Santos vs. Court of Appeals

An action for annulment of title and reversion of land containing a water reservoir is a real action within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not a water rights dispute subject to the limited jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council under Article 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1067; a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may issue prior to trial on the merits when the applicant’s right to the property is clear and unmistakable, the invasion of the right is material and substantial, and there is urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. SM-922 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan against Aurelio Santos and his children (the petitioners) for annulment of title and reversion, with damages and a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged that the Santos family had fraudulently obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-193403 covering the entire 16,088-square-meter Lot 4492 of the Santa Maria de Pandi Friar Land Estate, when the government had sold only 3,518 square meters to Aurelio Santos. The remaining 12,570 square meters — the site of the Marungko Water Reservoir — had been reacquired by the government. The Republic sought to cancel the erroneously issued title and recover the reservoir portion to restore public water supply and quell social unrest in the community.

The underlying land and titles. Lot 4492 of the Santa Maria de Pandi Friar Land Estate in Angat, Bulacan, originally comprised 16,088 square meters. On 15 September 1911, the government issued Sale Certificate No. 2892 to Venancio de la Fuente. De la Fuente assigned his interests to Felix Tiongson in 1929. Subsequently, the government reacquired a 12,570-square-meter portion of the lot, where it constructed the Marungko Water Reservoir. The remaining 3,518 square meters were covered by Sale Certificate No. 2892-1, issued to Tiongson on 17 March 1930. Tiongson assigned this portion to Marcelino Bongco in 1942, and Bongco assigned it to Aurelio Santos on 20 September 1946. On 26 April 1948, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources executed a Deed of Sale over 3,518 square meters in favor of Aurelio Santos, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2743 was issued on 28 June 1948. Following a partition, TCT No. T-30791 was issued to Aurelio Santos and his children.

The fraudulent petition to correct the area. On 7 November 1972, Aurelio Santos and his children filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-30791 and obtain a new title reflecting a corrected area of 16,088 square meters — the entire Lot 4492. They allegedly presented misleading technical descriptions and a report from the Land Registration Commission stating that the correct area was 16,088 square meters, without disclosing that only 3,518 square meters had been sold to them and that the remainder had been reacquired for the Marungko Water Reservoir. Acting on a court order dated 10 January 1974, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-193403 in the name of the Santos family covering the full 16,088 square meters, thereby including the government-owned reservoir.

The Republic’s action and the injunction. The Republic filed Civil Case No. SM-922 for annulment of the fraudulently obtained title and reversion of the 12,570-square-meter reservoir portion, alleging that the Santos family’s continued assertion of ownership caused social unrest by depriving the community of the reservoir‘s water. The trial court, after hearing both parties, issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on 11 August 1978 ordering petitioners to allow the government to open two gates of the dam, repair existing canals for free water flow, and enjoining any act to disturb the status quo. The order was issued with the conformity of petitioners’ counsel, who agreed to the writ provided no additional canal or work was made on their property. The trial court later ordered enforcement of the writ on 17 December 1979, directing police security for repairs.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners contended that the subject matter of the suit involved water rights — specifically, the use and appropriation of water accumulated in Lot 4492 — and that under Article 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water Code), the National Water Resources Council had exclusive original jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation, and protection of waters. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ.

• Improper and Premature Issuance of Injunction: Petitioners argued that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction could not issue before trial on the merits and final judgment, as its effect was to prematurely deprive them, as registered owners, of the use and enjoyment of the disputed property. They also maintained that the trial court could not properly enforce the writ while their motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ remained unresolved.

• Question of Better Right to Water Use: Petitioners asserted that because the better right to the use and enjoyment of the water found on the disputed portion was still in question, the issuance of a mandatory injunction was legally improper.

• Jurisdiction Over Real Action: Respondent Republic, through the Solicitor General, maintained that the complaint was primarily for annulment of title and reversion of real property — a real action within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The water-use aspect was merely incidental and did not convert the suit into a water rights dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council.

