Sansio Philippines, Inc. vs. Spouses Alicia and Leodegario Mogol, Jr.

Personal service of summons under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is validly effected wherever the defendant may be found in the Philippines, and a defendant’s refusal to receive and sign for the summons after it has been handed to him or to his counsel at his express instruction does not invalidate the service or require re-service; substituted service under Section 7 is not an alternative mode available merely for convenience.

Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling appliances and related products. Respondents Alicia and Leodegario Mogol, Jr. were the owners and managers of MR Homes Appliances. The controlling procedural backdrop is Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which governs service of summons in civil actions and distinguishes personal service under Section 6 from substituted service under Section 7.

Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling appliances and related products. Respondents Alicia and Leodegario Mogol, Jr. were the owners and managers of MR Homes Appliances, with residence at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City. On 15 November 1993 and 27 January 1994, the spouses purchased from Sansio air-conditioning units and fans worth ₱217,250.00 and ₱5,521.20, respectively. They issued postdated checks as payment, but the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was closed. After partial payments, a balance of ₱87,953.12 remained unpaid. Despite several demands, the spouses failed to settle the obligation. On 12 July 2000, Sansio filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against the spouses before the MeTC of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 167879CV and raffled to Branch 25. The complaint stated the spouses’ address at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City, where summons and other written legal processes may be served, and prayed for payment of ₱87,953.12 with legal interest, attorney’s fees of 25% of the amount collectible, ₱2,000.00 for every court appearance, and costs.

On 3 October 2000, at Sansio’s request, the process server of the MeTC of Manila served the summons and a copy of the complaint on the spouses at the courtroom of MeTC Manila, Branch 24. The spouses were in the courtroom waiting for the scheduled hearing of criminal cases filed by Sansio against Alicia Mogol for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Upon being informed of the summons and complaint, the spouses referred the matter to their counsel, who was also present. The counsel took the summons and complaint, read them, and pointed out that they should be served only at the address stated in both documents, 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City. He then returned the documents to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy or sign for them. The process server could not convince the spouses to sign, so he left the courtroom.

On 4 October 2000, the process server issued a Return on Service of Summons. It certified that on October 3, 2000, he tried to serve the summons and complaint on Leodegario Mogol, Jr. and Alicia Mogol, doing business under the name/style of “Mr. Homes Appliance,” at the MeTC Branch 24 courtroom as requested by plaintiff’s counsel, but failed because they refused to receive the documents with no valid reason. The original and duplicate copies of the summons were returned “UNSERVED.”

On 6 December 2000, Sansio filed a Motion to Declare Respondents in Default, averring that the summons and complaint had been validly served and that the spouses had filed no responsive pleading. On 15 December 2000, through a special appearance of their counsel, the spouses filed an Opposition. They argued that Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court required the complaint to contain the names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant; that the process server should have served the summons at the address stated in the complaint and summons; and that only if service at that address could not be complied with within a reasonable time may the process server resort to substituted service. They also stated that they did not dispute the requirement of personal service and, if they refused to receive and sign, service by tendering it to them, but maintained that service should have been effected at their residential address.

On 6 April 2001, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25, granted the Motion to Declare Respondents in Default and allowed Sansio to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court on May 25, 2001. The MeTC ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not specify where service is to be effected and that service may be undertaken wherever the defendant may be found. Although the Return stated that the summons was returned “UNSERVED,” the MeTC held that this did not mean the spouses had not been served, because the first paragraph of the Return stated that they refused to receive the summons and complaint for no valid reason. The spouses’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 11 June 2001.

On 17 July 2001, the spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the RTC of Manila against Judge Severino B. de Castro, Jr. and Sansio, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-101267 and raffled to Branch 33. They insisted that there was no valid service of summons per the process server’s Return, which was binding on the MeTC judge, and that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. They contended that the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring them in default, depriving them of due process despite their having a good defense, and prayed that the Orders dated 6 April 2001 and 11 June 2001 be declared null and void. On 18 January 2002, the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that Section 6, Rule 14 does not mandate service strictly at the address provided in the complaint and that service may be made wherever possible and practicable. The RTC found that the service inside the courtroom was made in the persons of the spouses and that the Return showed they refused to receive the documents for no valid reason.

