Santos vs. Spouses Ayon

Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses in the answer. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner, in which case a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.

Petitioner Ruben Santos is the registered owner of three lots in Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by TCT Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondents Spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. A building constructed by the previous occupant of respondents' property straddled both parties' lots, and respondents used the building as a warehouse. The dispute concerns the portion of the building encroaching on petitioner's property and the proper remedy for its recovery.

Petitioner Ruben Santos is the registered owner of three lots in Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by TCT Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176. Respondents Spouses Tony and Mercy Ayon are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of respondents' property built a building that straddled both the lots of the parties, and respondents used the building as a warehouse.

In 1985, when petitioner bought the three lots, he informed respondents that the building occupied a portion of his land, but he allowed them to continue using the building. In 1996, petitioner needed the entire portion of his lot, so he demanded that respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching on his property and turn over possession to him. Respondents refused and instead continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building. The dispute was referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement, and a certification to file action was issued on March 27, 1996.

In their answer, respondents sought dismissal on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction since there was no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. They denied occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they owned the contested portion and had been occupying it long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.

The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to vacate the portion of the subject properties, peacefully surrender possession, dismantle or remove the structures, pay ₱1,000.00 a month for use and occupation beginning September 1996, pay attorney's fees of ₱10,000.00, and pay costs. The RTC affirmed in toto, upholding the finding that respondents' occupation was by mere tolerance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner's proper remedy should have been accion publiciana before the RTC, not unlawful detainer, because respondents were already in possession when petitioner bought the lots in 1985, and the complaint did not allege that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest tolerated respondents' possession.

• Propriety of Unlawful Detainer: Petitioner contended that it is not necessary that he have prior physical possession of the questioned property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stressed that he tolerated respondents' occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it, and after his demand that they vacate, their continued possession became illegal, making his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC proper.
• Error of the Court of Appeals: Petitioner ascribed to the Court of Appeals the error of misapplying the law in dismissing the case on the ground that he should present his claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana, and that the CA's findings were not in consonance with existing laws and jurisprudence.

• Prior Possession: Respondents insisted that they had been in possession of the disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, petitioner could not claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Respondents sought dismissal of the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over it since there was no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties.

• Jurisdiction over Unlawful Detainer: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.

• Jurisdiction over Unlawful Detainer: No. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and petitioner's allegations clearly made a case for unlawful detainer within the MTCC's competence under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

• Jurisdiction over Unlawful Detainer: The Court applied the elementary rule that jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. This rule applies equally in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there are two distinct causes of action: forcible entry, where the defendant's occupation is illegal from the beginning; and unlawful detainer, where the defendant's possession was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff but became illegal upon termination of the right to hold possession. The Court examined petitioner's complaint, which alleged that respondents occupied a portion of the properties "by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the property," that petitioner needed the property in early 1996 and made demands to vacate, and that respondents refused without justifiable reason. These allegations clearly made a case for unlawful detainer. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The cause of action sprang from respondents' failure to vacate upon demand in 1996, and the complaint was filed on November 6, 1996, within one year therefrom. The Court applied the ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals: "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him." The MTCC was not divested of jurisdiction even if respondents raised the question of ownership in their pleadings, since the question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.

• Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations of the Complaint — Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. The Court applied this rule to hold that the MTCC properly assumed jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case based on the complaint's allegations, notwithstanding respondents' defense that they owned the contested portion.

• Unlawful Detainer vs. Forcible Entry — Forcible entry is an action to recover possession from a defendant whose occupation is illegal from the beginning, acquired by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Unlawful detainer is an action for recovery of possession from a defendant whose possession was inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff but became illegal upon continued possession despite termination of the right to hold possession. The Court distinguished the two causes of action under Section 1, Rule 70 and classified petitioner's complaint as one for unlawful detainer.

• Possession by Tolerance — Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

• Sufficiency of Complaint in Unlawful Detainer — A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The Court found petitioner's complaint sufficient because it alleged tolerance, demand, and refusal to vacate.

• "It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant." — This states the controlling rule on jurisdiction, which the Court applied to reject the Court of Appeals' reliance on respondents' defense of prior possession.

• "A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law." — This defines the standard for the sufficiency of an unlawful detainer complaint, which the Court used to validate petitioner's pleading.

• "It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner." — This articulates the core doctrine on possession by tolerance, which is the basis for the Court's conclusion that petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer was proper.

• "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him." — This is the canonical formulation from Roxas vs. Court of Appeals that the Court adopted as the controlling principle for the case.

• Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138955, October 29, 2002, 391 SCRA 351 — Controlling precedent on the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and on the doctrine that possession by tolerance becomes unlawful upon refusal to vacate after demand, making summary ejectment the proper remedy.
• Lavido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123462, April 10, 1997, 271 SCRA 143 — Cited for the proposition that the rule on jurisdiction being determined by the allegations of the complaint applies in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
• Progressive Development Corp., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 637 — Cited for the rule that all actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, including claims for damages and costs.
• Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44, 48 (1951) — Cited for the distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer as two entirely distinct causes of action.
• Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 134651, September 18, 2000, 340 SCRA 525 — Cited for the rule that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.

• Section 1, Rule 70, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines who may institute proceedings for forcible entry and unlawful detainer and when, providing that a person deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom possession is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding. The Court applied this provision to determine that petitioner's complaint was properly filed with the MTCC.

Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concurred.