Santos vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General

An allegation of forgery is never presumed and must be proven by the party making the claim with clear and convincing evidence, which is a degree of proof less than proof beyond reasonable doubt but greater than preponderance of evidence. A marriage certificate, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity, and its entries are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein; thus, a party seeking to correct or cancel its entries on the ground of forgery must present clear, positive, and convincing evidence, which may include expert testimony or other independent evidence, and self-serving allegations or bare denials are insufficient.

Lizza C. Santos filed a Petition for the Correction of Entries in the Marriage Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, seeking to cancel the wife portion, the place and date of marriage, and her name and signature in the marriage certificate. The marriage certificate, which she secured from the Manila Local Civil Registrar, states that she married Yoshio Imai, a Japanese citizen, on August 7, 2010, at the Manila City Hall. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General to appear, manifested that respondents would no longer present evidence.

Lizza C. Santos filed a Petition before the Regional Trial Court for the correction of entries in a marriage certificate she secured from the Manila Local Civil Registrar. The assailed marriage certificate states that Santos married Yoshio Imai, a Japanese citizen, on August 7, 2010, at 10:00 a.m. at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Gonzalo O. Rialp, and bears Santos's signature certifying that she appeared during the marriage ceremony. In her Petition, Santos asked the court to cancel the entire wife portion, the place and date of marriage, and her name and signature in the place and date of marriage.

In her testimony, Santos stated that, except for the address indicated therein, the entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate bear all her correct information. She claimed that she did not marry Imai on August 7, 2010 at the Manila City Hall, and that her signature was forged onto the marriage certificate. Santos did not present expert testimony from the National Bureau of Investigation to support her allegation of forgery. She gave the National Bureau of Investigation a photocopy of the marriage certificate, which responded that they "cannot render a definite opinion on the matter" because she only gave them a photocopy that "does not truly and clearly reflect the details of the writing strokes," and that "the sample specimen signatures [she] submitted are inappropriate to serve as basis for a scientific comparative examination." Santos explained that the National Bureau of Investigation required her to submit documents showing her full signature but she failed to do so.

Santos maintained that she only discovered her marriage to Imai in 2015, when she tried to get a Certificate of No Marriage, and that on August 7, 2010, she was in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, working for Q.C. Styropackaging Corporation. She presented her mother, Eugenia Celestino Santos, who said that Santos did not seek her parents' advice on or consent to a marriage with Imai. She also presented her co-worker Marty Dolores and her neighbor Genalyn Bote, who backed her claim that she was working in Bulacan on August 7, 2010. Bote said that at 5:30 a.m. that day, she saw Santos wearing her uniform to report for work and later at 7:00 p.m. she saw Santos cooking dinner at their house. Dolores said that on that day Santos was at their workplace from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Neither Dolores nor Santos presented Santos's daily time record for that date as documentary evidence.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed Santos's petition, finding that she failed to support her claim of forgery with clear and convincing evidence: (1) to support her alibi of being at her Bulacan workplace from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2010, Santos relied solely on her and her witnesses' testimonies; (2) Santos did not address the fact that her Bulacan workplace is close enough to the Manila City Hall for her to have been in both places on the same date; and (3) despite hinging her whole petition on her allegation of her signature's forgery, she presented neither documentary evidence nor testimony of a handwriting expert to prove that claim. The Regional Trial Court also differentiated Santos's case from Republic vs. Olaybar, ruling against applying Olaybar to Santos's case because, unlike the party there, Santos did not clearly establish that the Certificate of Marriage was a forgery. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto, similarly finding Olaybar inapplicable to her case.

• Question of Fact Exception: Petitioner claimed that her Petition falls under one of the exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition, particularly that the judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts.
• Forgery Proof: Petitioner argued that she is the "best witness to testify that there was no marriage celebrated between her and one Yoshio Imai," and that it was incorrect to dismiss her petition because she failed to present any documentary evidence or expert testimony to show that the signature on the certificate was not hers.
• Independent Judgment on Signatures: Petitioner cited Mendoza vs. Fermin, which says that "a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts and that the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny," pointing to her signatures in the Petition and letters dated July 11, 2016 and July 19, 2016.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that she presented witnesses such as her mother, her co-worker, and her neighbor, and that she "was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that she did not marry Yoshio Imai on 7 August 2010," claiming that because the opposing party did not object to these pieces of evidence during trial, nor refute her claims with their own evidence, she has sufficiently proven her case.
• Applicability of Olaybar: Petitioner maintained that Republic vs. Olaybar was applicable to her case.

