Santos, Jr. vs. Republic

An elder sister may adopt her younger brother; adoption between relatives by blood or affinity is not prohibited absent an express statutory prohibition, and the resulting dual relationship—one by nature and one by fiction of law—does not bar adoption where the child's welfare is paramount.

Luis E. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos were spouses residing in Manila; Edwin Villa y Mendoza was the legitimate son of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza, who were also Edipola's parents, making Edwin Edipola's younger brother. The governing law was the Civil Code's adoption regime, particularly Articles 335, 338, and 339, which respectively enumerate persons who may not adopt, authorize certain adoptions where a parent-child relationship already exists, and list persons who cannot be adopted. Prior jurisprudence in McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820, had addressed the adoption of stepchildren and the principle that adoption establishes paternity and filiation where none existed before.

On January 8, 1963, the spouses Luis E. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Special Proceeding No. 0001, seeking to adopt the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, then four years old. Edwin was the legitimate child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza, who were also the parents of Edipola; he was therefore Edipola's younger brother. The spouses were both 32 years of age, Filipinos, and residents of the City of Manila. They married in 1957 and maintained a conjugal home of their own. They had no child of their own blood, and neither spouse had any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural, or natural child by legal fiction; neither had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Luis E. Santos, Jr. was a lawyer with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and served as general manager of Medry Inc. and secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises; his income was approximately P600.00 a month. Edipola was a nurse by profession with an average monthly earning of about P300.00. Edwin was born on May 22, 1958. He had been a sickly child since birth. Because of the child's impairing health, his natural parents entrusted him to the petitioners, who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter; as a result, a deep and profound love developed between the petitioners and the child.

The natural parents of the minor testified that they voluntarily gave their consent to the adoption, submitted their written consent and conformity, and fully understood the legal consequences of the adoption. The order setting the case for hearing had been duly published, and no opposition was registered, so the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence. The trial court found that the minor's parents were also the parents of the petitioner-wife and that the minor was the petitioner-wife's legitimate brother. That relationship was undisputed.

• Incongruous Dual Relationship: The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, objected that adoption would result in an incongruous situation where the minor Edwin, the legitimate brother of petitioner-wife Edipola, would also become her son by adoption.
• Adoption Among Relatives: The State advanced the theory that adoption among persons related by nature should not be allowed in order to avoid a dual relationship, relying on the views expressed in McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.

• Adoption Between Relatives: Whether an elder sister may adopt her younger brother notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship of brother by nature and son by adoption.

• Adoption Between Relatives: Yes. No provision of the Civil Code prohibits relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one another, and the resulting dual relationship—one by nature and one by fiction of law—does not bar adoption; the child's welfare is paramount.

• Adoption Between Relatives: The analysis began from the absence of any statutory prohibition. No provision was cited by the Office of the Solicitor General, which argued for the State, prohibiting relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one another. The only objection was the alleged incongruity of a dual relationship: the adopted, who was the legitimate brother of the adopter, would also become her son by adoption. The State relied on McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820, where the adoption of two minor stepchildren was reversed because the purpose of adoption is to establish paternity and filiation where none existed before, and where a parent-child relationship already exists by blood or affinity, adoption would be unnecessary and superfluous unless expressly authorized by law, as in Article 338 of the Civil Code. American precedents, however, varied: some states imposed no restriction on adoption of blood relatives, while others expressly prohibited adoption within certain degrees of relationship. It could not be stated as a general proposition that adoption of a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law. Article 335 enumerates persons who may not adopt, and the petitioners were not among them. Article 339 names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor was not one of those excluded. Article 338 allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother; this provision removes doubts that adoption is not prohibited even where a parent-child relationship already exists by nature. To read Article 338 as the only exception would preclude adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree, which was not the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted was of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary and designed to provide homes, care, and education for unfortunate children, should be construed to encourage the adoption of such children by persons who can properly rear and educate them. As to the dual relationship, the fact alone should not prevent adoption: one relationship is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law. The relationship established by adoption is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives except as expressly provided by law; the adopted child cannot be considered a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children they may have after adoption, except that the law imposes certain marriage impediments by reason of adoption, and the children of the adopted are not considered descendants of the adopter. The Court cited Tolentino and other civil law authorities for this point. Thus, even under the rules on succession, the adoption was not objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting relationship. Similar dual relationships also result under the law on marriage when persons already related by blood or affinity marry, yet such marriages are allowed as long as the relationship is not within the prohibited degrees. Because no provision expressly prohibited adoption among relatives, the adoption ought not to be prevented. The decision appealed from was therefore set aside and the petition granted.

• Adoption Between Relatives — Absent an express statutory prohibition, adoption between relatives by blood or affinity is not prohibited. The Court applied this by allowing an elder sister to adopt her younger brother, noting that Articles 335 and 339 did not include the petitioners or the minor among the prohibited persons, and Article 338 did not exhaust the permissible cases of adoption among relatives.
• Dual Relationship Not a Legal Impediment — The fact that adoption creates a dual relationship—one by nature and one by fiction of law—does not by itself prevent adoption. The adoption relationship is limited to the adopting parents and does not extend to their other relatives except as expressly provided by law; the adopted child is not considered a relative of the adopter's ascendants, collaterals, or future legitimate children, except for marriage impediments imposed by law.
• Best Interest and Welfare of the Child — The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted is of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes are humane and salutary, designed to provide homes, care, and education for unfortunate children, and should be construed to encourage adoption by persons who can properly rear and educate them.
• Construction of Adoption Statutes — Adoption statutes should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of unfortunate children by persons who can properly rear and educate them, rather than to restrict adoption through implied prohibitions.

• "We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed to Us by the Office of the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting one another." — This states the ratio that no statutory prohibition bars adoption between relatives.
• "The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such children by person who can properly rear and educate them" — This articulates the paramount consideration and liberal construction of adoption statutes.
• "With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law." — This defines why the dual relationship is not a legal bar to adoption.
• "And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented." — This is the conclusion on statutory construction: absent an express prohibition, adoption among relatives is permitted.

• McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820 — The Court discussed this prior ruling, which had reversed the adoption of stepchildren on the ground that adoption establishes paternity and filiation where none existed and is superfluous where a parent-child relationship already exists unless expressly authorized. The Court limited its application, noting the variance in American decisions and holding that McGee did not establish a general prohibition against adoption of blood relatives.
• In re Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378 — Cited for the principle that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary and designed to provide homes, care, and education for unfortunate children, should be construed to encourage adoption by persons who can properly rear and educate them.

• Article 335, Civil Code — Enumerates persons who may not adopt. The Court noted that the petitioners were not among those prohibited from adopting.
• Article 338, Civil Code — Allows adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother. The Court explained that this provision removes doubts that adoption is not prohibited even where a parent-child relationship already exists by nature, and it does not preclude other adoptions among relatives.
• Article 339, Civil Code — Names those who cannot be adopted. The Court noted that the minor child whose adoption was under consideration was not one of those excluded by law.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.