Santos vs. Dichoso

A lawyer may not be disbarred or suspended absent clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof of the charges against him, the complainant bearing the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings, and the attorney enjoying the legal presumption of innocence and the presumption that he performed his duties in accordance with his oath.

Complainant Romulo Santos and his brother Lamberto Santos sought appointment as joint guardians over the person and property of their 75-year-old father, Emilio Santos, in Special Proceeding No. 2452-P before the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX. Emilio Santos had figured in a near tragic vehicular mishap that impaired his mental faculties and physical mobility, rendering him incompetent. Respondent Atty. Alberto M. Dichoso served as counsel for Flordeliza Aniana, the Oppositor in the guardianship proceeding, who claimed to be a daughter of Emilio Santos.

Complainant Romulo Santos and his brother Lamberto Santos sought to be appointed joint guardians over the person and property of their 75-year-old father, Emilio Santos, who had been rendered incompetent by a near tragic vehicular mishap that impaired his mental faculties and physical mobility. Respondent Atty. Alberto M. Dichoso served as counsel for Flordeliza Aniana, the Oppositor in the guardianship proceeding, who claimed to be a daughter of Emilio Santos.

In his sworn complaint dated October 10, 1977, complainant accused respondent of surreptitiously filing notices of lis pendens covering properties of Emilio Santos with the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila, and of Tagaytay City. Complainant alleged that respondent, taking advantage of his position and knowledge of the law, deliberately and wilfully misled and made false representations, beguiling and deceiving the Register of Deeds into making the annotation to the damage and prejudice of the registered owner. Complainant also alleged that in an action for unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 3761 to 3763, which complainant brought in representation of his father against Ester Chavez and Marcela Dizon with respondent as counsel, the scheduled hearing had to be postponed by respondent because "he will be busy with the inauguration of a new construction bridge," although as a practicing lawyer he had nothing to do with the inauguration of bridges, the alleged purpose being to impede, obstruct, and delay the administration of justice.

In his answer dated November 21, 1977, respondent specifically denied the charge of surreptitious filing of notices of lis pendens. He explained that the word "Counsel for Plaintiff" in the notice was a mere clerical error committed by his new clerk, Romulo Vicente, who had no legal background and experience, and who simply copied a form from other cases. Respondent claimed he was sick and suffering from stroke (hypertension) when the notice was filed, and that there was an urgent need to file the notice because the oppositor's client was informed that complainant was about to dispose of, squander, or abscond with the estate of their father. Respondent stated that when the notice was handed to him for signature, he called the clerk's attention to change "Plaintiff" to "Oppositor," but was surprised to learn the clerk did not make the change.

Regarding the motion for continuance in the ejectment cases, respondent explained that the motion was filed in good faith and its soundness and reasonableness had been passed upon by the court, which granted the request. He explained that the transfer of the hearing from August 10, 1977 to September 9, 1977 was due to a case pending in the City Court of Manila, and the reference to the "Justice of the Peace Court of Manila" was a clerical error since there is no Justice of the Peace of Manila. As for the request for postponement due to the inauguration of a bridge in his hometown, respondent explained that he had been a Mayor of the town, the town was a beneficiary of the bridge, and the inauguration was in connection with the visit and birthday of the President of the Philippines. He stated this was only a secondary reason, the main reason being that he was counsel for the accused in Criminal Case No. 787-VI, CFI, Ilocos Norte, set on the same date. Respondent noted that his clients were present during the hearing and were instructed to get another lawyer in case the motion was denied, so there was no delay in the disposition of the case.

• Deceit and Misrepresentation: Complainant charged that respondent surreptitiously filed notices of lis pendens on properties of Emilio Santos, taking advantage of his position and knowledge of the law to deliberately and wilfully mislead and make false representations, beguiling and deceiving the Register of Deeds into making the annotation to the damage and prejudice of the registered owner.
• Obstruction of Justice: Complainant alleged that respondent's motion for postponement of a scheduled hearing in the ejectment cases, citing the inauguration of a new construction bridge, had no purpose except to impede, obstruct, and delay the administration of justice to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.