In the meantime, on 3 August 2001, Sansio presented its evidence ex parte in the main case. On 17 August 2001, the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25, rendered a Decision in favor of Sansio, ordering the spouses to pay jointly and severally ₱87,953.12 with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid, attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the amount due, and costs. The spouses appealed to the RTC of Manila, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-101963 and raffled to Branch 50. On 19 March 2004, the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, affirmed in toto the MeTC Decision, holding that Section 6, Rule 14 does not require service only at the place stated in the summons and that the service inside the courtroom was the most practicable act under the circumstances. The RTC held that the spouses’ refusal to receive the summons without valid cause was equivalent to valid service that vested jurisdiction in the MeTC. The spouses’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 4 October 2004, and they no longer filed any appeal from the RTC Branch 50 Decision.

On 21 November 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70029, reversing and setting aside the RTC Branch 33 Order. The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid service of summons and that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the spouses. It relied on the process server’s Return stating that the summons was returned “UNSERVED,” and ruled that the spouses’ refusal to receive the summons did not dispense with the need for tender or substituted service and that no further effort was made to serve the summons anew. The Court of Appeals declared the MeTC Order dated 6 April 2001 null and void. Sansio’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated 12 March 2007. On 26 April 2007, Sansio filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

• Validity of Courtroom Service: Petitioner argued that the service of summons inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, was already valid and was a more practicable and convenient procedure than requiring the process server to serve the summons and complaint at the spouses’ residence in Lucena City.
• Tendering and No Re-service: Petitioner contended that when the spouses declined to receive and sign for the summons, tendering the same was sufficient, and the summons need not be served anew; Section 6, Rule 14 does not state that personal service fails because the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it.
• Process Server’s Return: Petitioner claimed that the second paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons, stating that the summons was returned “UNSERVED,” was a mere conclusion of law that does not bind the independent conclusion of the courts; the first paragraph clearly indicated that the summons and complaint were personally served upon the spouses, who merely refused to receive them for no valid reason.
• Mootness: Petitioner asserted that the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated 21 November 2006 had become moot and academic because the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, Decision dated 19 March 2004 in Civil Case No. 01-101963, affirming the MeTC Decision on the merits, had become final and executory for failure of the spouses to interpose an appeal before the Court of Appeals.

• Place of Service: Respondents maintained that Section 3, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court requires the complaint to contain the names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant; therefore, the process server should have taken notice of the address of the spouses stated in the complaint and should have served the summons there, at 1218 Daisy St., Employee Village, Lucena City.
• Substituted Service After Reasonable Time: Respondents argued that if service at the stated address could not be complied with within a reasonable time, then and only then may the process server resort to substituted service.
• Personal Service and Tendering: Respondents averred that there was no quarrel as to the requirement that they must be served summons in person and, if they refused to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to them; they merely reiterated that service should have been effected at their residential address as stated in the summons and the copy of the complaint.
• Invalid Service and Due Process: In their certiorari petition, respondents insisted that there was no valid service of summons per the process server’s Return, which was binding on the MeTC judge, and that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; they contended that the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring them in default, thereby depriving them of their right to be heard with due process of law despite their having a good defense against petitioner’s complaint.

• Validity of Service in Courtroom: Whether service of summons inside the courtroom, before the hearing, upon defendants who refused to receive it, constituted valid personal service under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
• Meaning of Tendering: Whether the clause “tendering it to him” when the defendant refuses to receive and sign for the summons under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court means “leaving a copy of the summons to her or in the premises where the defendant could get it.”
• Need for Re-service: Whether summons refused to be received by respondents, upon advice of their counsel, needed to be served anew.
• Effect of Process Server’s Return: Whether the court is bound by the conclusions of the process server in his Return of Service of Summons.

