Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of Appeals

A public officer’s resignation is not complete and operative without acceptance by the proper authority, but the officer may nonetheless be deemed to have relinquished the office through voluntary abandonment, which requires an intention to abandon and an overt act carrying that intention into effect and which needs no acceptance; having abandoned the office, he is not entitled to back salaries under the “no work, no pay” rule.

Augusto T. Antonio was the elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes, and later president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) for the municipality. Under the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), the ABC president was among the members of the Sangguniang Bayan appointed by the President. The 1991 Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), its implementing rules, and DILG circulars governed the continued ex-officio membership of incumbent ABC and liga presidents. These provisions framed the dispute between Antonio and the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, represented by Vice Mayor Nenito Aquino and Mayor Lydia T. Romano, over his claim to reassume his seat.

Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes, in March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) for the Municipality of San Andres, Catanduanes. In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres. Meanwhile, then DILG Secretary Luis T. Santos declared the election for president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province void for want of a quorum, making a reorganization of the provincial council necessary. Conformably, the DILG Secretary designated Antonio as a temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.

In view of his designation, Antonio resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He tendered his resignation dated June 14, 1990 to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres, Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial governor, the DILG, and the municipal treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), Nenito F. Aquino, then vice president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sangguniang Bayan in place of Antonio. Aquino assumed office on July 18, 1990 after taking his oath.

Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court in Taule vs. Santos. In the same case, the appointment of Antonio as sectoral representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void because he did not possess the basic qualification that he should be president of the federation of barangay councils. This ruling became final and executory on December 9, 1991. On March 31, 1992, Antonio wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, advising them of his re-assumption of his “original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral representative” therein. In response, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 6, Series of 1992, declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. On August 13, 1992, Antonio sought from the DILG a definite ruling relative to his right to resume his office as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Director Jacob F. Montesa, department legal counsel of the DILG, clarified that Antonio became an ex-officio member in the sanggunian, that such position had not been vacated because he did not resign nor abandon said office when he was designated as temporary representative of the Federation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan on June 7, 1990, and that there was no legal obstacle for him to re-assume his representation in the Sangguniang Bayan as ex-officio member. Despite this clarification, the local legislative body issued another resolution reiterating its previous stand. In response to Antonio’s request, Director Montesa opined that Antonio did not relinquish or abandon his office and that, since he was the duly elected ABC president, he could re-assume his position in the Sanggunian. A copy of said reply was sent to the members of the local legislative body. Notwithstanding, the Sanggunian refused to acknowledge the right of Antonio to re-assume office as sectoral representative.

On December 10, 1992, Antonio filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC. On February 18, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision holding that Antonio’s resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan was ineffective and inoperative, since there was no acceptance thereof by the proper authorities. The decretal portion of the decision ordered the respondents to pay Antonio jointly and severally P10,000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit; to allow Antonio to assume his position as sectoral representative of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes; to pay Antonio jointly and severally his uncollected salaries similar to those received by the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to the date of judgment; and declared Resolution Nos. 7 and 28, Series of 1992, null and void. Petitioners appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling but deleted the first, second, and fourth paragraphs of its dispositive portion. It held that Antonio’s resignation was not accepted by the proper authority, who is the President of the Philippines. While the old Local Government Code was silent as to who should accept and act on the resignation of any member of the Sanggunian, the law vests in the President the power to appoint members of the local legislative unit, so resignations must be addressed to and accepted by him. It added that, though the DILG Secretary is the alter ego of the President and notice to him may be considered notice to the President, the records were bereft of any evidence showing that the DILG Secretary received and accepted Antonio’s resignation letter. Moreover, granting that there was complete and effective resignation, Antonio was still the president of the ABC and, as such, was qualified to sit in the Sangguniang Bayan in an ex officio capacity by virtue of Section 494 of R.A. 7160 and Memorandum Circular No. 92-38. In view, however, of the May 1994 elections in which a new set of barangay officials was elected, Antonio’s reassumption of office as barangay representative to the Sangguniang Bayan was no longer legally feasible. The appellate court added that Antonio could not be considered to have abandoned his office because his designation as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was merely temporary and not incompatible with his position as president of the ABC of San Andres, Catanduanes. Finally, the Court of Appeals deleted the award of attorney’s fees for being without basis and held that Resolution Nos. 6 and 28 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres involved a valid exercise of the powers of said local body. It thus modified the trial court’s judgment by affirming paragraph 3 and deleting the other items. Unsatisfied, petitioners brought the present recourse.