• Rule 45 Limitation: Respondents argued that the issues raised in the petition are factual in nature and are therefore outside the scope of a Rule 45 review, as this remedy only concerns pure questions of law.
• Failure to Prove Marriage Never Took Place: Respondents argued that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Regional Trial Court's finding that, based on the totality of petitioner's evidence, she failed to prove that the marriage never took place.
• Burden of Proving Forgery: Respondents contended that forgery is never presumed, and it must be proven by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and that petitioner could have shown this if she had complied with the National Bureau of Investigation's request to prove it with documents bearing her original signature, but she did not.
• Alibi Not Established: Respondents claimed that petitioner's argument is essentially an alibi, similar to a criminal defense, but she did not show that it was physically impossible for her to be at the Manila City Hall for the marriage ceremony on August 7, 2010, and her daily time record was not even presented as evidence.
• Olaybar Distinguished: According to respondents, Olaybar is inapplicable because the party in Olaybar was able to establish that there was no marriage celebration.

• Procedural Issue (Rule 45): Whether the petition should be denied for raising questions of fact.
• Substantive Issue (Correction of Entries): Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the Petition for the Correction of Entries in the Marriage Certificate.

• Procedural Issue (Rule 45): Yes. The petition was denied for raising questions of fact. Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review under Rule 45, and the factual findings of appellate courts are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon the Court when supported by substantial evidence.
• Substantive Issue (Correction of Entries): No. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the dismissal. A marriage certificate is a public document enjoying the presumption of regularity and authenticity, and petitioner failed to present clear, positive, and convincing evidence to prove her allegation of forgery.

• Procedural Issue (Rule 45): It is well-settled that only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review under Rule 45. The Court will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court" when supported by substantial evidence. Although exceptions to this rule are recognized in jurisprudence, mere allegation of any of the exceptions does not suffice; exceptions must be "alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case." In this case, petitioner wanted the Court to revisit the factual finding of the lower courts regarding the alleged forgery of her signature. The authenticity of her signature as it appears on the marriage certificate is clearly a question of fact which the Court cannot entertain in a Rule 45 petition, as is the review of evidence on whether a marriage ceremony took place on August 7, 2010.

• Substantive Issue (Correction of Entries): A marriage certificate is "an official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar... [which] enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity." Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, its entries are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and it is in itself evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter. Therefore, for the marriage certificate to be deemed a forgery, petitioner needed to present no less than "clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence." The Court, in Tankeh vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, defined "clear and convincing evidence" as "less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for criminal cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases)," such that the "degree of believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case." Thus, petitioner should have submitted supporting expert testimony or come up with other evidence—which must be clear, positive, and convincing—that the Regional Trial Court could use to check for forgery. Yet petitioner submitted neither documentary evidence nor a testimony of a handwriting expert. While petitioner was not bound or required to present, specifically, expert testimony in support of her allegation of forgery, she still needed to give the court other independent evidence to that effect. She did not. Worse, she admits that, with her body of testimonial evidence, she can only lay claim to having "prove[d] by preponderance of evidence that she did not marry Yoshio Imai on 7 August 2010," showing only a "probability of truth" to her claim. Since petitioner had neither expert testimony to rely on, nor any other independent evidence to prove the alleged forgery, she did not meet the burden of proof placed upon her. As the Court ruled in Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, "[f]orgery cannot be presumed" and "must be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence," with those who allege it having "the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence." Petitioner's bare denial does not count as sufficient evidence against the genuineness of her signature in the marriage certificate. It was her failure to present sufficient evidence, and not the lack of a handwriting expert, which led to her petition's dismissal.

The Court also saw no reason to diverge from the Court of Appeals' finding that Republic vs. Olaybar is inapplicable to this case. The crucial circumstances in Olaybar, which led to the Court's ruling allowing the correction of the certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, included: the respondent there discovered the marriage through a CENOMAR, denied having contracted the marriage and claimed she did not know the alleged husband; she testified that she could not have appeared before the solemnizing officer because she was then in Makati working; she presented an employee of the MTCC who confirmed that the marriage was celebrated in their office but that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not the respondent; and a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. None of those controlling circumstances are present here. Unlike the party in Olaybar, petitioner failed to establish the physical impossibility of her having participated in the wedding, on a day where she also went to work. She failed to explain how or why the assailed marriage certificate could have come to bear "all the correct information referring to her," except only her address, and to present witnesses from the wedding who could confirm that she was not the woman who appeared and got married to Imai. Moreover, although the Office of the Solicitor General, through the Office of the City Prosecutor, participated during the trial, the alleged spouse Imai was not impleaded.

• Clear and Convincing Evidence — Defined as "less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for criminal cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases)," such that the "degree of believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case." The Court applied this standard to petitioner's allegation of forgery, holding that she failed to meet this burden because she presented neither documentary evidence nor expert testimony, and her own admission showed she only proved by preponderance of evidence that she did not marry Imai.

