Sarcos vs. Castillo

The provincial governor has no power to preventively suspend an elective municipal official under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967; that power belongs to the provincial board under the conditions stated in the statute. Deprivation of the governor's former authority under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code resulted from the exclusive-governance clause, the changed statutory language, and the decentralization policy favoring local autonomy and strict construction of suspension laws.

Domingo N. Sarcos was the duly elected independent Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, while Recaredo Castillo was the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur was the body charged with hearing administrative cases against municipal officials. Under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial governor could suspend a municipal officer pending board action if the charge affected official integrity. Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Act of 1967, effective September 12, 1967, repealed that scheme and declared in Section 5 that suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by its provisions.

Domingo N. Sarcos won as an independent candidate for Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, in the November 14, 1967 election. Thereafter, two related administrative charges emerged concerning timber from the communal forest reserve of Barobo. According to the Municipal Council of Barobo, in a charge under oath filed on April 18, 1968, Sarcos committed abuse of official power by consenting to and authorizing violations of forestry laws. In response to the Governor's May 21, 1968 order to explain within 72 hours, Sarcos stated that the logs he caused to be hauled sometime in January 1968 were logs cut and felled by other persons within the communal forests, seized by his patrolmen, and sold to raise funds for police uniforms and arms.

Subsequently, Provincial Governor Recaredo Castillo himself filed with the Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur, on October 4, 1968, an administrative complaint charging Sarcos with misconduct and dishonesty in office for allegedly conniving with private individuals to cut and fell timber and selling the timber or logs so cut for their own use and benefit within the communal forest reserve, to the damage and prejudice of the public and the government. On the basis of that complaint, the Governor issued an administrative order for Sarcos's immediate suspension from office as mayor and designated Vice-Mayor Brigido L. Mercader as Acting Mayor.

The suspension order was admitted by the Governor, who justified it on the ground that the admitted acts affected Sarcos's official integrity as municipal mayor by his having taken the law into his own hands, creating urgent necessity for immediate preventive suspension under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185. The administrative complaint and the suspension order thus precipitated the petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the suspension and secure reinstatement.

• Validity of Governor-Ordered Preventive Suspension: Petitioner challenged the administrative order immediately suspending him as Mayor of Barobo and designating the vice-mayor as acting mayor, seeking its annulment through certiorari and prohibition and his reinstatement to office.
• Exclusive Governance by Decentralization Act: Petitioner maintained that the suspension and removal of elective local officials is governed exclusively by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185, under which the provincial governor is no longer vested with power to order preventive suspension.

• Urgent Necessity Affecting Official Integrity: Respondent Governor countered that the acts charged against and admitted by petitioner affected his official integrity as municipal mayor by having taken the law into his own hands, creating urgent necessity for immediate preventive suspension.
• Authority under Section 5: Respondent maintained that the preventive suspension was in accordance with Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the Decentralization Act of 1967.

• Power to Suspend Preventively: Whether the provincial governor retains power to order the preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom charges have been filed under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967.

• Power to Suspend Preventively: No. The power of preventive suspension is not lodged in the provincial governor but in the provincial board under the conditions specified in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185.

• Power to Suspend Preventively: The former rule under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, which allowed the governor to suspend a municipal officer pending board action if the charge affected official integrity, was repealed by Section 25 of the Decentralization Act. Section 5 now categorically provides that suspension and removal shall be governed exclusively by its provisions, and the paragraph on preventive suspension assigns the hearing and investigation function to the President, Provincial Board, and City or Municipal Council, as the case may be, with the 60-day limit and related provisos. The deliberate selection of language different from the earlier act indicated an intended change, vesting the power in the provincial board rather than the governor. Absent an express or implied grant, no validity could attach to the governor's order, since public officials possess powers, not rights. Such construction was further required by the declared policy of Republic Act No. 5185 to transform local governments into effective instruments of self-government with greater freedom, by the universal rule of strict construction of suspension and removal laws especially for elective posts as stated in Lacson vs. Roque, and by the need to avoid undesirable partisan use of suspension power by a single official where a collective board provides a safeguard.

