Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.

A concerted mass leave by employees whose leave applications were disapproved, resulting in temporary work stoppage, constitutes a strike under Article 212(o) of the Labor Code; and shop stewards are considered union officers who may be declared to have lost their employment status for knowingly participating in an illegal strike under Article 264(a).

The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) was the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) at its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. The Union and the Company had entered into a three-year Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective July 1, 1996 to expire on June 30, 1999. Upon expiration, the Union sought to renegotiate, but the CBA meetings that commenced on July 26, 1999 reached an impasse over ground rules — specifically the Union's insistence that members of the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit as observers, and that negotiating panel members be paid based on work shift rates. The Alyansa was an unregistered aggregate of employees across the Company's various plants, not a registered labor organization, and the Company maintained its members were not part of the bargaining unit.

The Union and the Company entered into a three-year CBA effective July 1, 1996, expiring June 30, 1999. Upon expiration, the Union notified the Company of its desire to renegotiate. CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, but an impasse ensued when the Union insisted that members of the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola — an unregistered aggregate of employees from the Company's various plants — be allowed to sit as observers, and that negotiating panel members be paid based on work shift rates. The Company maintained that Alyansa members were not part of the bargaining unit.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors, and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB Regional Office in Southern Tagalog, citing deadlock on CBA ground rules and unfair labor practice arising from the Company's refusal to bargain. The Company moved to dismiss, arguing the cited reasons were not valid grounds for a strike. The Union then filed an Amended Notice of Strike on September 17, 1999, recharacterizing the grounds as unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain in good faith and interference with the right to self-organization.

Meanwhile, on September 15, 1999, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Company's premises, set for September 21, 1999. One hundred six Union members, officers, board directors, and shop stewards individually filed applications for leave of absence for that date. The Company, certain that plant operations would come to a complete stop since there were no sufficiently trained contractual employees to serve as replacements, disapproved all leave applications and notified the applicants accordingly. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore red tag cloths bearing the words "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears and on different parts of their uniform. The Office of the Mayor issued a permit allowing the Union to conduct a mass protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.

On September 21, 1999, Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant. All 14 personnel of the Engineering Section did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. Only one of three bottling lines operated during the day shift; all three lines operated during the night shift but with cumulative downtime of five hours due to lack of manning complement and skills requirements. Production for the day fell short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget. The Union maintained that no bottling operations were scheduled for September 21 and 22, 1999, that the workers merely marched to and fro at the side of the highway near one of the plant gates for three hours, and that everyone returned to work according to their shifting schedules.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal, alleging that the mass action was a strike conducted without observing the mandatory requirements of law — strike vote, cooling-off period, and reporting requirements — in violation of Article 262 of the Labor Code and the CBA's grievance machinery provision. The Company claimed losses amounting to ₱2,733,366.29 and prayed for declaration of the strike as illegal, termination of the employment status of Union officers, and damages. The Union countered that the mass action was a valid exercise of the right to picket and free expression, not a strike, and that the petition was designed to harass its officers and members to weaken the Union's position in ongoing CBA negotiations.

The Labor Arbiter, in his November 26, 1999 Decision, found that the September 21, 1999 activity constituted a strike under Article 212 of the Labor Code, citing the temporary work stoppage evidenced by production and engineering department reports, the concerted nature of the action, and its connection to the labor dispute over CBA ground rules. The strike was declared illegal for non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements, and the individual petitioners were considered to have lost their employment status for knowingly participating. The NLRC affirmed with the modification excluding Union Treasurer Charlita M. Abrigo, who was on bereavement leave. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Union's petition for certiorari, also finding forum shopping in the related case.