• Presumption of Regularity of Public Documents — A marriage certificate is "an official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar... [which] enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity." Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, its entries are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and it is in itself evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter. The Court applied this doctrine to require petitioner to present clear, positive, and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption.

• Forgery Must Be Proven, Not Presumed — "[F]orgery cannot be presumed" and "must be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence," with those who allege it having "the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence." The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's bare denial does not count as sufficient evidence against the genuineness of her signature in the marriage certificate.

• Rule 45 Limited to Questions of Law — Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review under Rule 45. The factual findings of appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this court" when supported by substantial evidence. Exceptions to this rule must be "alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case." The Court applied this doctrine to deny the petition, as the authenticity of petitioner's signature and whether a marriage ceremony took place are questions of fact.

• Rule 108 Correction of Entries in Civil Registry — Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure to cancel or correct an entry in the civil registry. It is a special proceeding that may be summary, if the correction is merely clerical, or adversarial, if the entry concerned affects a party's civil status, citizenship, or nationality. In cases involving the correction or cancellation of an entry in a marriage certificate which is not clerical in nature, a proper adversarial proceeding should be held, where both the civil registrar and the supposed spouse, as the person who has interest in the case, shall be impleaded. Moreover, the petitioner shall introduce independent evidence that no marriage involving the petitioner actually took place. When there is an allegation of forgery, such should be proven by clear and convincing evidence; self-serving allegations are not sufficient. The Court also warned against the use of a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the marriage certificate as a substitute for a direct action to question the validity of a marriage.

• "An allegation of forgery is never presumed, and it must always be proven by the party making that claim with clear and convincing evidence. Without such clear and convincing evidence, courts cannot assess and determine a signature to be a mere forgery." — This opening statement articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case, establishing the evidentiary standard required to prove forgery in a petition for correction of entries in a marriage certificate.

• "A marriage certificate is 'an official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar... [which] enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity.' Moreover, it is a public document. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, its entries are 'prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated,' and it is in itself 'evidence...of the fact which gave rise to [its] execution and of the date of the latter.'" — This passage establishes the evidentiary weight given to marriage certificates as public documents, which the petitioner must overcome with clear, positive, and convincing evidence.

• "[F]orgery cannot be presumed" and "must be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence," with those who allege it having "the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence." — This quotation from Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals states the canonical formulation of the doctrine on proving forgery, which the Court applied to reject petitioner's bare denial as insufficient evidence.

• Republic vs. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378 (2014) — Distinguished from the present case. In Olaybar, the Court allowed the correction of the certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion because the respondent there established the physical impossibility of her participation in the wedding through her testimony, the testimony of an MTCC employee who confirmed the alleged wife who appeared was not the respondent, and a document examiner who testified that the signature was forged. None of these controlling circumstances were present in Santos's case.

• Tankeh vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 720 Phil. 641 (2013) — Cited to define "clear and convincing evidence" as "less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for criminal cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases)," such that the "degree of believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case."

• Tenio-Obsequio vs. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 588 (1994) — Cited for the rule that "[f]orgery cannot be presumed" and "must be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence," with those who allege it having "the burden of proving it since a mere allegation is not evidence."

• Mendoza vs. Fermin, 738 Phil. 429 (2014) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that "a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts and that the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny."

• Pascual vs. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) — Cited for the rule that only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review under Rule 45, and that exceptions must be "alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case."

• Republic vs. Harp, 787 Phil. 33 (2016) — Cited for the proposition that a marriage certificate is "an official record in the custody of the Civil Registrar... [which] enjoys the presumption of regularity and authenticity."

• Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 416 Phil. 322 (2001) — Cited for the requirement that for a marriage certificate to be deemed a forgery, a party must present no less than "clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence."

• Aloria vs. Clemente, 518 Phil. 764 (2006) — Cited to support the proposition that a bare denial does not count as sufficient evidence against the genuineness of a signature in a marriage certificate.

• Rule 45, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides that only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. The Court applied this rule to deny the petition because the issues raised were factual in nature.

• Rule 130, Section 44, Rules of Court — Provides that entries in official records are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The Court applied this rule to give evidentiary weight to the marriage certificate as a public document.

• Rule 132, Section 23, Rules of Court — Provides that a public document is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter. The Court applied this rule to the marriage certificate.

• Rule 108, Rules of Court — Provides the procedure to cancel or correct an entry in the civil registry. The Court discussed this rule in the context of Olaybar, noting that it is a special proceeding that may be summary or adversarial, and that in cases involving the correction or cancellation of an entry in a marriage certificate which is not clerical in nature, a proper adversarial proceeding should be held where both the civil registrar and the supposed spouse shall be impleaded.

Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concurred.