• Validity of Resignation: Petitioner argued that Antonio’s resignation was valid and effective despite the absence of an express acceptance by the President of the Philippines; the letter of resignation was submitted to the Secretary of the DILG, an alter ego of the President and the appointing authority, and acceptance could be inferred from the fact that the DILG Secretary himself appointed Antonio as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes.
• Abandonment of Office: Petitioner maintained that Antonio’s acts clearly established his intention to totally abandon his office, indicating an absolute relinquishment thereof, because he actually tendered his resignation, subsequently accepted an ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, performed the duties and functions of that office for almost two years, was completely aware of the appointment and assumption on July 18, 1990 of Nenito F. Aquino as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan, failed to question Aquino’s twenty-month tenure, and remained silent for almost eight months after knowledge of the decision in Taule vs. Santos nullifying his designation as representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
• Back Salaries: Petitioner raised the issue of whether Antonio was entitled to collect salaries similar to those received by other members of the Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to the date of judgment, contending in effect that his abandonment of the office barred any such claim.

• Validity of Resignation: Whether respondent’s resignation as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes, was complete and effective so as to terminate his official relation thereto.
• Abandonment of Office: Whether respondent had totally abandoned his ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang Bayan.
• Back Salaries: Whether respondent is entitled to collect salaries similar to those received by other members of the Sangguniang Bayan from April 8, 1992 up to the date of judgment in the case by the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes.

• Validity of Resignation: No. The resignation was not complete and operative because there was no acceptance by the proper authority, as required by Ortiz vs. COMELEC and Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Abandonment of Office: Yes. Notwithstanding the invalid resignation, Antonio effectively relinquished his office through voluntary abandonment, which requires an intention to abandon and an overt act carrying that intention into effect.
• Back Salaries: No. Having abandoned his post, Antonio cannot recover back salaries under the “no work, no pay” rule.

• Validity of Resignation: The Court applied the definition in Ortiz vs. COMELEC: resignation is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it, requiring acceptance by competent and lawful authority. A complete and operative resignation from public office requires (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term, (b) an act of relinquishment, and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority; the last is required by Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The governing law was B.P. Blg. 337. Although it was silent on who should accept the resignation of an appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Section 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing rules provided that resignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, with a copy furnished to the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local Government, and that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance. Antonio’s resignation letter was addressed only to the municipal mayor, with copies furnished to the provincial governor, municipal treasurer, and DILG; neither the mayor nor those furnished copies expressly acted on it. Even assuming the rule was valid and applicable, the mayor should have referred or endorsed the letter to the Sangguniang Bayan for proper action. No evidence showed acceptance by any government functionary. Under jurisprudence, absent statutory provisions on whom resignation should be submitted to, it should be tendered to the appointing person or body; Antonio should have submitted it to the President or his alter ego, the DILG Secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the DILG Secretary a copy, there was no showing it was received or acted upon. The third requisite being absent, there was no valid and complete resignation.