• Exclusive governance of suspension and removal by Section 5 — Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 provides that any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by that section, with charges against elective municipal officials preferred before the provincial governor or secretary of the provincial board, notice within seven days, and hearing and investigation by the provincial board. Applied here, the exclusive clause displaced Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code and removed the governor's former preventive-suspension authority.
• Change of language as indicia of change in law — The deliberate selection of language other than that used in an earlier act indicates that a change in the law was intended, as illustrated by Brewster vs. Gage. Applied here, the rewording of the preventive-suspension provision to center authority in the provincial board manifested withdrawal of the power previously exercised alone by the governor.
• Public office as power requiring grant of authority — Public officials possess powers, not rights, and must show an express or implied grant of authority to justify official action, in line with United States vs. Lee. Applied here, the absence of any grant to the governor to suspend preventively rendered the suspension order without legal validity.
• Strict construction of suspension and removal laws — Strict construction of laws relating to suspension and removal is the universal rule, with even greater necessity for restricted construction when dealing with elective posts, as held in Lacson vs. Roque. Applied here, the power to suspend preventively could not be extended by implication to officials other than those specifically mentioned, lest the elective mandate be diluted.
• Purposive construction of statutes — Once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect must be given to it, preferring the construction that best accords with letter and purpose, from Ty Sue vs. Hord, United States vs. Toribio, Riera vs. Palmaroli, and Commissioner of Customs vs. Caltex. Applied here, the Decentralization Act's purpose to grant local governments greater freedom and effect equitable distribution of powers required denying the governor a suspension power that would frustrate local autonomy and invite partisan harassment.

• "Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this section." — States the controlling exclusive-governance clause of Section 5 that displaced the former authority of the governor under the Revised Administrative Code.
• "We hold that such a power has been withheld from the provincial governor and may no longer be exercised by him." — Articulates the core holding that preventive suspension of a municipal mayor is no longer within the governor's powers.
• "The preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension." — Quotes the statutory limit confirming the complete scheme in Section 5 under which suspension authority is exercised by the investigating board or council, not the governor alone.

• Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953) — Followed as leading authority that strict construction of laws on suspension and removal is the universal rule, with greater necessity for restricted construction for elective posts.
• Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958) and Ochate vs. Deling, 105 Phil. 384 (1959) — Cited as illustrations of the former law under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code allowing gubernatorial preventive suspension, now repealed.
• Brewster vs. Gage, 280 US 327 (1930) — Cited for the principle that deliberate selection of different language from an earlier act indicates an intended change in the law.
• United States vs. Lee, 106 US 196 (1882) — Cited for the postulate that all government officers are creatures of law and bound to obey it, supporting the requirement of a grant of authority.

• Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185 (Decentralization Act of 1967) — Provides exclusive rules for suspension and removal, grounds of disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct, venue for charges, seven-day notice, hearing by President, Provincial Board or Council within ten days, 60-day limit on preventive suspension with reinstatement, and continuation of municipal or barrio suspension after guilty finding within thirty days until final board decision; applied to hold that only the provincial board may preventively suspend a municipal mayor.
• Section 2188, Revised Administrative Code — Formerly authorized the provincial governor to receive and investigate complaints and to suspend a municipal officer (except treasurer) pending board action if the charge affected official integrity; held repealed and no longer available as basis for gubernatorial suspension.
• Section 2, Republic Act No. 5185 — Declaration of policy to transform local governments into effective instruments of self-government and grant greater freedom and ampler means to respond to people's needs; relied upon to construe Section 5 against gubernatorial suspension power.
• Section 25, Republic Act No. 5185 — Repealing provision invoked to show that the former law conferring suspension power on the governor stands repealed.
• Section 5, Republic Act No. 2264 — Describes composition of provincial boards as collective bodies including governor, vice-governor and elected members; relied upon to show safeguard against partisan use when power resides in the board rather than a single official.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.