• Clerical Error: Respondent denied the charge of surreptitious filing of notices of lis pendens, explaining that the word "Counsel for Plaintiff" instead of "Counsel for the Oppositor" was a mere clerical error committed by his new clerk, Romulo Vicente, who had no legal background and simply copied a form from other cases.
• Urgent Necessity: Respondent explained that the filing of the notice of lis pendens was urgently necessary because the oppositor's client was informed that complainant was about to dispose of, squander, or abscond with the estate of their incompetent father, and respondent was sick with stroke (hypertension) at the time.
• Good Faith in Postponements: Respondent argued that the motions for postponement were filed in good faith, their soundness and reasonableness having been passed upon by the court which granted them, and that the reasons cited — a conflicting hearing in the City Court of Manila and the inauguration of a bridge in his hometown where he had been Mayor — were legitimate, with the main reason being a conflicting hearing in a criminal case in Ilocos Norte.

• Filing of Notices of Lis Pendens: Whether respondent's filing of notices of lis pendens on the properties of Emilio Santos constituted deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct, or violation of the lawyer's oath.
• Motions for Postponement: Whether respondent's motions for postponement of hearings in the ejectment cases constituted an attempt to impede, obstruct, and delay the administration of justice.

• Filing of Notices of Lis Pendens: No. The filing of the notices of lis pendens was well within the scope of respondent's authority as counsel for the Oppositor in the guardianship proceeding, and the annotation of notice of lis pendens is permissible in guardianship proceedings as a precautionary measure against instances wherein the incompetent may dispose of his properties.
• Motions for Postponement: No. The court before whom the ejectment cases were heard found the motions to be in order and well-taken, and no showing existed that respondent acted with deceit in seeking the postponements.

• Filing of Notices of Lis Pendens: The Court found respondent's explanation for the alleged misrepresentation reasonable and satisfactory. Being the counsel of the Oppositor in the guardianship proceeding, respondent had the duty to pursue with zeal and dedication the best interests of his client, and the filing of the notices of lis pendens was well within the scope of his authority as counsel. The annotation of notice of lis pendens is permissible in guardianship proceedings, for it is a precautionary measure against instances wherein the incompetent may dispose of his properties in favor of persons who may take undue advantage of the incompetent's advanced age and weak mental and physical condition. The alleged error in the notice — the word "Plaintiff" instead of "Oppositor" — was explained as a mere clerical error committed by respondent's new clerk who had no legal background and experience.

• Motions for Postponement: The Court found no showing that respondent acted with deceit in seeking postponements of the hearings in the ejectment cases. No less than the court before whom the cases of ejectment were heard found the motions to be in order and well-taken. The acts complained of did not constitute malpractice, gross misconduct, nor violation of the lawyer's oath.

• Burden of Proof in Disbarment Proceedings: The Court emphasized that the purpose of disbarment is to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duty in accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty. The Court found that the records did not contain such proof of the highest degree.

• Burden of Proof in Disbarment Proceedings — In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. Clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty, considering the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar. The Court applied this doctrine in dismissing the complaint, finding that the complainant failed to present the requisite quantum of proof.

• Presumption of Innocence of Attorneys in Administrative Cases — An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duty in accordance with his oath. The Court relied on this presumption in evaluating respondent's explanations as reasonable and satisfactory.

• Purpose of Disbarment — The purpose of disbarment is to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The Court invoked this doctrine to frame the analysis of whether respondent's conduct warranted disciplinary action.

• Protection of Lawyers from Unjust Accusations — While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will, on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled opponents, may not be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar. The Court applied this principle in dismissing the complaint, noting that the success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation.

• "An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duty in accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof." — This passage articulates the controlling standard of proof in disbarment proceedings and the presumptions favoring the respondent attorney, forming the core of the Court's ratio decidendi.

• "The purpose of disbarment is to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence." — This passage defines the doctrinal purpose of disbarment, which guided the Court's assessment of whether respondent's conduct warranted the extreme penalty of removal from the Bar.

• "While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will, on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar." — This passage states the complementary duty of courts to protect lawyers from unfounded accusations, which the Court applied in dismissing the complaint.

N/A — The decision does not cite any specific case precedents.

• Lawyer's Oath — The complaint charged respondent with violation of his lawyer's oath, but the Court found that the acts complained of did not constitute such violation, the respondent's explanations being reasonable and satisfactory.

• Teehankee (Chairman)
• Makasiar
• Muñoz Palma
• Fernandez

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.