• Validity of Service in Courtroom: Yes. Service was valid under Section 6, Rule 14 because the summons was handed to the spouses in person through their counsel, who received and read it at their express instruction, wherever they were found in the Philippines.
• Meaning of Tendering: No. “Tendering” under Section 6 is not equivalent to leaving a copy at the defendant’s residence or premises; that is substituted service under Section 7, which is not an alternative mode available merely for convenience.
• Need for Re-service: No. Once personal service was accomplished, the subsequent return of the summons and refusal to sign did not invalidate the service or require service anew.
• Effect of Process Server’s Return: No. The process server’s statement that the summons was “UNSERVED” was a mere conclusion of law; courts are not bound by it, and the first paragraph of the Return showed valid service.

• Validity of Service in Courtroom: Under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Personal service most effectively ensures that the notice required by due process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found in the Philippines. In this case, the process server presented the summons and complaint to the spouses at the MeTC Branch 24 courtroom. The spouses referred the matter to their counsel, who was present. At their express direction, the counsel took the summons and complaint, read them, and informed himself of their contents. That act of counsel constituted receipt on the part of his clients because it was done with their behest and consent. The operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to the spouses in person was already accomplished, and jurisdiction over their persons was acquired by the MeTC Branch 25. The subsequent act of counsel in returning the documents to the process server was no longer material. Section 6, Rule 14 does not require that service on the defendant in person be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. Service inside the courtroom was the most practicable act under the circumstances; service at the Lucena City address would have been more costly and would have entailed a longer delay.

• Meaning of Tendering: Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. They do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons that may be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience. Personal service of summons is generally preferred over substituted service. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service and is an extraordinary method, since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice is served not upon him but upon another whom the law presumes would notify him. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business. In this case, there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of the spouses when their counsel, upon their explicit instructions, received and read the summons. A tender of summons, much less substituted service, need no longer be resorted to. The Court cited Lazaro vs. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., where it was stated that personal service does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant’s actual residence; it is enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the summons in person by anyone authorized by law.

• Need for Re-service: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the fact that the summons was returned to the process server and the spouses subsequently declined to sign for them did not mean that the service of summons in their persons was a failure, such that a further effort was required to serve the summons anew. A contrary ruling would inevitably give every future defendant the unwarranted means to easily thwart the cardinal procedures for service of summons by the simple expedient of returning the summons and complaint to the process server and refusing to sign for the same even after being informed of their contents. The Court would not allow such a result. The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered, traditional notions of fair play are satisfied, and due process is served. Here, the spouses’ counsel read the summons and complaint and learned of the nature of the claim against them; they chose not to obtain a copy and pretended that it did not exist, taking a gamble in not filing any responsive pleading.

• Effect of Process Server’s Return: The certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein, fortified by the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of the sheriff’s return, the evidence against it must be clear and convincing. In this case, the facts stated in the first paragraph of the Return on Service of Summons were not disputed by the spouses. The first paragraph showed that the summons and complaint were already validly served on the spouses, who merely refused to receive or obtain a copy. The second paragraph’s statement that the original and duplicate copies of the summons were returned “UNSERVED” was an erroneous statement, but it was a mere conclusion of law that does not bind the independent judgment of the courts. It could not be said that because of such a statement, the spouses had the right to rely on the Return informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus justifying their non-filing of any responsive pleading. They were validly served, and their counsel read the documents and learned of the claim against them.

• Personal Service of Summons in Person — Under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Personal service most effectively ensures that the notice required by due process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found in the Philippines. In this case, service was valid because the summons was handed to the spouses through their counsel, who received and read it at their express instruction; the subsequent return of the documents and refusal to sign did not invalidate the service.