• Nature of the Mass Action: Petitioners maintained that the September 21, 1999 mass protest action was not a strike but a picket — a valid exercise of their constitutional right to free expression and assembly — and that they did not intend a work stoppage since they knew beforehand that no bottling operations were scheduled on that date pursuant to the Logistics Planning Services Mega Manila Production Plan dated September 15, 1999.
• Compliance with Formalities: Petitioners argued that they applied for leaves of absence, obtained a mayor's permit to hold the picket near the highway, faithfully complied with the conditions set therein, and returned to work after three hours, never blocking ingress or egress from the Company's premises.
• Due Process: Petitioners insisted they were denied due process because the Labor Arbiter's decision was implemented even while their appeal was pending before the NLRC, and that the decision would become final and executory only after the NLRC resolved the appeal with finality.
• Disproportionate Penalty: Petitioners averred that even assuming they staged a strike, the penalty of dismissal was too harsh, that they acted in good faith, and that under Article 264 of the Labor Code, dismissal of union officers who participated in an illegal strike is discretionary on the employer.
• Shop Stewards as Non-Officers: Petitioners contended that six of them were shop stewards who were mere members of the Union and not officers thereof, and that there was no proof they committed illegal acts during the strike.
• Analogy to San Fernando Walkout: Petitioners pointed out that members of the IBM-KMU at the San Fernando Coca-Cola bottling plant staged a simultaneous walkout on October 7 and 8, 1999, which the Secretary of Labor and Employment declared a mass action rather than a strike, meting only a three-day suspension — a ruling the Company accepted without appeal.

• Factual Issues Inappropriate for Review: Respondent averred that the issues raised by petitioners were factual in nature and therefore inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari, and that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, were conclusive on the Supreme Court.
• Mandatory Penalty: Respondent argued that the law offers no discretion as to the proper penalty for a union official participating in an illegal strike, and that dismissal is the prescribed consequence.
• Shop Stewards as Union Officers: Respondent countered that shop stewards are union officers, citing Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America vs. Hoffa, and Coleman vs. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, etc..

• Classification of the Mass Action: Whether the September 21, 1999 mass action staged by the Union was a strike or merely a picket.
• Legality of the Strike: Whether the strike, if it was one, was legal.
• Dismissal of Union Officers and Shop Stewards: Whether the individual officers and shop stewards of the Union should be dismissed from their employment, and whether shop stewards are union officers within the meaning of Article 264(a) of the Labor Code.

• Classification of the Mass Action: Yes. The mass action was a strike, not merely a picket, as it involved concerted absence from work by 106 Union members resulting in temporary work stoppage, undertaken by reason of a labor dispute.
• Legality of the Strike: No. The strike was illegal for total non-compliance with the mandatory procedural requisites under Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, and for violation of the CBA's no-strike clause and grievance machinery provision.
• Dismissal of Union Officers and Shop Stewards: Yes. Union officers, directors, and shop stewards who knowingly participated in the illegal strike were properly declared to have lost their employment status; shop stewards are union officers occupying positions of trust.

• Classification of the Mass Action: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The Court applied the principle from Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals that the substance of the situation, not its appearance or the label used, is controlling. The term "strike" encompasses not only concerted work stoppages but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, and similar activities. Picketing, by contrast, involves merely marching to and fro at the employer's premises, accompanied by display of placards, as a means of peaceable persuasion. Here, 106 Union members whose leave applications were disapproved opted not to report for work, gathered in front of the company premises, wore red ribbons, and carried placards with strike-related slogans. The concerted absence resulted in only one of three bottling lines operating during the day shift, with cumulative downtime of five hours and production short by 60,000 physical cases. The existence of a labor dispute was undisputed — the Union had filed a Notice of Strike over CBA ground rules. The mayor's permit was deemed inconsequential, as the totality of circumstances — not the label attached to the activity — determines whether it is a strike. The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, were conclusive on the Supreme Court, quasi-judicial agencies having acquired unique expertise in their specific jurisdictions, and the issue being factual and thus inappropriate for review under Rule 45.

