedy disposition claims:
  • The right to speedy disposition is different from the right to speedy trial; the former may be invoked before any tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial, while the latter is invoked in criminal prosecutions before courts.
  • A case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to preliminary investigation; fact-finding investigations prior to the formal complaint are excluded from the delay determination.
  • Courts must determine which party bears the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the prescribed time periods, the defense bears the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period, the prosecution bears the burden of justifying the delay.
  • If the defense bears the burden, it must prove (1) that the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and attended by utter lack of evidence, and (2) that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
  • If the prosecution bears the burden, it must prove (1) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; (2) that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and (3) that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
  • The determination of the length of delay is never mechanical; courts must consider the entire context of the case.
  • Exceptions include malicious prosecution and waiver by the accused.
  • The right must be timely raised; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
  • COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Periods — Rule 34, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that if the respondent does not submit a counter-affidavit within the ten-day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant. Rule 34, Section 8 provides that the preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and the resolution must be made within five days thereafter. These provisions must be read together: in the event of failure to file a counter-affidavit, the twenty-day period is counted from the time the period to file the counter-affidavit lapsed without one being filed. The failure to file a counter-affidavit does not authorize the COMELEC to indefinitely toll or delay the preliminary investigation and the rendition of a resolution.
  • Inordinate Delay and Burden of Justification — Once the delay exceeds the prescribed periods and the right to speedy disposition is invoked, the burden shifts to the prosecution or investigating agency to justify the delay. It must prove compliance with the prescribed procedure, complexity of issues and volume of evidence making the delay inevitable, and absence of prejudice to the accused. In this case, the COMELEC failed to justify the six-year delay; the case involved only a simple mathematical determination of whether the reported expenditures exceeded the statutory limit, and the COMELEC relied only on the SOCE.
  • Waiver and Timely Invocation of the Right — The right to speedy disposition must be timely raised, but a respondent in a criminal prosecution or investigation is not duty bound to follow up on his or her case. It is the governing agency that is tasked to promptly resolve it. The prosecutor has the duty to speedily resolve the complaint as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence, provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him. Here, the delay was attributable to the COMELEC, not to petitioner.
  • Grave Abuse of Discretion from Inordinate Delay — Inordinate delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The assailed resolution is nullified, and the complaint is dismissed.
  • Election Overspending — Section 100 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7166, penalizes election overspending. The elements are: (1) the offender is any candidate or registered political party; and (2) the offender spent in his or her election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding the expenditure limit for every registered voter in the constituency where the certificate of candidacy was filed, or where the political party fielded its official candidates. The limits include PHP 10.00 for President and Vice President; PHP 3.00 for other candidates with a political party; PHP 5.00 for other candidates without any political party and without support from any political party; and PHP 5.00 for political parties. In this case, the COMELEC found that petitioner, a candidate with a political party, spent PHP 143,000 against the PHP 30,816 limit for 10,272 registered voters.

• "Rule 34, Section 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not be read in isolation but must be read together with Rule 34, Section 6 of the same rules. The import of the two provisions is that the failure of a respondent to file a counter-affidavit does not give the COMELEC the unbridled license to indefinitely toll or delay the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the rendition of a resolution on the case." — This passage rejects the COMELEC's argument that the period to resolve never began and establishes that the absence of a counter-affidavit does not excuse indefinite delay.
• "Harmonizing Sections 6 and 8 of Rule 34, in the event of failure to file a counter-affidavit, the 20-day period within which to conclude the preliminary investigation must be counted from the time that the period to file the counter-affidavit lapsed without one being filed." — This states the reckoning period for the COMELEC's duty to conclude the preliminary investigation when the respondent fails to file a counter-affidavit.
• "Given the length of time that passed, i.e., six years and over one month from the time that petitioner was ordered to file his counter-affidavit, it is reasonable to conclude that the COMELEC failed to observe the 20-day period to conclude the preliminary investigation, and thereafter, the five-day period to render a resolution on the case under Rule 34, Section 8 in relation to Rule 34, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure." — This is the Court's factual finding that the COMELEC breached its own procedural periods.
• "Ultimately, the Court finds that the COMELEC committed inordinate delay in conducting the preliminary investigation against petitioner. Thus, the Court finds that the issuance of the COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolution dated July 28, 2021 is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the assailed COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolution should be nullified, and the criminal action filed against petitioner, if any, should be dismissed." — This is the ratio decidendi and the basis for the nullification and dismissal.

• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, 837 Phil. 815 (2018) — The controlling framework for analyzing claims of violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases; the Court applied its burden-shifting rules and factors.
• Peñas vs. COMELEC, 919 Phil. 513 (2022) — The Court found inordinate delay where the COMELEC took about six years to resolve a motu proprio election overspending complaint; the Court applied it despite petitioner's failure to file a counter-affidavit.
• Peralta vs. Commission on Elections, 950 Phil. 761 (2024) — The Court reiterated Peñas and dismissed a COMELEC complaint where the preliminary investigation lasted more than six years without reasonable justification.
• Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, 366 Phil. 602 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the prosecutor has the duty to speedily resolve the complaint regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence, provided the delay was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
• Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 805 Phil. 964 (2017) — Cited for the exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration before a petition for certiorari.
• Daep vs. Sandiganbayan, 903 Phil. 783 (2021) — Cited for the principle that the Court will not hesitate to dismiss a case when the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases is violated.
• Figueroa vs. Sandiganbayan, 919 Phil. 892 (2022) — Cited for the rule that the right to speedy disposition may be invoked before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

• Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees all persons the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The Court found this right violated by the COMELEC's inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation.
• Section 100, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Defines and penalizes election overspending. The COMELEC alleged that petitioner violated this provision by spending PHP 143,000 against the PHP 30,816 limit for 10,272 registered voters.
• Section 262, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 — The provision in relation to which Section 100 was invoked in the charge for election overspending.
• Republic Act No. 7166 — Amended the Omnibus Election Code and provided the expenditure limits. For a candidate with a political party, the limit was PHP 3.00 for every registered voter; for 10,272 registered voters, the limit was PHP 30,816.
• Rule 34, Sections 6 and 8, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Govern the conduct and termination of preliminary investigation. Section 6 allows the investigating officer to base the resolution on the complainant's evidence if the respondent fails to submit a counter-affidavit within ten days. Section 8 requires termination of the preliminary investigation within twenty days after receipt of the counter-affidavits and other evidence, and resolution within five days thereafter. The Court harmonized them to require the twenty-day period to run from the lapse of the period to file the counter-affidavit when none is filed.
• Rule 64 and Rule 65, Rules of Court — Rule 64 governs petitions for certiorari assailing COMELEC resolutions, while Rule 65 generally requires a prior motion for reconsideration, subject to exceptions. The Court applied the exceptions because a motion for reconsideration would have been futile.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Villanueva, JJ., concur. Kho, Jr., J., no part. Singh, J., on leave.