Santos vs. Court of Appeals

Probation is a mere privilege and act of grace, not a right, grantable only to a penitent offender whose reformation, together with justice and public interest, warrants leniency. It was properly denied to an offender convicted of fifty-four counts of issuing bouncing checks who, instead of making amends, resorted to falsification and simulated disposition to defeat execution of civil liability.

Marilyn C. Santos was the accused-drawer of dishonored checks prosecuted at the instance of Corazon T. Castro, the private complainant and person aggrieved in the civil aspect of the criminal cases. Castro sought enforcement of the P3,989,175.10 civil liability adjudged with the criminal convictions. Probation under P.D. 968, as amended, and certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court frame the dispute over eligibility for clemency and standing to assail its grant.

Petitioner Marilyn C. Santos issued fifty-four checks totaling P3,989,175.10, all dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank. On October 12, 1993, she was charged with fifty-four counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in separate Informations before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Upon arraignment she pleaded not guilty, and after trial was found guilty in a Decision promulgated on December 20, 1994, sentenced to a total of fifty-four years imprisonment and ordered to pay P3,989,175.10 to private respondent Corazon T. Castro.

Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation, which Presiding Judge Umali referred to the Probation Officer of Marikina for investigation, report, and recommendation. Private respondent opposed the application on the grounds that petitioner, sentenced to fifty-four years, was ineligible and had failed to pay the judgment debt. On January 6, 1995, private respondent moved for a writ of execution, granted on January 11, 1995, and the sheriff prepared and signed a Notice of Levy on Execution over several of petitioner's properties.

On February 13, 1995, petitioner and her husband executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying for P264,570.00 a parcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18721 to Teodoro S. Dijamco. On the same day, the sheriff annotated the Notice of Levy on Execution on the dorsal portion of that title. On March 29, 1995, Dijamco filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim over the same property invoking the sale but averring a consideration of P3,000,000.00, with attached checks allegedly paid therefor. On May 5, 1995, private respondent filed a Supplemental Opposition alleging petitioner had disposed of and mortgaged properties, including the sale to Dijamco and a real estate mortgage in favor of the Rural Bank of Angono, Inc., to negate satisfaction of civil liability, constituting indirect contempt and disqualification from probation.

In an Order dated June 30, 1995, Judge Umali granted probation for six years subject to reporting, residence, travel, employment, association, supervision, tree-planting, and community-project conditions. The order relied on the probation officer's findings that petitioner was not a recidivist, needed individualized rather than correctional treatment, posed no grave threat, and remained welcome in the community, while holding failure to satisfy civil liability was not a ground for denial in light of the writ and levy already issued. Reconsideration was denied, and the Court of Appeals on certiorari set aside the grant, finding petitioner unworthy for resorting to chicanery, falsification, and misrepresentation to defeat recovery.

• Real Party in Interest: Petitioner argued that private respondent Corazon T. Castro was not the real party in interest to question the grant of probation.
• Civil Liability and Probation: Petitioner maintained that non-payment of the civil liability imposed in the criminal decision was not a ground for revocation of probation.
• Rehabilitation Focus: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals improperly prioritized full satisfaction of the civil aspect over her rehabilitation as a probationer.
• Fait Accompli and Compliance: Petitioner maintained that the grant of probation was fait accompli and she had complied with its conditions.
• Absence of Grave Abuse: Petitioner argued that Judge Umali's grant of probation under the facts did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
• Hold Departure Order: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a hold departure order against her.

• Ineligibility for Probation: Respondent countered that petitioner was not eligible for probation because she had been sentenced to fifty-four years imprisonment and had failed to pay the judgment debt.
• Evasion of Civil Liability: Respondent argued that petitioner disposed of and mortgaged her properties, including the post-judgment sale of the Benguet property to Dijamco after levy and the mortgage to Rural Bank of Angono, Inc., in obvious attempt to negate satisfaction of civil liability.
• Contempt and Disqualification: Respondent maintained that the mortgage in anticipation of unfavorable judgment and the sale after judgment and levy constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and showed petitioner was disqualified from probation benefits.

• Standing: Whether private respondent, as private complainant, is the real party in interest to question the grant of probation through certiorari.
• Entitlement to Probation: Whether petitioner was entitled to probation and whether its grant constituted grave abuse of discretion, in light of non-payment of civil liability and post-judgment dispositions.
• Fait Accompli: Whether the grant of probation had become fait accompli by compliance and lapse of time so as to preclude its annulment.
• Hold Departure Order: Whether issuance of a hold departure order to prevent petitioner from leaving the Philippines was proper.