• Substituted Service is Extraordinary and Requires Requisites — Substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 is not an alternative mode of service that may be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience. It derogates the regular method of personal service and is extraordinary, since it binds the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice is served upon another. For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s office or place of business. In this case, substituted service was unnecessary because personal service had already been accomplished.

• Process Server’s Return: Prima Facie Evidence and Presumption of Regularity — The certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein, fortified by the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must be clear and convincing. However, a statement in the Return that is a mere conclusion of law, such as “UNSERVED,” does not bind the independent judgment of the courts. In this case, the first paragraph of the Return showed valid service and refusal to receive; the second paragraph’s “UNSERVED” statement was a non-binding conclusion of law.

• Due Process Notice in Service of Summons — The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that service of summons be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered, traditional notions of fair play are satisfied, and due process is served. In this case, due process was satisfied because the spouses’ counsel read the summons and complaint at their express instruction and they learned of the claim against them, even though they refused to obtain a copy or sign for it.

• Jurisdiction over the Person in Civil Actions — In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. In this case, valid service of summons was accomplished, and the MeTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the spouses; their failure to file a responsive pleading justified the default order.

• “The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself, wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in the Philippines.” — This passage states the controlling rule on personal service of summons, establishing that service is not limited to the defendant’s residence or the address stated in the summons.
• “Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent.” — This passage applies the rule to the facts, holding that counsel’s receipt and reading of the summons at the defendants’ express instruction amounted to valid personal service on the defendants.
• “Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties.” — This passage distinguishes personal service from substituted service and rejects the view that substituted service may be chosen merely for convenience.
• “Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by the process server in the aforesaid second paragraph – an error that undoubtedly added to the confusion of the parties to this case – the same was, nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law, which does not bind the independent judgment of the courts.” — This passage explains why the Return’s statement that the summons was “UNSERVED” did not invalidate the service or bind the courts.

• Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, 16 August 2006, 499 SCRA 21, 33 — Cited for the rule that when the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
• Domagas vs. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 663, 673-674 — Cited for the definition of an action in personam as one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court.
• Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 433 Phil. 290, 300 (2002) — Cited for the principle that personal service of summons most effectively ensures the notice required by due process, and that substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service.
• Paluwagan Ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. King, 254 Phil. 56, 58 (1989) — Cited for the rule that the essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself.
• Cohen & Cohen vs. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526, 535 (1916) — Cited for the rule that personal service may be made wherever the defendant may be found, provided he is in the Philippines.
• Robinson vs. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, 12 December 2006, 510 SCRA 678, 683 — Cited for the rule that personal service of summons is generally preferred over substituted service, and for the requisites of substituted service.
• Lazaro vs. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., 456 Phil. 414, 424 (2003) — Cited for the rule that service of summons to be done personally does not mean that service is possible only at the defendant’s actual residence; it is enough that the defendant is handed a copy of the summons in person by anyone authorized by law.
• Guanzon vs. Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 309, 318 — Cited for the rule that the certificate of service of the process server is prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein, fortified by the presumption of regularity of official duty, and can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.
• Montalban vs. Maximo, 131 Phil. 154, 162 (1968), cited in Boticano vs. Chu, Jr., G.R. No. L-58036, 16 March 1987, 148 SCRA 541, 551 — Cited for the due process requirement that service of summons be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired.
• Spouses Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, 26 November 1999 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the rule that the sheriff’s certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out; the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the Return’s “UNSERVED” statement misplaced because the first paragraph showed valid service.

• Section 6, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Provides that whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. The Court applied this provision in holding that service was valid when the process server handed the summons and complaint to the spouses through their counsel, who received and read them at the spouses’ express instruction, and that service need not be made only at the address stated in the summons.
• Section 7, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Provides for substituted service if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The Court held that substituted service was not applicable because personal service had already been accomplished, and that Sections 6 and 7 cannot be construed to apply simultaneously or as alternative modes of service based on convenience.

Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Diosdado M. Peralta concurred.