Santos vs. People

A resolution of a CTA Division denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order that cannot be appealed or made the subject of a petition for review to the CTA En Banc; the proper remedy is to proceed to trial and appeal from an adverse judgment, or, under exceptional circumstances, to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Judy Anne L. Santos was charged with violating Section 255, in relation to Sections 254 and 248(B) of the NIRC for substantial underdeclaration of her 2002 income. BIR officers found that Santos declared an income of P8,033,332.70 derived solely from ABS-CBN, while documents confirmed she received at least P14,796,234.70 from ABS-CBN and other sources. The estimated tax liability from the underdeclaration amounted to P1,718,925.52. BIR Commissioner Parayno referred the case to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation and potential filing of information. After finding probable cause, a State Prosecutor filed an Information with the CTA. Santos posted bail and moved to quash the Information.

• The Alleged Tax Violation: BIR Commissioner Parayno referred findings of substantial underdeclaration of income by Santos to the DOJ, recommending criminal prosecution under Sections 254, 255, and 248(B) of the NIRC. The estimated tax liability arising from the underdeclaration was P1,718,925.52.
• Filing of the Information: Following a preliminary investigation, Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas found probable cause and filed an Information with the CTA. After the CTA noted discrepancies, a second Information was admitted, alleging a gross underdeclaration resulting in a total income tax deficiency of P2,714,617.18.
• Motion to Quash: Santos moved to quash the Information on grounds that the facts charged did not constitute an offense, the prosecuting officer lacked authority, the CTA lacked jurisdiction, and the filing violated her rights to due process and equal protection.
• Procedural Stalemate: The CTA First Division denied the motion to quash and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Santos attempted to appeal the denial to the CTA En Banc via a petition for review, but the En Banc denied her motion for extension of time to file the petition, holding that the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and not a proper subject of appeal.

• Appealability of Interlocutory Order: Petitioner maintained that a CTA Division resolution denying a motion to quash is a proper subject of appeal to the CTA En Banc under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, because the law does not explicitly restrict appeals only to final dispositions. A restrictive interpretation creates a procedural void leaving parties without remedy for erroneous interlocutory resolutions.
• Lack of Authority of Prosecuting Attorney: Petitioner argued that Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas lacked authority to file the Information without the approval of the BIR Commissioner as required by Section 220 of the NIRC, and that the Quezon City Prosecutor possessed exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed within Quezon City.
• Violation of Constitutional Rights: Petitioner asserted a violation of due process and equal protection because similar charges against Regina Encarnacion A. Velasquez were dismissed by the DOJ when her tax liability was not yet fully determined.

• Interlocutory Nature of the Order: Respondent countered that a resolution denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order, which, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, cannot be the subject of an appeal or petition for review.
• Sufficiency of BIR Commissioner's Approval: Respondent argued that the BIR Commissioner’s letter of referral to the DOJ constituted the requisite prior approval under Section 220 of the NIRC, and that no specific form of approval is prescribed by law.
• Jurisdiction of State Prosecutors: Respondent maintained that State Prosecutors exercise national authority to prosecute cases before the CTA, which exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged, distinct from the limited territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Prosecutor.
• No Equal Protection Violation: Respondent asserted that the dismissal of charges against another individual does not compel the dismissal of charges against the petitioner absent proof of clear and intentional discrimination.

• Appealability of Denial of Motion to Quash: Whether a resolution of a CTA Division denying a motion to quash is a proper subject of an appeal to the CTA En Banc under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion (Authority to File Information): Whether the CTA First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash based on the alleged lack of authority of the Prosecuting Attorney to file the Information.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion (Constitutional Rights): Whether the CTA First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash based on alleged violations of due process and equal protection.

• Appealability of Denial of Motion to Quash: A resolution denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed or made the subject of a petition for review to the CTA En Banc. The petition for review under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, adopts the procedure for appeals in courts of general jurisdiction, which prohibit appeals from interlocutory orders. The proper remedy is to proceed to trial and appeal from an adverse judgment, or, under exceptional circumstances, to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion (Authority to File Information): No grave abuse of discretion was committed. The BIR Commissioner’s letter to the DOJ referring the case for preliminary investigation and filing of information if evidence warranted constituted prior approval under Section 220 of the NIRC; the law does not prescribe a specific form for such approval. Furthermore, the State Prosecutor possesses national authority to prosecute cases before the CTA, which exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged, superseding the limited territorial jurisdiction of the Quezon City Prosecutor.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion (Constitutional Rights): No violation of due process or equal protection was established. Due process was observed as petitioner was afforded the opportunity to be heard during the preliminary investigation. Equal protection was not violated because the dismissal of charges against another individual does not compel the dismissal of charges against the petitioner absent a showing of clear and intentional discrimination; the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties prevails over bare allegations of selective prosecution.

• Interlocutory Orders and Appeals — An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable. It leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case. The remedy of the accused is to proceed to trial, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
• Exceptions to the Interlocutory Order Rule — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to in order to question an interlocutory order, such as the denial of a motion to quash, only under exceptional circumstances: (1) when the tribunal issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.
• Equal Protection and Selective Prosecution — The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted is not, by itself, a denial of equal protection. To invoke the equal protection clause successfully, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination by the prosecuting officials. The unlawful administration of a statute fair on its face results in a denial of equal protection only if intentional or purposeful discrimination is present.

• "The denial of the motion to quash means that the criminal information remains pending with the court, which must proceed with the trial to determine whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged therein. Equally settled is the rule that an order denying a motion to quash, being interlocutory, is not immediately appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial."
• "Section 220 of the NIRC, as amended, simply requires that the BIR Commissioner approve the institution of civil or criminal action against a tax law violator, but it does not describe in what form such approval must be given."
• "The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws... The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination."

• Matute v. Court of Appeals, 136 Phil. 157 (1969) — Followed. Cited for the rationale that interlocutory orders are always under the control of the court until final decision, and that allowing appeals from such orders would cause multiplicity of appeals and suspend the hearing on the merits.
• Acharon v. Purisima — Followed. Cited for the established procedure that the remedy from a denial of a motion to quash is to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom, rather than filing a petition for certiorari.
• People v. Dela Piedra, 403 Phil. 31 (2001) — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that selective prosecution does not violate the equal protection clause absent a showing of clear and intentional discrimination by the prosecuting officials.

• Section 18, Republic Act No. 1125 (as amended by Republic Act No. 9282) — Provides that a party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial may file a petition for review with the CTA En Banc. Interpreted in conjunction with the Rules of Court to prohibit appeals from interlocutory orders, such as the denial of a motion to quash.
• Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court — States that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. Applied to affirm the CTA En Banc's denial of the petition for review.
• Section 220, National Internal Revenue Code — Requires the approval of the BIR Commissioner before filing a civil or criminal action for the recovery of taxes or enforcement of penalties. Applied to hold that the BIR Commissioner's letter of referral constituted sufficient compliance, as the law does not prescribe a specific form for such approval.
• Section 28, Republic Act No. 537 (Revised Quezon City Charter) — Defines the duties of the City Prosecutor. Distinguished to show that the State Prosecutor, not the City Prosecutor, possesses authority to prosecute cases before the CTA, which exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Ruben T. Reyes