Sandoval II vs. HRET

Substituted service of summons is void where the proof of service does not state the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time and the efforts exerted to locate the defendant, and where the summons is left with a person who is not a competent person in charge of the defendant’s office or regular place of business. Such failure means the tribunal does not acquire jurisdiction over the person and the period to answer does not begin to run.

Federico S. Sandoval II and Aurora Rosario A. Oreta were rival candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas in the 14 May 2001 national elections. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the constitutional tribunal vested with jurisdiction as sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress. Under Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of the HRET, the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to HRET proceedings.

Federico S. Sandoval II and Aurora Rosario A. Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of Malabon-Navotas in the 14 May 2001 national elections. The canvass of election returns yielded 92,062 votes for Sandoval and 72,862 votes for Oreta, a difference of 19,200 votes. On 22 May 2001 Sandoval was proclaimed duly elected representative by the District Board of Canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After taking his oath of office, he assumed the post at noon of 30 June 2001.

On 1 June 2001 Oreta filed with the HRET an election protest against Sandoval, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-027, assailing alleged electoral frauds and anomalies in 1,308 precincts of the Malabon-Navotas District. On 4 June 2001 the HRET issued the corresponding summons for service upon Sandoval. On 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the summons by substituted service upon Gene Maga, who signed the process server’s copy of the summons and indicated thereon his position as “maintenance” and the date and time of receipt as 7 June 2001 at 1:25 p.m. The pro-forma affidavit of service executed by the process server a day after service stated that on 6/7/01 he personally served the document on counsels and parties at their respective addresses; the party/counsel was Rep. Federico S. Sandoval, the address was No. 992 M. Naval St., Navotas, M.M., and the recipient was Gene Maga, with the position “Maintenance.”

On 12 July 2001 the HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081, taking note of Sandoval’s failure to file an answer to the election protest within ten days from service of the summons on 7 June 2001 and entering in his behalf a general denial of the allegations in the protest. The HRET also ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary conference. On 18 July 2001 the HRET ordered both Sandoval and Oreta to file their respective preliminary conference briefs. Sandoval received the order on 20 July 2001, as shown by a rubber stamp bearing his name and his district office in Navotas and indicating the time and date of receipt as well as the person with corresponding position, administrative staff, who received the order. On 1 August 2001 Oreta filed the required preliminary conference brief. On 6 August 2001, instead of filing a preliminary conference brief, Sandoval moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and prayed for admission of his answer with counter-protest. He argued that the substituted service of summons upon him was improperly effected upon a maintenance man, Gene Maga, who was neither a regular employee nor a responsible officer at Sandoval’s office. On 9 August 2001 the HRET issued Resolution No. 01-118 denying reconsideration of Resolution No. 01-081 and admission of Sandoval’s answer with counter-protest. On 30 August 2001 Sandoval filed the instant petition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning Resolutions Nos. 01-081 and 01-118 and assailing the HRET’s jurisdiction over his person. The Court denied the plea for injunctive writs. Sandoval was constrained to file his preliminary conference brief ad cautelam and to attend the preliminary conference on 18 October 2001, which had been postponed several times upon his request.

In affirming the substituted service of summons and its jurisdiction over Sandoval and in rejecting admission of his answer with counter-protest, the HRET rationalized that the records showed the summons was received by Gene Maga of Maintenance, District Office, on 7 June 2001 at 1:25 p.m.; that on 27 July 2001 an Affidavit of Service attached to the Tribunal’s receiving copy of the summons was jointly executed by Process Server Pacifico Lim and Accounting Clerk Aurora Napolis; that the affidavit stated Lim found Maga at Sandoval’s district office, who identified himself as a member of Sandoval’s staff, and thus Lim left the summons with him; that after Lim left the Tribunal premises, Napolis talked to Primitivo P. Reyes, a congressional staff of Sandoval’s father, Rep. Vicente A. Sandoval, who assured that there was somebody at Sandoval’s district office who could receive the summons; and that on 16 June 2001, or the ninth day from 7 June 2001, the Chief of Staff of Sandoval at the House of Representatives inquired by telephone with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal as to the last day for Sandoval to file his answer. The HRET found valid service and no fault on the part of its process server in effecting substituted service through Maga.

