Santos vs. Santos

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, not an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code, when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission that the first spouse was absent and that the marriage was terminated, and it does not nullify the effects of the declaration of presumptive death or the subsequent marriage.

Celerina J. Santos and Ricardo T. Santos were married on June 18, 1980. They were engaged in the buy and sell business and resided in Tarlac City after moving from San Juan, Metro Manila. The Family Code provides that a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage is null and void unless the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, with a summary proceeding for judicial declaration of presumptive death required before contracting a subsequent marriage.

Celerina J. Santos and Ricardo T. Santos married on June 18, 1980. After a year of marriage, they moved to Tarlac City and engaged in the buy and sell business. Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper, and Celerina allegedly convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. According to Ricardo, she applied at an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995, left Tarlac two months after, and was never heard from again. Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate her, going to her parents in Cubao, Quezon City, and inquiring from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. He claimed that it was almost 12 years since Celerina left and that he believed she had passed away.

On June 15, 2007, Ricardo filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City for the purpose of remarriage. On July 27, 2007, the trial court declared Celerina presumptively dead. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008, when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. She alleged that her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City, which had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. She claimed that Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City, depriving her of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition. Celerina asserted that she never resided in Tarlac, never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad, and never went to an employment agency in February 1995. She claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years, and that it was Ricardo who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. She referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper and because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of the petition.

• Affidavit of Reappearance Inapplicable: Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death, and that it would be inappropriate to file such an affidavit if she did not disappear in the first place.

• Annulment of Judgment Proper: Celerina insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.

• Insufficiency of Affidavit of Reappearance: Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

• Annulment of Judgment Not Proper: Ricardo argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed when there are other remedies available, and that Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage.

• Article 42 as Appropriate Remedy: Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.

• Proper Remedy for Fraudulently Obtained Declaration of Presumptive Death: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.

• Proper Remedy for Fraudulently Obtained Declaration of Presumptive Death: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment has become final and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, with grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged sufficient grounds in her petition, and the filing of an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not suffice for the purpose of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

• Proper Remedy for Fraudulently Obtained Declaration of Presumptive Death: Annulment of judgment under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is the remedy when the judgment, order, or resolution has become final and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction under Rule 47, Section 2. Extrinsic fraud, as defined in Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi, occurs when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevent a party from having a real contest or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. Celerina alleged in her petition that Ricardo deliberately made false allegations with respect to her residence, falsely claimed she was absent for 12 years, and that there was no publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, depriving her of notice and opportunity to oppose the petition. She also claimed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of the petition, which are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Her petition was filed on November 17, 2008, less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008, within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud and before the action is barred by laches. There was also no other sufficient remedy available to her at the time of her discovery of the fraud.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions. The Family Code provides that proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. Article 42 provides that the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead. A close reading of Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. Reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid, and the burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage. The Court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance in Social Security System vs. Vda. de Bailon, noting that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage if no step is taken to terminate it, and that by fiction of law, the reappearing spouse must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent. A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists, but a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when: (1) the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; (2) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; (3) there must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and (4) there is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead, and the first marriage will not be considered validly terminated. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. If Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition and contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, because the circumstances lack the element of well-founded belief under Article 41.

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. The Court had recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. Celerina does not admit to have been absent and seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 is valid until terminated, the children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouses will be the same as in valid marriages. A judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. While an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify its effects, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife, so this remedy is not available to Celerina. Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice, and Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will lie.

• Extrinsic Fraud as Ground for Annulment of Judgment — Fraud is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevent a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that Celerina's allegations — that Ricardo deliberately made false allegations regarding her residence, falsely claimed she was absent for 12 years, and that there was no publication of the notice of hearing — constituted sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud to support a petition for annulment of judgment.

• Conditional Nature of Reappearance Under Article 42 of the Family Code — The termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance of the absent spouse is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. The Court held that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination, and that by fiction of law, the reappearing spouse must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

• Requisites for Validity of Bigamous Subsequent Marriage — A bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when: (1) the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; (2) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; (3) there must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and (4) there is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead, and the first marriage will not be considered validly terminated.

• "For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy." — This passage from Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi defines the controlling doctrine of extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of judgment, which the Court applied to Celerina's allegations.

• "The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead." — This statement explains why the affidavit of reappearance remedy was inappropriate for Celerina, who did not admit to having been absent and sought to nullify the effects of the declaration.

• "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law." — This passage from Social Security System vs. Vda. de Bailon illustrates the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage.

• "The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law." — This statement establishes that the reappearance remedy under Article 42 is not exclusive and does not bar the presumptively dead spouse from pursuing annulment of judgment.

• Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi, 374 Phil. 879 (1999) — Controlling precedent defining extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of judgment, cited by the Court to determine that Celerina's allegations constituted sufficient grounds.

• Social Security System vs. Vda. de Bailon, 520 Phil. 249 (2006) — Followed for the proposition that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage if no step is taken to terminate it, and that the reappearing spouse must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.

• Manuel vs. People, 512 Phil. 818 (2005) — Cited for the proposition that a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.

• Amor-Catalan vs. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568 (2007) — Cited for the proposition that a real party in interest may file an action to nullify a marriage.

• Rule 47, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides that annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The Court applied this provision to determine that Celerina properly availed of annulment of judgment.

• Rule 47, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides that the grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court found that Celerina alleged both grounds in her petition.

• Rule 47, Section 3, Rules of Court — Provides the period for filing an action for annulment of judgment, which is within four years in case of extrinsic fraud and before the action is barred by laches in case of lack of jurisdiction. The Court found that Celerina's petition was filed within the four-year period.

• Article 41, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void unless the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, and requires a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death. The Court applied this provision to determine the requisites for a valid subsequent marriage.

• Article 42, Family Code — Provides that the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. The Court interpreted this provision to require several conditions before reappearance causes termination of the subsequent marriage.

• Article 35(4), Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage is void. The Court applied this provision to determine that a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith would be considered void for being bigamous.

• Article 43, Family Code — Provides the effects of termination of the subsequent marriage, including that children conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate. The Court cited this provision to explain the effects of termination by reappearance.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Cited in relation to the prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage, which still applies to a party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith.

• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 4, 2003), Section 2 — Provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The Court applied this provision to determine that the remedy of declaration of absolute nullity of the subsequent marriage was not available to Celerina.

• Justice Carpio (Chairperson)
• Justice Del Castillo
• Justice Mendoza
• Justice Perlas-Bernabe (designated acting member per Special Order No. 1829 dated October 8, 2014)