Santiago vs. People

A second spouse who knowingly marries a person bound by a prior subsisting marriage is liable as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of bigamy. A party cannot successfully assert the nullity of a marriage as a defense in a bigamy prosecution when that nullity was procured through the party’s own fraudulent misrepresentation, as no court will lend its aid to a claim founded on an illegal act (ex turpi causa non oritur actio).

Leonila G. Santiago, a 43-year-old widow and faculty member of Divina Pastora College, met Nicanor F. Santos, a laborer, sometime between 1993 and 1996. After a courtship of about six months, the two married on 29 July 1997. Unknown to Santiago, or so she claimed, Santos had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974. Four months after the wedding, an Information for bigamy was filed against both. Santos died during the pendency of the case. The prosecution presented Galang, who testified that she had introduced herself as Santos’s legal wife to Santiago on two occasions in March and April 1997, before the second marriage.

• Nature of the Case: Criminal prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Leonila G. Santiago was charged as a co-accused with Nicanor F. Santos.

• The First Marriage: Nicanor F. Santos and Estela Galang were legally married on 2 June 1974. No evidence indicated that this marriage had been legally dissolved or that Santos had obtained a judicial declaration of presumptive death regarding Galang.

• The Second Marriage: Petitioner met Santos sometime between 1993 and early 1996. After approximately six months of courtship, they were married on 29 July 1997. The Certificate of Marriage stated that the union was celebrated without a marriage license, invoking the exemption under Article 34 of the Family Code — implying that the parties had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the marriage.

• Knowledge of the Prior Marriage: Petitioner claimed she had no knowledge of Santos’s prior marriage. However, the prosecution presented Estela Galang, who testified that she had introduced herself as Santos’s legal wife to petitioner on two occasions in March and April 1997, before the second marriage. Petitioner’s in-laws had also openly disapproved of Santos during his courtship, advising her to choose someone “without responsibility.” The trial court found Galang more credible and concluded that petitioner, an educated woman, could not have been easily deceived.

• Cohabitation and the Marriage License: The records showed that petitioner and Santos had known each other for less than five years prior to their marriage — at most, since 1993. Petitioner herself testified that Santos had never cohabited with her before the wedding because she lived with her in-laws and her children disliked him. Despite this, the spouses represented to the solemnizing officer that they qualified for the Article 34 exemption, and the Certificate of Marriage was issued on that basis. No separate affidavit of cohabitation appears in the records.

• Procedural Note: Santos died on 28 November 2001 during the pendency of the criminal case; thus, only petitioner faced judgment.

• Lack of Knowledge of Prior Marriage: Petitioner maintained that she was unaware of Santos’s existing marriage to Estela Galang at the time of their wedding and therefore could not be charged as a co-accused. She asserted that she met Galang only in August or September 1997, after the marriage had already been celebrated.

• Invalidity of the Second Marriage for Absence of a License: Petitioner argued that the prosecution must prove all essential requisites of a valid second marriage to sustain a bigamy conviction. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio because no marriage license was issued, and the Article 34 exemption did not apply — she and Santos had not cohabited for at least five years prior to the wedding. Accordingly, the second marriage lacked an essential requisite, and she could not be convicted of bigamy. She invoked People v. De Lara, where an acquittal was ordered because the second marriage was celebrated before the issuance of the marriage license.

• Insufficiency of Proof of Knowledge: Petitioner attacked the credibility of Estela Galang’s testimony and insisted that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she knew of the prior marriage.

• Factual Issues Not Reviewable: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the Rule 45 petition should be denied because it raised factual questions — particularly concerning petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s first marriage — which are generally beyond the scope of review under a petition for review on certiorari.

• Credible Evidence of Knowledge: Respondent countered that the courts below had correctly relied on credible testimonial evidence, particularly Galang’s straightforward account and the surrounding circumstances, to establish petitioner’s awareness of the subsisting marriage.

• Validity of the Second Marriage Presumed: The OSG did not substantively engage the argument that the second marriage was void for lack of a license, effectively treating the Certificate of Marriage as sufficient prima facie evidence of a valid subsequent union.

• Criminal Participation: Whether petitioner, as the second spouse, was properly convicted as a principal in the crime of bigamy, or whether she should have been held liable merely as an accomplice.

• Validity of the Second Marriage as a Defense: Whether petitioner could successfully raise the nullity of her own marriage to Santos — predicated on the absence of a marriage license and non-compliance with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code — as a defense to the bigamy charge.