The process server’s affidavit of service was dated 8 June 2001, not 27 July 2001, and gave only the date of receipt and the position of the person receiving the summons. The HRET’s findings were instead based on the 27 July 2001 joint affidavit of Process Server Pacifico Lim and Accounting Clerk Aurora Napolis, executed long after the summons was served on 7 June 2001. Gene Maga, in his own sworn statement, stated that he was a maintenance man who cleaned and repaired items in the offices and houses of anyone who contracted his services; that on 7 June 2001 he was instructed by Mrs. Jeannie N. Sandoval, wife of Cong. Federico S. Sandoval II, to clean the district office of Cong. Sandoval at M. Naval St., San Jose, Navotas, Metro Manila; and that Mrs. Sandoval was a regular client whom he served regularly doing chores she asked him to do. Sandoval asserted in his motion for reconsideration that Maga was neither a regular employee nor a responsible officer at his office. The Chief of Staff of Sandoval, Atty. Cristopher B. Landrito, denied under oath having placed the alleged telephone call. The record did not show that Sandoval actually received the summons and a copy of the election protest; what could be inferred was his knowledge of the HRET Order of 18 July 2001, copy of which was received by his staff on 20 July 2001, requiring him to file his preliminary conference brief.

• Invalid Substituted Service: Petitioner argued that the substituted service of summons was improperly effected upon Gene Maga, a maintenance man who was neither a regular employee nor a responsible officer at petitioner’s office.
• Lack of Jurisdiction over Person: Petitioner assailed the HRET’s jurisdiction over his person and sought admission of his answer with counter-protest.

• Time in Election Protests: Respondent Oreta argued that personal service need not be exhausted before substituted service may be used since time in election protest cases is of the essence.
• HRET’s Affirmation of Service: The HRET maintained that substituted service was valid and that it had jurisdiction over petitioner’s person, relying on the fact that Gene Maga was found at petitioner’s district office during office hours and identified himself as petitioner’s staff, and on the affidavit of service and the alleged assurance and telephone inquiry indicating notice.

• Validity of Substituted Service: Whether substituted service of summons upon petitioner Federico S. Sandoval II through Gene Maga in HRET Case No. 01-027 was validly effected.

• Validity of Substituted Service: No. The substituted service was invalid because the process server’s affidavit did not state the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time or the efforts exerted to locate petitioner, and Gene Maga was not a competent person in charge of petitioner’s office. Consequently, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s person and the period to file his answer with counter-protest did not start to run.

• Validity of Substituted Service: Service of summons is governed by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply suppletorily to the Revised Rules of the HRET through Rule 80. Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 require personal service whenever practicable; substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, and then only by leaving copies at his residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or at his office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge thereof. Substituted service is extraordinary and derogates from the regular method; its statutory restrictions must be strictly, faithfully, and fully observed. For validity, the following must be established: (a) impossibility of service within a reasonable time; (b) efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or a competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. The pertinent facts proving these circumstances must be stated in the proof of service or officer’s return itself; only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure renders the substituted service absolutely void and the proceedings taken thereafter void for lack of jurisdiction over the person. Here, the process server’s affidavit of service dated June 8, 2001 contained only the date of receipt and the position of the person receiving the summons; it did not indicate the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time or the efforts exerted to locate petitioner. The HRET instead relied on the July 27, 2001 joint affidavit of Process Server Pacifico Lim and Accounting Clerk Aurora Napolis, which was not the officer’s return but a species of evidence aliunde generally inadmissible absent exceptional circumstances, none of which appeared. Gene Maga was a maintenance man, not an employee of petitioner; his own sworn statement showed he was an independent contractor for odd maintenance jobs and was instructed by petitioner’s wife to clean the district office. He was not a competent person in charge of petitioner’s office, had no relation of confidence with petitioner, and was not integrated in the responsibilities and duties of petitioner as Congressman. His alleged self-identification as a member of petitioner’s staff did not ipso facto make him competent, especially since the affidavit itself stated his position as maintenance. Even assuming he was an employee, he was not qualified to receive the summons. The alleged assurance by a staff member of petitioner’s father was not relied upon by the process server and there was no showing that the staff member was petitioner’s speaking agent. The alleged telephone call by petitioner’s Chief of Staff was not mentioned in the affidavits, was not authenticated, and was denied under oath. There was no proof petitioner actually received the summons or a copy of the election protest. The presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions did not apply because there was no barest compliance with the procedure for substituted service. The process server hastily resorted to substituted service without first attempting personal service, violating the absolute preference for personal service. Because the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner’s person, the period to file his answer with counter-protest did not begin to run. Petitioner was justified in promptly moving for reconsideration and seeking admission of his answer with counter-protest; where the ground for affirmative relief is lack of jurisdiction, the pleading or motion may be filed anytime before estoppel or laches, neither of which obtained. Petitioner did not seek annulment of the HRET proceedings but only admission of his answer with counter-protest; no legitimate policy or legal obstacle existed to deny that relief. Admission would allow him to prove affirmative defenses and present evidence on his counter-protest, without relieving respondent Oreta of her burden, since a general denial had already been entered. Correction of jurisdictional errors is a function of certiorari and the Court’s constitutional mandate.

