Santos vs. Court of Appeals

A fair and true report of a complaint filed in court or with a quasi-judicial body, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, is a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354(2) of the Revised Penal Code, even before an answer is filed or a decision is promulgated. The privilege attaches because pleadings are part of the public record and are presumed to contain lawful allegations subject to court scrutiny; the privilege is lost only upon positive proof of express malice.

The petitioner, Nanerico D. Santos, was a columnist for the Manila Daily Bulletin whose "beat" was the stock market. The private offended parties, Carlos Moran Sison and Luis F. Sison, were the board chairman and president-general manager, respectively, of CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. The case involved the application of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines when defamatory imputations are presumed malicious and enumerates the exceptions for qualifiedly privileged communications. The controlling question was whether the publication of a complaint filed with the SEC, a quasi-judicial body, before any action was taken thereon, constituted a privileged report of a judicial proceeding.

Nanerico D. Santos was a columnist for the Manila Daily Bulletin whose beat was the stock market. On February 23, 1970, he wrote and published in his weekly column an article entitled "Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc." The article quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 13, 1970 by Rosario Sison Sandejas and her daughters, charging CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling stockholder Carlos Moran Sison and its president-general manager Luis F. Sison, with engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market.

On the very day the news item appeared, Carlos Moran Sison sought a meeting with Santos to submit his reply, which he wanted published "the very next day" in the same column. They met at about 6:15 in the evening at the Andres-Soriano Executive Center in Makati, Rizal, where Santos promised Sison that he would have the reply published in the February 25, 1970 issue of the Manila Daily Bulletin because "it was already past the deadline for the next day's issue." The reply was not published on February 25, 1970 as promised. Carlos Moran Sison then called Santos by phone to tell him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle the talks, and informed him that he would be sued for libel, to which Santos retorted: "Well, sue me for libel."

About a week later, when Carlos Moran Sison chanced upon Santos at the Hotel Intercontinental lobby, Santos asked Sison: "When will you sue me?" Santos received his answer on March 4, 1970 when the appropriate complaint for libel was lodged against him by Carlos Moran Sison and Luis F. Sison before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Charged together with Santos were Mariano B. Quimson, Jr., Hans M. Menzi, M.M. de los Reyes, Felix G. Gonzales and Ben Rodriguez, also of the Manila Daily Bulletin. A few weeks following the publication of the complaint, Santos' weekly column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on overhead expenses brought about by the adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange.

The trial court rendered its judgment of conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, declaring that the article was not a privileged communication because at the time the complaint was published there was as yet no proceeding at which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard, citing Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co. and Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co. The appellate court also found the article libelous, as it imputed to the private offended parties the crime of willful violation of the Securities Act and the implementing Rules and Regulations issued by the commission, which is penalized by imprisonment or fine or both, and imputed fraudulent acts and illegal purchases/sales and manipulations of securities to the prejudice of their customers and the general investing public.

• Privileged Communication: Petitioner insisted that the published article is privileged, being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding, without comments or remarks, and therefore not punishable.
• Verbatim Reproduction: Petitioner maintained that the alleged libelous news report was merely lifted from the complaint word for word, except for the last innocuous paragraph which he added to the effect that "(i)nvestors and Sison's fellow brokers are eagerly awaiting developments on these charges."
• Superseded Doctrine: Petitioner contended that the cited rulings in Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co. and Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co. are no longer valid, having been superseded by the doctrine in Cuenco vs. Cuenco.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the private offended parties or the prosecution beyond the lower courts' findings and the appellate court's declaration that the article was not privileged and was libelous.

• Privileged Communication: Whether the publication of a complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission before any judicial action is taken thereon is privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding.
• Malice: Whether the prosecution was able to establish that the columnist was motivated by malice, thereby removing the protection of privilege.

• Privileged Communication: Yes. A fair and true report of a complaint filed in court or with a quasi-judicial body, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, is covered by the privilege under Article 354(2) of the Revised Penal Code, even before an answer is filed or a decision is promulgated. The doctrine in Barreto and Choa Tek Hee is no longer controlling and has been superseded by Cuenco vs. Cuenco.
• Malice: No. The prosecution failed to establish that the columnist was motivated by malice. The published article was a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body, with no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions, or defamatory comments.