• Legality of the Strike: Article 263 of the Labor Code mandates three procedural requisites for a valid strike: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike, subject to the cooling-off period. These requirements are mandatory, and failure to comply renders the strike illegal; substantial compliance does not suffice. The records showed no evidence that the Union conducted a strike vote, observed the cooling-off period, or submitted a strike vote report to the DOLE. Additionally, the strike violated Section 1, Article VI of the CBA, which prohibited strikes, walkouts, stoppages, slowdowns, picketing, and similar activities during the term of the agreement so long as the grievance procedure was followed. The Union bypassed the grievance machinery entirely, proceeding directly to the strike.

• Dismissal of Union Officers and Shop Stewards: Article 264(a) of the Labor Code distinguishes between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated; only a worker who commits illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost employment status. For union officers, however, knowingly participating in an illegal strike — or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike — is sufficient ground for termination. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost employment status. The Union officers and directors were promptly notified that their leave applications were disapproved and that operations would come to a complete stop; they knowingly and deliberately proceeded, unmindful of the consequences. As for shop stewards, the Court held that they are union officers. While the Labor Code contains no express provision defining shop stewards as officers, the Court relied on the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 (Sections 501(a), (b) and 3(q)), which explicitly includes shop stewards among officers, agents, and representatives of a labor organization occupying positions of trust. The Union's own Constitution and By-Laws provided for principal and subordinate officers, and the CBA defined the position of shop steward with the Union certifying eight shop stewards. Section 6, Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code described the functions of shop stewards — receiving and verifying grievances, bringing complaints to supervisors, and participating in grievance settlement — establishing that they occupy positions of trust laden with responsibilities as representatives of the Union. Instead of acting as "peacemakers" and grievance solvers, the shop stewards participated in the strike, and thus deserved the penalty of dismissal like the officers and directors.

• Definition of Strike (Article 212(o), Labor Code) — A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The term encompasses not only concerted work stoppages but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage or sabotage plant equipment, and similar activities. The substance of the situation, not the label used by employees, is controlling. In this case, the concerted absence of 106 Union members resulting in temporary work stoppage at the plant constituted a strike despite petitioners' characterization of it as a mere picket.

• Distinction Between Strike and Picketing — Picketing involves merely marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by display of placards, as a means of peaceable persuasion. A strike, by contrast, involves a temporary stoppage of work through concerted action. The totality of circumstances — not the mayor's permit, the label attached, or the duration — determines whether an activity is a strike. Where concerted absence from work results in work stoppage by reason of a labor dispute, the activity is a strike.

• Mandatory Procedural Requisites for a Valid Strike (Article 263, Labor Code) — Three requirements must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike, subject to the cooling-off period. These requirements are mandatory; failure to comply renders the strike illegal. Substantial compliance does not suffice; strict adherence is required.

• Distinction Between Union Members and Union Officers (Article 264(a), Labor Code) — A worker who merely participates in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. A worker or union officer who commits illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost employment status. A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike may be declared to have lost employment status. The employer has the option to terminate union officers who knowingly participated. Union officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect the law; their responsibility is greater than that of the members.

• Shop Stewards as Union Officers — Shop stewards are union officers occupying positions of trust, charged with receiving and verifying grievances, bringing complaints to supervisors, and participating in grievance settlement. They are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution. Although the Philippine Labor Code contains no express provision classifying shop stewards as officers, they are considered as such by virtue of their functions, their certification by the Union under the CBA, and the parallel treatment under the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. Shop stewards who knowingly participate in an illegal strike may be declared to have lost their employment status under Article 264(a).

• Conclusiveness of Factual Findings of Quasi-Judicial Agencies — The factual findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial tribunals such as the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, when based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Supreme Court. This doctrine rests on the unique expertise these agencies have acquired in their specialized jurisdictions. Factual issues are inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

• "The term 'strike' encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities." — This passage defines the broad scope of what constitutes a strike under Philippine labor law, establishing that the label employees attach to their action is inconsequential and that mass leaves fall within the definition.