• Strict Compliance with Substituted Service of Summons — Substituted service is an extraordinary method that derogates from personal service; statutory restrictions must be strictly, faithfully, and fully observed. The requisites are: (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing in the defendant’s residence or a competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business. These facts must appear in the proof of service or officer’s return; only exceptionally may they be proved by evidence aliunde. Failure renders the substituted service void and the proceedings taken thereafter void for lack of jurisdiction over the person. Applied here, the process server’s affidavit did not show impossibility or efforts, and the HRET’s reliance on a later joint affidavit was inadmissible aliunde evidence.

• Competent Person in Charge — The recipient of substituted service at the defendant’s office must be a competent person in charge, meaning duly qualified and having sufficient capacity, ability, or authority, with a relation of confidence to the defendant such that he may be expected to deliver the process or notify the defendant. A maintenance man who is an independent contractor for odd jobs, not an employee, and who merely signs the summons as “maintenance,” is not a competent person in charge. Mere self-identification as staff does not ipso facto confer competence.

• Preference for Personal Service — Personal service of summons is the preferred method and must be attempted whenever practicable; substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time. The hierarchy applies equally to regular court cases and election protest cases before the HRET because the Rules of Court apply suppletorily.

• Jurisdiction over the Person and Due Process — Valid service of summons is essential to the tribunal’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person and to due process. Where substituted service is invalid, the tribunal does not acquire jurisdiction over the person and the period to file an answer does not begin to run. A motion or pleading invoking lack of jurisdiction may be filed anytime before barred by estoppel or laches.

• Proof of Service and Aliunde Evidence — The officer’s return must itself state the facts proving the requisites of substituted service; a later joint affidavit is not the officer’s return and is generally inadmissible aliunde evidence absent exceptional circumstances.

• Presumption of Regularity — The presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply where there is no barest compliance with the procedure for substituted service.

• Judicial Review of HRET Proceedings — Although the HRET is the sole judge of contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress, the Supreme Court may entertain certiorari where jurisdictional issues are involved or grave abuse of discretion is shown, pursuant to the expanded judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. The Court may review HRET rules and correct jurisdictional errors.

• Relief in Certiorari for Invalid Service — Where a party does not seek annulment of the proceedings but only admission of an answer with counter-protest upon a clear jurisdictional ground, the relief may be granted; the correction of jurisdictional errors is a function of certiorari.

• "Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. As safeguard measures for this drastic manner of bringing in a person to answer for a claim, it is required that statutory restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed." — States the strict-compliance doctrine governing substituted service and explains why the rules on substituted service are construed narrowly.

• "In our jurisdiction, for service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to establish the following circumstances, i.e., (a) impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time, (b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein or some competent person in charge of his office or regular place of business." — Enumerates the requisites for a valid substituted service of summons, which the Court found absent in this case.