• Abandonment of Office: Although the resignation was invalid for lack of acceptance, the Court held that Antonio effectively relinquished his membership by voluntary abandonment. Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof; it is a species of resignation, but while resignation is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser is neglect to use a privilege, right, easement, or office. Abandonment springs from deliberation and freedom of choice, and its effect is that the former holder can no longer legally repossess the office even by forcible reoccupancy. The intention to abandon must be clear and may be express or inferred from conduct; failure to perform duties must be with actual or imputed intention to abandon. Abandonment is not wholly a matter of intention; it results from a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will infer relinquishment. The essential elements are (1) an intention to abandon and (2) an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. The Court found Antonio’s intention to abandon from: (1) his failure to perform his function as member of the Sangguniang Bayan; (2) his failure to collect the corresponding remuneration; (3) his failure to object to Aquino’s appointment as his replacement; and (4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume his post after the Supreme Court nullified his designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The overt acts carrying the intention into effect were: (1) his letter of resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan; (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; (3) his faithful discharge of duties and functions as member of that Sanggunian; and (4) his receipt of remuneration for such post. The Court stressed that when an officer is designated to another post, the law usually allows him to discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities and does not require resignation from the original post; Antonio, however, did not simultaneously discharge both positions or express an intention to resume his Sangguniang Bayan office. His silence, inaction, and acquiescence when Aquino succeeded him showed abandonment. His immediate and natural reaction should have been to object or file an appropriate legal action, but he did neither. He expressed intention to resume only on March 31, 1992, after Aquino had been deemed resigned on March 23, 1992, and months after the Supreme Court nullified his designation on August 12, 1991. From his passivity, he was deemed to have recognized the validity of Aquino’s appointment and discharge of duties. His failure to promptly assert his right implied loss of interest. As Mechem observed, public offices are held upon the implied condition that the officer will diligently and faithfully execute the duties belonging to them; while a temporary or accidental failure to perform them in a single instance or during a short period will not operate as an abandonment, if the officer refuses or neglects to exercise the functions of the office for so long as to reasonably warrant the presumption that he does not desire or intend to perform the duties of the office at all, he will be held to have abandoned it, not only when his refusal to perform was willful, but also where, while he intended to vacate the office, it was because he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right to hold it. Finally, Antonio’s claim as ABC president to membership in the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 was not self-executory; the law required another positive act—appointment by the President or the Secretary of Local Government under E.O. 342. What he could have done after Aquino’s resignation was to seek reappointment from the President or the Secretary of Local Government. He could not claim an absolute right to the office which, by his own actuations, he was deemed to have relinquished. The Court reiterated Aparri vs. Court of Appeals that a public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law; the right to hold a public office is not a natural right and exists only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it; there is no vested interest or estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office, except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure.

• Back Salaries: Having ruled that Antonio voluntarily abandoned his post at the Sangguniang Bayan, the Court held he was not entitled to any back salaries. The basic “no work, no pay” rule applies. A public officer is entitled to receive compensation for services actually rendered for as long as he has the right to the office being claimed. When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned.

• Resignation of Public Officers — Resignation is the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. Acceptance is required by Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of statutory provisions as to whom resignation should be submitted, it should be tendered to the appointing person or body. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Antonio’s resignation was not complete because it was addressed only to the municipal mayor, with copies furnished to other officials, and no proper authority accepted it.
• Abandonment of Office — Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. It is a species of resignation; while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment, abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through nonuser. Nonuser refers to a neglect to use a privilege or a right or to exercise an easement or an office. Abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. Its concomitant effect is that the former holder of an office can no longer legally repossess it even by forcible reoccupancy. There are two essential elements: first, an intention to abandon; and second, an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Antonio abandoned his Sangguniang Bayan seat through his failure to perform duties, collect remuneration, object to Aquino’s appointment, and promptly assert his right to reassume, coupled with his resignation, assumption of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan post, discharge of duties there, and receipt of remuneration.
• Designation Does Not Require Resignation from Original Office — When an officer is designated to another post, he is usually called upon to discharge duties in addition to his regular responsibilities; the law does not require the public servant to resign from his original post and instead allows him to concurrently discharge the functions of both offices. The Court used this principle to explain that Antonio’s designation to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not by itself require his resignation from the Sangguniang Bayan, but that his failure to discharge both offices concurrently and his other acts showed abandonment.
• Public Office Is Not a Vested Right — A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The right to hold a public office is not a natural right; it exists only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. The Court applied this doctrine to reject Antonio’s claim of an absolute right to reassume his Sangguniang Bayan seat.
• No Work, No Pay — A public officer is entitled to receive compensation for services actually rendered for as long as he has the right to the office being claimed. When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned. The Court applied this rule to deny Antonio back salaries after finding that he had abandoned his post.