• "The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayor's permit is not conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not amount to a strike. The Mayor's description of what activities petitioners were allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation." — This articulates the totality-of-circumstances test for distinguishing a strike from a picket, negating the argument that a local government permit transforms a strike into a lawful picket.

• "Union officers are duty-bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is greater than that of the members." — This passage, quoted from Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines vs. NLRC, articulates the heightened responsibility of union officers in the context of illegal strikes and justifies the differential treatment between officers and rank-and-file members.

• "In fine, they are part and parcel of the continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with awesome responsibilities." — This defines the role of shop stewards in the grievance machinery and establishes the basis for treating them as union officers subject to dismissal under Article 264(a).

• Bangalisan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 619 — Followed. Established that the conventional term "strike" need not be used by employees to describe their action; the substance, not the appearance, is controlling.
• Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 120505, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 219 — Followed. Held that union officers are duty-bound to guide members to respect the law and that their responsibility is greater than that of members; dismissal is a just penalty for knowingly participating in an illegal strike.
• Panay Electric Company vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 102672, October 4, 1995, 248 SCRA 688 — Distinguished. The Court there meted suspension rather than termination because the NLRC found no sufficient proof of bad faith on the part of union officers — a circumstance absent in the present case.
• Lapanday Workers Union vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 95 — Followed. The Court affirmed dismissal of union officers who could not claim good faith, having admitted knowledge of the law on strikes and their procedures.
• CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, 299 SCRA 410 — Followed. Held that strike requirements under Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory requisites, without which a strike is illegal; substantial compliance will not suffice.
• Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. vs. NLRC, 381 Phil. 254 (2000) — Cited by respondent to support the proposition that shop stewards are union officers; the Court agreed with this characterization.
• San Miguel Corporation vs. MAERC Integrated Services, Inc., 453 Phil. 543 (2003) and Cosmos Bottling Corporation vs. NLRC, 453 Phil. 151 (2003) — Followed. Established the doctrine that factual findings of quasi-judicial tribunals based on substantial evidence are conclusive on the Supreme Court.

• Article 212(o), Labor Code — Defines "strike" as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Applied to classify the September 21, 1999 mass action as a strike rather than a picket.
• Article 212(l), Labor Code — Defines "labor dispute" as any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging such terms. Applied to establish that the CBA negotiation impasse constituted a labor dispute.
• Article 263(f), Labor Code — Requires that a decision to declare a strike be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit, obtained by secret ballot in meetings called for that purpose, and that the results be furnished to the DOLE at least seven days before the intended strike, subject to the cooling-off period. Applied to find the strike illegal for non-compliance.
• Article 264(a), Labor Code — Provides that any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, may be declared to have lost employment status; mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike is not sufficient ground for termination. Applied to justify dismissal of union officers, directors, and shop stewards.
• Section 1, Article VI, CBA — Stipulates a no-strike clause prohibiting strikes, walkouts, stoppages, slowdowns, picketing, sit-down strikes, and similar activities during the term of the agreement, so long as the grievance procedure is followed. Applied to find that the Union violated the CBA by bypassing the grievance machinery.
• Section 6, Article II, CBA — Defines the position of shop steward, providing that the Union shall certify eight shop stewards and inform management of their distribution among departments. Applied to establish that shop stewards are certified officers of the Union.
• Section 6, Rule XIX, Implementing Rules of Book V, Labor Code — Describes the functions and duties of shop stewards in the grievance procedure, including receiving and verifying grievances, bringing complaints to supervisors, and participating in grievance settlement. Applied to establish that shop stewards occupy positions of trust.
• Sections 501(a), (b) and 3(q), Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act) — Provides that officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust, and defines "officer" to include shop stewards. Applied as persuasive authority to support the classification of shop stewards as union officers under Philippine labor law.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, and Minita V. Chico-Nazario concurred. No separate concurring opinions were rendered.