• "It is also essential that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or officer's return itself and only under exceptional terms may they be proved by evidence aliunde." — Establishes that the officer’s return must contain the facts justifying substituted service and that later evidence is generally inadmissible to cure a defective return.

• "Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the respondent." — States the consequence of non-compliance: the substituted service and subsequent proceedings are void for lack of jurisdiction over the person.

• Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 134792, 12 August 1999, 312 SCRA 353 — Cited to support the Supreme Court’s taking cognizance of certiorari proceedings involving HRET rules; the Court noted prior cases where it reviewed HRET procedural rules.
• Libanan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 283 SCRA 520 (1997) — Quoted for the rule that judicial guidance is appropriate where jurisdictional issues are involved or grave abuse of discretion is presented, so the Court may vindicate due process or correct grave abuses.
• Loyola vs. HRET, G.R. No. 109026, 4 January 1994, 229 SCRA 90; Lazatin vs. HRET, G.R. No. 84297, 8 December 1988, 168 SCRA 391; Arroyo vs. HRET, G.R. No. 118597, 14 July 1995, 316 SCRA 464 — Cited to show that the Supreme Court has taken cognizance of certiorari proceedings involving HRET rules, including the import of a general denial, HRET’s power to set prescriptive periods, and suppletory application of rules of evidence.
• Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126947, 15 July 1999, 310 SCRA 343 — Cited for the principle that compliance with the rules on service of summons is a concern of jurisdiction and due process; also cited in connection with strict compliance with substituted service.
• Mapa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79374, 2 October 1992, 214 SCRA 417 — Cited for the requirement that the facts proving the circumstances for substituted service be stated in the proof of service or officer’s return, and that aliunde evidence is allowed only under exceptional terms.
• Toyota Cubao vs. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 181 (1997) — Cited together with Mapa for the same requirement on proof of service and aliunde evidence.
• Umandap vs. Sabio, G.R. No. 140244, 29 August 2000, 339 SCRA 243 — Cited for the rule that failure to comply with the requirements renders the substituted service absolutely void and the proceedings taken thereafter void for lack of jurisdiction over the person.
• Keister vs. Navarro, No. L-29067, 31 May 1977, 77 SCRA 209; Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70661, 9 April 1987, 149 SCRA 193 — Cited for the qualification of the person to whom process may be left: there must be a relation of confidence between that person and the defendant, such that the person will deliver the process or give notice.
• Gochangco vs. CFI-Negros Occidental, No. L-49396, 15 January 1988, 157 SCRA 40 — Cited for the rule that the person in charge of the defendant’s regular place of business need not be specially authorized to receive summons, provided he appears to be in charge.
• Far Corporation vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 57218, 12 December 1986, 146 SCRA 197 — Cited for the principle that a person receiving summons must be integrated in the responsibilities and duties of the defendant; also cited for the rule that if dismissal of the HRET proceedings were sought, the prayer would be denied and an alias summons served.
• Hamilton vs. Levy, G.R. No. 139283, 15 November 2000, 344 SCRA 281; Venturanza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77760, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 305; Arevalo vs. Quilatan, 202 Phil. 256 (1982) — Cited together for the rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply absent even the barest compliance with the procedure for substituted service.

• Section 6, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires personal service of summons by handing a copy to the defendant in person whenever practicable, or by tendering it if he refuses to receive and sign for it.
• Section 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Allows substituted service only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, by leaving copies at his residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or at his office or regular place of business with a competent person in charge thereof.
• Rule 80, Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal — Provides that the Rules of Court, decisions of the Supreme Court, and decisions of the Electoral Tribunals apply by analogy or in suppletory character to HRET proceedings insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with HRET rules and issuances. The Court applied the Rules of Court on service of summons suppletorily.
• Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Vests the HRET with jurisdiction as sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress; the Court recognized this but held it does not bar certiorari for jurisdictional issues or grave abuse of discretion.
• Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Expands judicial power to include determination of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government; cited as basis for the Court’s review of HRET jurisdictional issues.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The petition was filed under Rule 65 as a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction; the Court granted the petition and corrected the jurisdictional error.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona concurred. No separate concurring opinions are summarized in the text. Vitug, Mendoza, and Panganiban took no part; Quisumbing was on leave.