• Privileged Communication: The Court applied Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious except in cases of (1) private communications made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings. The Court noted that the character of the privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of express malice, and that under Article 362, libelous remarks connected with the matter privileged under Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author from criminal liability. The Court found that the doctrine in Barreto and Choa Tek Hee, which held that publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in court before any judicial action is taken thereon is not privileged, had been overturned by Cuenco vs. Cuenco, which held that the reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are privileged is not only because they have become part of the public record open to public scrutiny, but also because pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts, and therefore of general public concern. The Court adopted the rule that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks or comments, even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated, should be covered by the privilege. The Court also cited Manuel vs. Pano, which categorically stated that the publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under Item 2 of Article 354. The Court further noted that the complaint, by itself, is a public record and may be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court unless the court directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.
• Malice: The Court examined the published article and found that it was a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body, with no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions, or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public contempt. The Court noted that what the petitioner did was to simply furnish the readers with the information that a complaint had been filed against a brokerage firm, and then reproduce that pleading verbatim in his column. The Court found this to be part and parcel of the petitioner's job as a columnist whose beat happens to be the stock market, and that he was obligated to keep the public abreast of the current news in that particular field. The Court resolved all doubts in favor of the petitioner and declared that there is no libel, noting that the rule on privileged communications in defamation cases developed because "public policy, the welfare of society and the orderly administration of justice" have demanded protection for public opinion, and therefore they should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsehood.

• Privileged Communications (Qualified Privilege) — Under Article 354(2) of the Revised Penal Code, a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings is a qualifiedly privileged communication. The privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of express malice; the onus of proving actual malice is placed on the plaintiff, who must convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to a verbatim newspaper report of a complaint filed with the SEC, a quasi-judicial body, and found the petitioner entitled to the protection of the privilege because the prosecution failed to prove malice.
• Publication of Pleadings as Privileged Report — The doctrine established in Cuenco vs. Cuenco and affirmed in Manuel vs. Pano holds that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court, without remarks or comments, even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated, is covered by the privilege under Article 354(2). The reason is that pleadings have become part of the public record open to public scrutiny, and are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts, and therefore of general public concern. This doctrine superseded the earlier rule in Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co. and Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co. that publication of a complaint before any judicial action is taken thereon is not privileged.

• "We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, adopting the rule from Cuenco vs. Cuenco and rejecting the older doctrine in Barreto and Choa Tek Hee.
• "It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public contempt." — This passage applies the privilege to the facts, finding that the article was a verbatim reproduction without defamatory additions, supporting the conclusion that no malice was shown.
• "The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made without malice, we find the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for libel." — This passage summarizes the Court's conclusion and the basis for the acquittal.

• Cuenco vs. Cuenco, No. L-29560, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 212 — Controlling precedent that overturned the doctrine in Barreto and Choa Tek Hee. The Court quoted this case for the proposition that pleadings in judicial proceedings are privileged because they are part of the public record and are presumed to contain lawful allegations subject to court scrutiny.
• Manuel vs. Pano, No. L-46079, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 225 — Followed; categorically stated that the publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under Item 2 of Article 354.
• Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 30 Phil. 88 — Distinguished and superseded; held that an answer to a complaint filed in court containing libelous matter is not privileged so as to exempt a newspaper from prosecution for publication thereof, no action having been taken by the court thereon. The Court quoted Justice Moreland's rationale but declared the doctrine no longer controlling.
• Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil. 447 — Distinguished and superseded; held that publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in a Court of First Instance before any judicial action is taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding.
• Ubarra vs. Biscom, No. L-25332, October 14, 1968, 25 SCRA 498 — Cited in the footnotes in connection with the discussion of qualifiedly privileged communications under Article 354.
• US vs. Felipe Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 — Cited in the footnotes in connection with the rule that privileged communications should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsehood.

• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in cases of (1) private communications made in the performance of a legal, moral, or social duty, and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings. The Court applied paragraph 2 to hold that the petitioner's publication was a qualifiedly privileged communication.
• Article 362, Revised Penal Code — Provides that libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability. The Court cited this provision to emphasize that the privilege is lost only upon proof of malice.
• Rule 135, Section 2, Rules of Court — Cited by the Court to support the argument that a complaint, by itself, is a public record and may be published as such unless the court directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided text.