• Criminal Participation: Petitioner’s conviction as a principal was erroneous. Following People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. and People v. Archilla, a second spouse who knowingly marries a person already bound by a valid subsisting marriage is liable only as an accomplice, not as a principal. Because the lower courts correctly found that petitioner had knowledge of Santos’s prior marriage, she was properly indicted, but her penal responsibility was that of an accomplice. Consequently, the penalty was reduced: the imposable penalty was prision correccional in its medium period (two years, four months and one day to four years and two months), and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum was taken from arresto mayor.

• Validity of the Second Marriage as a Defense: The defense of nullity was rejected. Although jurisprudence requires that a second marriage possess all essential requisites for validity — and a marriage celebrated without a valid license is generally void — petitioner could not assert that defect to escape criminal liability. The absence of a license was not a mere oversight; it resulted from petitioner and Santos deliberately misrepresenting to the solemnizing officer that they had cohabited for at least five years, when they had not. The Supreme Court, applying the principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio, declared that no court will lend its aid to a party who grounds her cause on an illegal act. To allow petitioner to benefit from her own fraud would mock the sanctity of marriage and render the penal laws on bigamy illusory. People v. De Lara was distinguished because the accused there had not procured a falsified document to evade the license requirement. The constitutional policy that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State compelled affirmance of the conviction, albeit as an accomplice.

• Accomplice Liability of the Second Spouse in Bigamy — A person who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy, not as a principal. Knowledge of the prior subsisting marriage is an indispensable element for the second spouse’s criminal participation. (People v. Archilla; People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.)

• Essential Requisites of the Second Marriage in Bigamy — In a prosecution for bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity; were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage, the second would be valid. The nullity of the second marriage may be raised as a defense during trial, but the accused must present proper proof.

• Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio (Clean Hands Doctrine in Criminal Defense) — A litigant cannot seek relief from a court on a ground that arises from her own illegal or fraudulent act. When the accused’s cause of action or defense is founded on a transgression of positive law, she shall be left unassisted by the courts. This principle was applied to deny petitioner the defense that her marriage was void due to lack of a license, because the defect was the product of her own deliberate misrepresentation.

• Constitutional Protection of Marriage — Marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family, which must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of contracting parties. Penal laws on marriage may not be subverted by schemes designed to contract multiple marriages through deliberate flaws in the marital contracts. (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals)

• “It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.” (Citing Montanez v. Cipriano)

• “In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.” (People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.)

• “We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.” (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals)

• “It is a basic concept of justice that no court will ‘lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.’ If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts.”

• “No less than the present Constitution provides that ‘marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.’ It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.”

• People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., 159-A Phil. 771 (1975) — Followed. Established that a second spouse who had knowledge of the prior marriage may be included as a co-accused, but liability is not automatically that of a principal.

• People v. Archilla, 111 Phil. 291 (1961) — Followed. Held that a person who knowingly marries another already bound by a valid marriage is guilty as an accomplice; knowledge constitutes indispensable cooperation.

• Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 723 (2004) — Relied upon. Emphasized that penal laws on bigamy must not be rendered nugatory by individuals who deliberately ensure each marital contract is flawed to escape liability.

• People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079 — Distinguished. The accused in De Lara was acquitted of bigamy because the marriage license was issued one day after the ceremony, through no fraudulent act of the accused. Here, petitioner actively participated in a misrepresentation that explained away the absence of a license.

• Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the nullity of a subsequent marriage may be raised as a defense during trial in a bigamy prosecution.

• Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012, 684 SCRA 315 — Cited for the elements of bigamy.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy with prision mayor. Applied as the principal offense; the penalty for an accomplice was determined by lowering the penalty by one degree under Article 52.

• Article 52, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for an accomplice is one degree lower than that prescribed for the principal. Applied to reduce petitioner’s penalty to prision correccional.

• Article 34, Family Code — Exempts from the marriage license requirement marriages of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without legal impediment. Petitioner’s non-compliance with the cohabitation period was central to her defense, which the Court rejected based on her own fraudulent invocation of the provision.

• Article 3, Family Code — One of the essential requisites of marriage is a valid marriage license, except in cases provided by law. Petitioner invoked this to argue voidness of the marriage.

• Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Applied in fixing the minimum and maximum terms of the sentence.

• Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Declares marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family, which shall be protected by the State. Used to support the policy against allowing fraudulent manipulation of marriage requirements to escape criminal liability.

Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Jose Portugal Perez, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred. No separate opinions were filed.