• Valid Issuance of Injunction: The Republic argued that the writ was ancillary to the main action and was issued to preserve the subject matter and prevent serious harm. The government’s right to the reservoir was clear, well-defined, and certain; the community faced social unrest from deprivation of water; the parties had been given full opportunity to be heard. The requisites for a mandatory injunction were satisfied.

• Estoppel: The Republic underscored that petitioners’ counsel had expressly agreed to the issuance of the writ on 11 August 1978, subject only to conditions that were adopted in the order. Having submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by their conformity, they were estopped from later challenging the writ.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the action for annulment of title and reversion involving the Marungko Water Reservoir constitutes a water rights dispute within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council under Article 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1067, thereby ousting the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction.

• Propriety of the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before trial on the merits and prior to resolution of the pending motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve, effectively depriving petitioners of possession and use of the disputed property.

• Estoppel: Whether petitioners are estopped from questioning the writ after having initially agreed, through counsel, to its issuance.

• Jurisdiction: The Regional Trial Court had exclusive original jurisdiction over the action for annulment of title and reversion. The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by defenses or counter-allegations in the answer. The Republic’s complaint sought cancellation of title over 12,570 square meters of Lot 4492 and reversion of the same to the government, and contained factual allegations sufficient to support that prayer. The suit clearly involved title to and possession of real property, jurisdiction over which is conferred by law upon the Regional Trial Court. Article 88 of the Water Code vests the National Water Resources Council with limited jurisdiction over disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation, and protection of waters; that jurisdiction does not extend to conflicting rights over real properties. Where the issue is not the settlement of water rights but the enjoyment of a water use for which a permit was already granted — as here, where the government had constructed the reservoir — the regular courts, not the Water Council, retain jurisdiction (citing Amistoso v. Ong, 130 SCRA 228).

• Propriety of the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: The issuance of the writ was proper and did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. A preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy available at any time after the commencement of an action and before judgment, when the plaintiff‘s complaint shows an entitlement to the relief demanded. The general rule that an injunction may not be issued to take property out of the possession of one party and place it into the hands of another admits exceptions, as when (1) the applicant has clearly established its rights to the property, or (2) the defendant is clearly a mere intruder. The records showed that the government’s title to the reservoir portion was clear, well-defined, and certain, and that there was an urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage — specifically, social unrest from the community’s deprivation of the reservoir‘s waters. All requisites for a mandatory injunction were satisfied: (a) the invasion of the right was material and substantial; (b) the complainant’s right was clear and unmistakable; and (c) there was an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Furthermore, both parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence before the writ issued, negating any claim of grave abuse of discretion. The pendency of motions to dismiss and to dissolve did not bar issuance or enforcement.

• Estoppel: Petitioners were estopped from assailing the writ. Their counsel expressly agreed to the issuance of the injunctive order on 11 August 1978, with conditions that were incorporated into the order. A party cannot adopt inconsistent positions or trifle with the courts; thus, petitioners were barred from later challenging the writ after submitting to the court‘s jurisdiction and consenting to the relief granted.

• Determination of Jurisdiction by the Allegations of the Complaint — The nature of an action and the court’s jurisdiction over it are determined by the material allegations of the complaint, not by facts averred in the answer or opposition of the adverse party. This principle was applied to classify the Republic’s suit as a real action for annulment of title and reversion, not a water rights dispute, thereby confirming the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

• Limited Jurisdiction of the National Water Resources Council — Under Article 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1067, the National Water Resources Council has original jurisdiction only over disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation, and protection of waters. This jurisdiction does not extend to conflicting claims of ownership over real property, even if a water source is located on the land. Where a permit for water use has already been granted, a dispute concerning the enjoyment of that right falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

• Exceptions to the Rule Against Mandatory Injunction That Takes Property Out of a Party‘s Possession — A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction may issue to place property into the hands of the applicant, notwithstanding the general prohibition, when: (1) the applicant has clearly established its rights to the property in question; (2) the defendant is clearly a mere intruder; or (3) the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor’s co-owners whose rights have not been affected by the sale.