• “Although a resignation is not complete without an acceptance thereof by the proper authority, an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance.” — This opening statement states the core ratio decidendi: it reconciles the absence of a valid resignation with the finding of abandonment and explains why Antonio could not reassume the office despite the lack of acceptance.
• “To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.” — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the requisites of resignation, which it used to hold that Antonio’s resignation was incomplete because no proper authority accepted it.
• “Therefore, there are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or ‘external’ act by which the intention is carried into effect.” — This excerpt defines the test for abandonment that the Court applied to Antonio’s conduct, particularly his nonuser and overt acts.
• “When the act or conduct of a public servant constitutes a relinquishment of his office, he has no right to receive any salary incident to the office he had abandoned.” — This passage states the salary consequence of abandonment and supports the denial of Antonio’s back salaries under the “no work, no pay” rule.

• Ortiz vs. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812 (1988) — The Court cited this case for the definition of resignation and the requirement of acceptance by competent and lawful authority; it supplied the three requisites of complete and operative resignation.
• Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 1 (1981) — Cited as authority for the requisites of complete resignation, particularly acceptance by the proper authority.
• Taule vs. Santos, 200 SCRA 512 (1991) — The Supreme Court’s prior ruling reversed the DILG Secretary’s annulment of the FABC election and declared Antonio’s appointment to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan void; this triggered his attempt to reassume his Sangguniang Bayan seat.
• Triste vs. Leyte State College Board of Trustees, 192 SCRA 326 (1990) — Cited for the principle that designation implies temporariness and may vest additional duties while the officer performs his permanent office; the Court used it to explain why designation to another post does not ordinarily require resignation from the original office.
• Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1981) — Cited for the rule that a public office is created and conferred by law, the right to hold office is not a natural right, and there is no vested interest or absolute right to hold office or its salary, except constitutional offices.
• Celerian vs. Tantuico, Jr., 190 SCRA 1 (1990) — Cited for the “no work, no pay” rule in denying back salaries to Antonio after abandonment.
• Jorge vs. Mayor, 10 SCRA 331 (1964) — Cited for the principle that abandonment springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968) — Cited for the definition of laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert the right either abandoned it or declined to assert it.

• Article 238, Revised Penal Code — The Court cited this provision as the reason acceptance by the proper authority is required for complete resignation; it penalizes a public officer who, before acceptance of his resignation, abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.
• Section 6, Rule XIX, Implementing Rules of B.P. Blg. 337 — Provided that resignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, with a copy furnished to the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local Government, and that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance. The Court found no acceptance under this rule.
• Section 146, B.P. Blg. 337 (Local Government Code of 1983) — Defined the composition of the Sangguniang Bayan, including members appointed by the President such as the resident of the katipunang bayan and the president of the kabataang barangay municipal federation. The Court held Antonio’s claimed right under this provision was not self-executory.
• Section 50, B.P. Blg. 337 — Governed permanent vacancies in local sanggunians and authorized the governor, in the case of sangguniang bayan members, to appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. It was the basis for Aquino’s appointment in Antonio’s place.
• Section 494, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Provided that duly elected presidents of the liga at the municipal, city, and provincial levels shall serve as ex-officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively, during their term as liga presidents. The Court of Appeals cited this in ruling that Antonio remained qualified to sit ex officio.
• Article 210(d)(3), Rule XXIX, Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7160 — Provided that incumbent presidents of the municipal, city, and provincial chapters of the liga shall continue to serve as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until the expiration of their term of office, unless sooner removed for cause. This was cited in the DILG opinion.
• E.O. No. 342 — Delegated to the Secretary of Local Government the power to appoint certain local officials under Sections 42(4), 48(3), 49(2), 146(1) and (2), 173(1) and (5), and 205(2) of the Local Government Code. The Court cited it to show that Antonio’s right to the Sangguniang Bayan was not self-executory and required appointment.
• Memorandum Circular No. 92-38 — Issued by DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino on June 29, 1992; it allowed the incumbent ABC president to continue ex-officio membership in the sanggunian as a consequence of his continuance as liga president. The Court of Appeals cited it.
• Memorandum Circular No. 89-09 — DILG circular on the reorganization of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at all levels and guidelines on the election of their officers; it was cited in the DILG opinion regarding Antonio’s election as ABC president.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ.