Santos vs. Lacurom

A party must choose between self-representation or representation by counsel and cannot simultaneously do both. Furthermore, a judge violates the Code of Judicial Conduct when an immediate family member accepts a favor from a party-litigant.

Complainant Arcely Y. Santos filed an administrative complaint against Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom, Presiding Judge of RTC Cabanatuan City, Branch 29, alleging bias and partiality in favor of Rogelio R. Santos, Sr., a close friend of the judge who had three pending cases before his sala. The complaint cited the judge's allowance of the non-lawyer Santos to personally litigate despite existing counsel, the designation of Santos as "lead counsel," undue delay in executing an adverse Court of Appeals decision against Santos, and the judge's refusal to inhibit despite their close friendship and the judge's association with a homeowners' association involved in related disputes.

• Nature: Administrative complaint for gross misconduct, grave abuse of judicial authority, gross bias and partiality, and gross violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics against a presiding RTC judge.
• Non-Lawyer Appearance: Respondent judge allowed Rogelio R. Santos, Sr., a non-lawyer, to appear in court and litigate personally in three pending cases, notwithstanding that Santos was already represented by counsel of record. In Special Proceedings Case No. 516-AF, the judge issued an Order "appointing" Santos as lead counsel for the petitioners. Complainant's motion to expunge a pleading signed by Santos and subsequent motion to reconsider were denied, with the judge stating Santos was qualified to conduct his litigation personally.
• Unequal Treatment: Complainant alleged that while Santos was permitted to address the court directly, she and other oppositors were compelled, under pain of contempt, to secure the services of a lawyer.
• Alleged Favoritism and Delay: Complainant accused the judge of granting Santos's pleadings with dispatch and unduly delaying the execution of the April 28, 2000 Court of Appeals decision against Santos in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF.
• Refusal to Inhibit: Complainant sent a letter-request for the judge to inhibit himself due to bias, prejudice, and conflict of interest. The judge denied the request, asserting he could fairly hear and decide the cases.
• Close Friendship and Conflicts: The judge admitted Santos was a "close friend" who had lent a portable bunker to the judge's son. The judge had previously inhibited himself in another case because Santos was a close friend, but refused to do so here, claiming his friendship with oppositors "neutralized" his friendship with Santos. The judge's son also received a favor from the officers of Fabern’s Inc., a party in one of the pending cases, who facilitated the cementing of the road in front of the son's house.
• VBHA Involvement: Complainant asserted the judge had an interest in Villa Benita Subdivision, as the three cases involved properties there. The judge was an incorporator, director, officer, and legal adviser of the Villa Benita Homeowners Association (VBHA), which had filed cases against complainant before the HLURB. The judge clarified he was only a "nominal" incorporator who signed registration documents to lend prestige, never attended meetings, and had no knowledge of HLURB cases; his son owned the property in the subdivision.

• Unauthorized Practice of Law: Petitioner argued that allowing a non-lawyer who already had counsel to personally litigate constitutes gross misconduct and grave abuse of discretion, as it effectively allows the unauthorized practice of law.
• Bias and Partiality: Petitioner maintained that the judge's prompt granting of Santos's pleadings and the undue delay in executing the Court of Appeals decision against Santos demonstrated gross partiality.
• Mandatory Inhibition: Petitioner asserted that the judge should have voluntarily inhibited himself because of their close friendship and his involvement with VBHA, which filed cases against her, thereby violating Canon 2, Rule 3.12(a), and Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

• Right to Self-Representation: Respondent argued that Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court permits a party to conduct his litigation personally. He merely "recognized" Santos as lead counsel because Santos's counsel was often absent. If complainant disagreed, the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari.
• No Undue Delay: Respondent denied causing the delay in the execution of the CA decision, stating he ordered implementation as early as September 2000 and issued a writ of execution in October 2002, with the delay caused by the parties themselves.
• Discretionary Inhibition: Respondent countered that inhibition was discretionary, no mandatory ground for disqualification existed, and complainant failed to follow the proper procedure under Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. He argued his friendship with both parties neutralized any bias.
• No Conflict of Interest: Respondent maintained he had no protectable interest in the subdivision as he was neither a homeowner nor landowner, and his participation in VBHA was merely nominal.

• Self-Representation: Whether a party already represented by counsel may simultaneously litigate personally and be designated as "lead counsel."
• Inhibition: Whether respondent judge was required to inhibit himself due to his close friendship with a party-litigant and his nominal incorporation in a homeowners association involved in related disputes.
• Code of Judicial Conduct Violation: Whether the acceptance of a favor by the judge's son from a party-litigant constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

• Self-Representation: Simultaneous self-representation and representation by counsel is prohibited. The disjunctive "or" in Section 34, Rule 138 signifies that a party must choose between self-representation or representation by a member of the Bar; shifting between the two causes confusion. By designating the non-lawyer Santos as "lead counsel"—a term reserved for lawyers managing a party's case—the judge erroneously made it appear that Santos was a lawyer, when a party representing himself acts only as a party exercising a right, not as counsel.
• Inhibition: Inhibition was discretionary, not mandatory, as the cases did not fall under the rule on mandatory disqualification of judges under Section 1, Rule 137. Furthermore, complainant failed to follow the proper procedure for disqualification under Section 2, Rule 137. However, the judge's close friendship with Santos, while not strictly a violation of judicial canons absent proof of influence, made it imprudent for him to hear the cases, as it could erode litigants' trust in the administration of justice.
• Code of Judicial Conduct Violation: Rule 5.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct was violated when the judge's son accepted a favor from the officers of Fabern’s Inc., a party-litigant. Judges must advise their immediate family members not to accept favors from party-litigants or their officers, as the private and official conduct of judges must be free from the appearance of impropriety.

• Right to Self-Representation vs. Practice of Law — A party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered practice of law, just as rendering first aid to oneself is not practicing medicine. However, the Rules require a party to choose between self-representation or representation by counsel; dual representation is prohibited for the orderly administration of justice.
• Judicial Impartiality and Family Favors — A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as allowed by law. A judge must advise family members against accepting favors from party-litigants to avoid the appearance of impropriety.
• Voluntary Inhibition — The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. Absent a mandatory ground for disqualification, a judge's inhibition rests on their own determination, provided the proper procedural motion is filed by the objecting party.

• "A party’s representation on his own behalf is not considered to be a practice of law as 'one does not practice law by acting for himself, any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.'"
• "Judges must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity."

• Maderada v. Mediodea, 459 Phil. 701 (2003) — Followed. Cited for the principle that representing oneself in court does not constitute the practice of law.
• Rustia v. Judge of First Instance of Batangas, 44 Phil. 62 (1922) — Followed. Cited for the rule that a party originally represented by counsel who later decides to represent himself must dispense with the services of counsel.
• Constante v. Pimentel, 85 SCRA 41 (1978) — Followed. Cited to emphasize that the procedure for the disqualification of judges under Section 2, Rule 137 must be substantially followed.
• Macariola v. Asuncion, 199 Phil. 295 (1982) — Followed. Cited for the rule that close friendship with a party-litigant does not render a judge guilty of violating judicial canons, absent proof that the relationship influenced official conduct.

• Section 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Governs by whom litigation is conducted. Applied to determine that a party may conduct litigation personally or by attorney, but the disjunctive "or" mandates an election between the two modes of representation.
• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Enumerates grounds for the mandatory disqualification of judges. Applied to find that the circumstances of the case did not trigger mandatory disqualification.
• Section 2, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Prescribes the procedure for objecting to a disqualified judge. Applied to rule against the complainant for failing to follow the proper procedural mechanism for inhibition.
• Rule 5.04, Code of Judicial Conduct — Prohibits a judge or immediate family members from accepting gifts, bequests, favors, or loans. Applied to find the judge administratively liable for his son's acceptance of a favor from a party-litigant's officers.
• Sections 9(7) and 11(B), Rule 140, Rules of Court (as amended) — Classifies simple misconduct as a less serious charge and prescribes its penalties. Applied to determine the appropriate penalty for the respondent judge.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.