• Requisites for the Issuance of a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction — A mandatory injunction is proper when: (a) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. All three requisites were found present based on the government‘s clear title and the urgent need to avert social unrest.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion When Parties Are Given a Hearing — No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to a judge in the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction when the adverse party was not deprived of its day in court and was allowed to exhaustively present arguments and evidence.

• Estoppel by Inconsistent Positions — A party who expressly agrees to the issuance of an injunctive order before the trial court is estopped from later repudiating it and asserting lack of jurisdiction. The doctrine bars a litigant from trifling with the courts by adopting contradictory stances.

• “The nature of an action in court is determined by facts alleged in the complaint * * * and not by the facts averred in the answer or opposition of the adverse parties.” — The passage encapsulates the settled rule used to characterize the Republic’s suit as a real action, sustaining the trial court’s jurisdiction.

• “Article 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water Code) speaks of limited jurisdiction conferred upon the National Water Resource Council over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of waters and said jurisdiction of the council does not extend to, much less cover, conflicting rights over real properties, jurisdiction over which is vested by law with the regular courts.” — This statement delineates the boundary between the special jurisdiction of the Water Council and the general jurisdiction of the regular courts.

• “Where the issue involved is not on a settlement of water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted, the regular court has jurisdiction over the dispute, not the National Water Resources Council.” — The Court‘s succinct test for distinguishing between a water rights dispute and a proprietary action involving an existing water facility.

• “Preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy which the parties litigant may avail of in order to preserve or protect their rights or interests, during the pendency of the principal action.” — Standard formulation of the purpose and nature of a preliminary injunction, invoked to justify its issuance before trial.

• “The general rule that injunctions are not available to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into that of another is not without any exceptions, as where: (1) the applicant has clearly established its rights to the property in question, and (2) the defendant is clearly a mere intruder * * *.” — The articulation of the recognized exceptions to the rule against mandatory injunctions that alter possession, applied in favor of the government.

• Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez, 142 SCRA 252 (1986) — Cited as authority that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over actions for annulment of title, reversion, and damages.

• Malayan Industries Corporation v. Judge Mendoza, 154 SCRA 548 (1987); Alger Electric Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 37 (1985); Cultura v. Tapucar, 140 SCRA 311 (1985); Municipality of La Trinidad v. CFI Baguio-Benguet, Br. I, 123 SCRA 81 (1983) — Relied upon for the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the complaint’s allegations.

• Salao v. Crisostomo, 138 SCRA 17 (1985) — Confirmed that the nature of an action is not determined by averments in the adverse party’s answer.

• Amistoso v. Ong, 130 SCRA 228 (1984) — The controlling precedent holding that where the dispute involves enjoyment of an already granted water use permit, the regular court — not the National Water Resources Council — has jurisdiction.

• Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643 (1986) — Enumerated the three requisites for the proper issuance of a mandatory injunction, all found satisfied in the case.

• National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWEMIF) v. Valero, 132 SCRA 578 (1984) — Established that no grave abuse of discretion exists where the party opposing an injunction was given its day in court and was fully heard.

• Republic v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 505 (1984); Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756 (1983) — Applied for the doctrine of estoppel barring a party from adopting inconsistent positions and trifling with the courts.

• Section 19(2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), formerly Section 44(b), Republic Act No. 296 — Confers upon Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property. The suit for annulment of title and reversion fell squarely within this grant.

• Article 88, Presidential Decree No. 1067 (Water Code) — Vests the National Water Resources Council with original jurisdiction over disputes relating to appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation, and protection of waters. The provision was interpreted not to extend to conflicting rights over real property or to disputes over the enjoyment of an already granted water use.

• Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court — Authorizes the issuance of a preliminary injunction at any time after the commencement of an action and before judgment, when the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the complaint shows facts entitling him to such relief. The trial court’s order was grounded on this rule.

Justices Davide, Jr., Romero, and Melo concurred. Justice Gutierrez, Jr. was on official leave.