• Standing: Yes. The private offended party, as person aggrieved with interest in the civil aspect, may file certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 in her own name on jurisdictional grounds.
• Entitlement to Probation: No. Probation was improperly granted because petitioner, a fifty-four-time BP 22 offender who evaded execution through falsified and simulated disposition, was unreformed and unworthy of clemency.
• Fait Accompli: No. The six-year probation from June 30, 1995 had not been completed, and lapse of the period cannot validate an order tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
• Hold Departure Order: Yes. Restriction of movement was warranted to prevent frustration of multiple judgments given petitioner's propensity to evade lawful orders.

• Standing: The rules permit the person aggrieved to file certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and in criminal cases the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. Because the complainant retains interest in the civil aspect, the action may be prosecuted in the complainant's own name rather than that of the People of the Philippines, with benefit to the People not constituting reversible error.
• Entitlement to Probation: Probation being a discretionary privilege centered on reformation, not a right, requires consideration of reform potential, justice, public interest, and relevant circumstances, without being bound by the probation officer's merely persuasive report. Unworthiness was established by fifty-four violations involving close to P4,000,000.00 followed by preemption of levy through registration of the Benguet sale, understatement of price from P3,000,000.00 to P264,570.00 with consequent tax deprivation, indicia of simulation where the husband still claimed ownership, and failure to remit any mortgage or sale proceeds toward the judgment, depreciating the seriousness of the offenses and manifesting incapacity for reform.
• Fait Accompli: The probation period commencing June 30, 1995 had not yet run its six-year course at the time of review, so compliance during its pendency could not moot the jurisdictional defect. Even expiration would not cure grave abuse of discretion, there being no valid probation to speak of when improperly granted.
• Hold Departure Order: Having displayed criminal tendency to disobey trial court orders and evade execution, restriction was necessary to preserve the efficacy of the judgments and prevent flight from civil and criminal accountability.

• Probation as privilege, not right — Probation is an act of grace, clemency, or immunity conferred by the State upon a seemingly deserving defendant to escape the rigors of the penalty. Applied here to reject entitlement based merely on the probation officer's favorable report and to require demonstrated penitence and reformability, which petitioner lacked.
• Discretionary grant guided by reformation, justice, and public interest — Before granting probation, the court must consider the offender's potentiality to reform together with demands of justice, public interest, and other relevant circumstances, and must ensure the ends of justice and best interests of public and accused are served. Applied to annul probation where fifty-four offenses and post-conviction chicanery showed petitioner would depreciate offense seriousness and menace society if allowed to mingle with the public.
• Persuasive character of probation report — Courts are not limited to the probation officer's report or recommendation, which is at best only persuasive. Applied to disregard the Marikina probation findings relied upon by Judge Umali in favor of countervailing evidence of evasion and falsification.
• Standing of private complainant in certiorari against jurisdictional acts — The private offended party, having interest in the civil aspect, may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in his own name to assail jurisdictional error, following People vs. Santiago and De la Rosa vs. Court of Appeals. Applied to sustain Castro's petition against the probation orders.

• "Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense for which he was convicted." — States the controlling definition of probation as discretionary clemency, grounding denial to an unreformed multiple offender.
• "The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds." — Defines the basis for private-complainant standing to bring Rule 65 certiorari in her own name.
• "Probation having been improperly granted, there is no probation to speak of." — Rejects the fait accompli defense by holding a void grant cannot ripen through partial compliance or lapse of time.

• Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384 — Cited as authority that probation is not a right but a mere privilege and act of grace.
• Salgado vs. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 304 — Cited for the primary objective of reformation and the duty of courts to ensure justice and public interest are served by probation.
• Bernardo vs. Balagot, 215 SCRA 526 — Cited for discretionary grant considering reform potential, justice, public interest, and for the merely persuasive character of the probation officer's report.
• People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA 143, 153 — Followed to hold the aggrieved complainant may file certiorari in his own name on jurisdictional grounds.
• De la Rosa vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 501, 508 — Followed to sustain recourse brought in the complainant's name where it benefited the People without reversible error.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Punishes issuance of bouncing checks; applied as the basis for fifty-four convictions, fifty-four-year total sentence, and P3,989,175.10 civil liability.
• P.D. 968, as amended (Probation Law) — Governs grant of probation as discretionary clemency for reformation; applied to test petitioner's qualifications and to annul the grant for unworthiness.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Allows the person aggrieved to file certiorari for grave abuse of discretion; applied to uphold the private complainant's standing to assail the probation orders.
• Section 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Defines indirect contempt; invoked by private respondent to characterize the post-judgment mortgage and sale to defeat execution.

Melo, J., Vitug, J., Panganiban, J., and Gonzaga-Reyes, J., concur.