Santos-Gantan vs. Gantan

A spouse need not be personally examined by a physician or psychologist for a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, provided the totality of evidence sufficiently establishes the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the psychological incapacity. The absence of personal examination does not automatically render the expert's findings hearsay or invalid, especially when the failure to examine is attributable to the respondent's own refusal to appear.

Petitioner Bernardine S. Santos-Gantan and respondent John-Ross C. Gantan were married twice by civil rites in 2002. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, which recognizes psychological incapacity as a ground to void a marriage. The case implicates the State's constitutional mandate to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution, balanced against the recognition that a marriage void from the beginning has no legal existence deserving of such protection. The case also involves the application of the "totality of evidence" rule in Article 36 petitions, particularly where the psychological report is based on information gathered from the petitioner and other informants rather than from a personal examination of the respondent spouse.

Petitioner Bernardine S. Santos-Gantan and respondent John-Ross C. Gantan first met in 1999 when respondent was nineteen years old. They married twice by civil rites: first on May 28, 2002 in Angeles City, and again on December 18, 2002 in Baguio City. Petitioner was then thirty-two years old while respondent was twenty-two. They had no common children nor conjugal properties.

As next-door neighbors, petitioner knew before marriage that respondent was irresponsible and had been in and out of school. She observed that he did not speak much, easily got bored, and exhibited a short temper when drunk. He was also irritable and unable to keep a job. Despite these observations, petitioner married him hoping he would change, but he did not. He continued to be lackadaisical and irresponsible, which often caused his termination from work.

Their relationship became a "roller coaster ride" after marriage. Respondent was often unruly and violent, especially when drunk, and had anger management issues. He frequently abused petitioner physically, even during petty arguments. One time, he severely beat her, causing her hospitalization, and she suffered a miscarriage due to his fits of anger. He was also verbally and emotionally cruel, often refusing intimacy because of short-term illicit affairs with older or married women, and insulted her by calling her "thin," "old," "ugly," and "old hag." In 2006, respondent left to work in Korea where he had an illicit affair, and when his overseas employment expired, he decided to live with his paramour. From then on, they have been separated.

Petitioner consulted clinical psychologist Dr. Martha Johanna Dela Cruz, who opined that the marriage should be nullified on the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity. Dr. Dela Cruz was unable to interview respondent despite repeated invitations, but collated information from petitioner herself, the couple's relatives, and common friends. She diagnosed respondent with "Axis II Anti-Social Personality Disorder," characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others. Dr. Dela Cruz concluded that respondent's personality disorder was serious, grave, incurable, and had juridical antecedence, rendering him psychologically incapacitated to perform his responsibilities as husband. Respondent did not respond to the petition. During the hearing, Dr. Dela Cruz elaborated on her report and explained the link between the manifestation of respondent's psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself, while petitioner testified on the facts upon which the psychological report was based.

• Reversible Error by the Court of Appeals: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it reversed the trial court's decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
• Expert Findings Disregarded: Petitioner faulted the Court of Appeals for disregarding the expert findings of Dr. Dela Cruz, arguing that the lack of personal examination and interview of respondent did not per se invalidate her findings.

N/A — Respondent did not file a comment despite service of the petition; his comment was deemed dispensed with by the Court.

• Psychological Incapacity — Personal Examination Requirement: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it reversed the trial court's decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that the clinical psychologist's failure to personally examine respondent rendered her findings inconclusive, unreliable, and inaccurate.

• Psychological Incapacity — Personal Examination Requirement: Yes. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error. There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, and the absence of such personal examination is not fatal so long as the totality of evidence sufficiently supports a finding of psychological incapacity.

• Psychological Incapacity — Personal Examination Requirement: The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in discrediting Dr. Dela Cruz's findings and testimony for alleged lack of probative value due to her failure to personally examine respondent. Under Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes, the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since marriage necessarily involves only two persons, and the totality of the behavior of one spouse during cohabitation and marriage is generally witnessed mainly by the other. The absence of personal examination is not fatal so long as the totality of evidence sufficiently supports a finding of psychological incapacity. The Court noted that the failure to examine respondent was attributable to his own failure or refusal to appear for interview despite repeated invitations. As for the absence of respondent's parents, Dr. Dela Cruz explained they were abroad as illegal aliens and could not be subjected to evaluation. The Court further held that Dr. Dela Cruz's assessment could not be considered prejudiced and partial because it was based on information gathered from petitioner herself and the couple's relatives and common friends, not merely from petitioner alone. The procedures adopted by Dr. Dela Cruz, including the facts and data she used, are those that other psychologists rendering opinions in Article 36 petitions would rely upon, as such facts and data are the "bread and butter" of psychiatric and psychological expert opinions. The Court applied the doctrine in Kalaw vs. Fernandez that courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in nullity cases. Applying the totality of evidence rule, the Court found that petitioner's testimony and Dr. Dela Cruz's clinical documentation sufficiently established respondent's psychological incapacity. The evidence showed respondent's failure to observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, his abandonment of petitioner to live with his paramour, his physical, mental, and emotional abuse, his illicit affairs, his lackadaisical attitude causing termination from employment, and his lack of remorse. Dr. Dela Cruz's clinical documentation showed respondent exhibited behaviors including anger, baiting, belittling, bullying, cheating, chronic broken promises, emotional abuse, impulsiveness, lack of conscience, manipulation, pathological lying, physical abuse, violence, and verbal abuse. The Court found that Dr. Dela Cruz's testimony, corroborated by petitioner, amply proved that respondent's anti-social personality disorder was grave and serious, distorted his concept of marital relationship, and incapacitated him from comprehending, assuming, and carrying out essential marital obligations. The disorder was clinically permanent with a stable and long-standing pattern, rooted in respondent's teen years arising from his dysfunctional family set-up where his parents, being overseas workers, left him under the care of his uncle. The Court also held that the trial court's findings and evaluation on the existence of psychological incapacity deserve credence and should be final and binding, as the trial court was in a better position to observe and examine the demeanor of witnesses. The Court emphasized that the State's constitutional mandate to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only applies to a valid marriage, and the Court cannot afford the same protection to a marriage that is void ab initio because such a marriage has no legal existence.

• Totality of Evidence Rule — The totality of evidence is a short and simple way of expressing the allocation of the burden of proof in a civil case for nullity of marriage under Article 36, Family Code. The burden of proof lies upon the petitioner to prove his or her case by preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities, discharged if the petitioner proves his or her cause of action more likely than not. In this case, the Court applied the rule and found that the totality of evidence, including petitioner's testimony and Dr. Dela Cruz's expert opinion, sufficiently established respondent's psychological incapacity.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36, Family Code — Psychological incapacity refers to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be non-cognitive of the basic marital covenants which must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, including the mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity, and to help and support each other. It is the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. To constitute psychological incapacity, the personality disorder must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Court found all three elements satisfied in this case.

• Personal Examination Not Required — There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician. The non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons, and the totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. The absence of such personal examination is not fatal so long as the totality of evidence sufficiently supports a finding of psychological incapacity.

• Case-to-Case Basis in Article 36 Petitions — Each case must be judged according to its own facts, guided by findings of experts in the field of psychology and decisions by church tribunals. Courts should interpret Article 36 on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals, and not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations.

• Due Regard to Expert Opinion — Courts must give due regard to expert opinion on the parties' psychological and mental disposition in cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages. Despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, courts must not discount but instead must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

• "There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician." — This states the core ratio decidendi of the case, resolving the central issue of whether the clinical psychologist's failure to personally examine respondent invalidated her findings.

• "The absence of such personal examination is not fatal so long as the totality of evidence sufficiently supports a finding of psychological incapacity." — This articulates the controlling standard for evaluating psychological reports in Article 36 petitions where the respondent was not personally examined.

• "What is important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." — This quotation from Zamora v. Court of Appeals reinforces the principle that the totality of evidence, not personal examination, is the decisive factor in establishing psychological incapacity.

• "The fulfilment of the State's constitutional mandate to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only applies to a valid marriage. The Court cannot afford the same protection to a marriage that is void ab initio because such a marriage has no legal existence." — This explains why the State's interest in protecting marriage does not bar the declaration of nullity where the marriage is void from the beginning.

• Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) — Cited for the principle that each case must be judged according to its own facts, guided by findings of experts in psychology and decisions by church tribunals, and that the declaration of nullity under Article 36 provides "a decent burial to a stillborn marriage."

• Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) — Controlling precedent holding that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist.

• Zamora vs. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 701 (2007) — Cited for the rule that personal examination of the person by a physician is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity; what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.

• Kalaw vs. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482 (2015) — Cited for the doctrine that courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in nullity cases, and that the trial court's findings on psychological incapacity deserve credence and should be final and binding.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Cited for the definition of psychological incapacity and the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Cited for the proposition that there is no requirement of personal examination by a physician for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

• Republic vs. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 — Cited for the distinction that psychological incapacity is the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.

• Tani-De La Fuente vs. De La Fuente, Jr., 807 Phil. 31 (2017) — Cited for the rule that courts must give due regard to expert opinion on the parties' psychological and mental disposition.

• Article 36, Family Code — The provision recognizing psychological incapacity as a ground to void a marriage: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." The Court applied this provision in declaring the marriage void ab initio.

• Article 68, Family Code — The provision defining the essential marital obligations: "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." The Court cited this provision to define the marital covenants that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with.

Peralta (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lopez, and Rosario, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided text.