Sandejas vs. Robles

An action for the resolution of a contract of sale of real property is an action in personam, not quasi in rem, such that the court's jurisdiction depends on jurisdiction over the parties rather than over the property itself. A prior judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction during the Japanese occupation bars a subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause of action, provided the parties were not deprived of due process.

Jose P. Sandejas and the defendants-appellees — Zacarias C. Robles, Elena C. Vda. de Robles, and Rosario y Singson — were parties to a contract of sale involving three parcels of land located in the Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the appellees instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the resolution of that contract of sale. The validity of judgments rendered by courts functioning during the Japanese occupation had been addressed by the Supreme Court in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, which appellants did not contest but sought to distinguish on the ground that the territory where the property lay was under guerrilla control at the time the prior judgment was rendered.

Jose P. Sandejas entered into a contract of sale with Zacarias C. Robles, Elena C. Vda. de Robles, and Rosario y Singson involving three parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo. The agreed purchase price was ₱35,000, of which the appellants had paid ₱5,723.60 on account. A dispute arose concerning the performance of the terms and conditions of the contract, prompting the appellees to file an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo during the Japanese occupation for the resolution of the contract of sale.

The appellants submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of that court by filing their answers to the complaint through their counsel, Atty. Benjamin H. Tirol, the same attorney who represented them in the present appeal. They were notified of the date set for hearing. When the case was called for trial on September 29, 1944, Atty. Tirol requested and obtained permission to withdraw his appearance, stating as ground that it was difficult to communicate with his clients, who had gone to Arevalo, a suburb approximately six or seven kilometers from Iloilo City. To afford the appellants an opportunity to be heard, the hearing was postponed to the afternoon of the same date.

The appellants did not appear on the afternoon of September 29, 1944, and the case was heard in their absence. On October 2, 1944, the court rendered judgment declaring the resolution of the contract between the parties and ordering the appellees to return to the appellants the sum of ₱5,723.60 received as partial payment. On October 25, 1944, the appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Their attempt to appeal was likewise denied on November 23, 1944, and the judgment was declared final and executory. On November 29, 1944, the appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the appeal, but no resolution on that motion had been received by the time the present complaint was filed.

The appellants thereafter instituted the present action before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, raising the same cause of action — the performance or non-performance of the terms and conditions of the same contract of sale. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the prior judgment rendered on October 2, 1944. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case, giving rise to the present appeal.

• Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Res: Appellants contended that the Court of First Instance of Iloilo during the Japanese occupation had no jurisdiction to try the case or render the decision of October 2, 1944, because the three parcels of land involved were located in the Municipality of Passi, which by mid-September 1944 was under the control of Panay guerrilla forces and beyond the authority of the puppet Republic of the Philippines. Because the action was, in their view, quasi in rem, the court lacked jurisdiction over the res.
• Denial of Due Process: Appellants maintained that, even assuming the occupation court had jurisdiction, the decision was rendered after they had been deprived of their day in court, in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

• Nature of the Action and Jurisdiction: Whether an action for the resolution of a contract of sale of real property is quasi in rem, such that the occupation court's jurisdiction depended on its authority over the territory where the property was located.
• Due Process: Whether the appellants were deprived of their day in court during the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo during the Japanese occupation.

• Nature of the Action and Jurisdiction: No. An action for the resolution of a contract of sale is in personam, not quasi in rem; jurisdiction over the parties, not over the property, is controlling, and the location of the land in guerrilla-held territory does not affect the court's jurisdiction.
• Due Process: No. The appellants were not deprived of due process; their absence from the trial was attributable to their own fault, as the record showed they had filed answers, were notified of the hearing, and were given an opportunity to appear on the afternoon of the same date.

• Nature of the Action and Jurisdiction: The appellants' contention rested on the premise that the action for resolution of a contract of sale was quasi in rem, requiring the court to have jurisdiction over the res — the land located in Passi, then under guerrilla control. This premise was rejected. Citing Grey Alba vs. Dela Cruz and American Jurisprudence, the Court defined an action in personam as one whose technical object is to establish a claim against a particular person, with a judgment binding that person, even if it concerns rights to or possession of specific property. An action quasi in rem, by contrast — as defined in Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca — is one where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject his interest in property to an obligation or lien burdening the property, such as attachment or foreclosure. The action instituted by the appellees sought to resolve the contract of sale and recover the partial payment; its object was to establish and enforce personal rights and obligations arising from the contract, not to subject the property itself to a lien. The action was therefore in personam, and jurisdiction over the parties — which was not disputed — was sufficient. The fact that the property lay in guerrilla-controlled territory was immaterial.

• Due Process: The record of the prior judgment (Exhibit A to the motion to dismiss) showed that the appellants had filed answers through their attorney, were notified of the hearing date, and that when their counsel withdrew on September 29, 1944, due to difficulty communicating with them, the court postponed the hearing to the afternoon of the same day to give them an opportunity to appear. Their failure to appear was thus attributable to their own fault, not to any denial by the court. They subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and attempted to appeal, demonstrating active participation in the proceedings. The contention that they were deprived of their day in court was therefore untenable.

• Res Judicata — A subsequent action is barred by prior judgment when the parties and the cause of action in both actions are the same or represent the same interest, and the court rendering the prior judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In this case, all elements were satisfied: the parties were identical, the cause of action in both suits was the performance or non-performance of the same contract of sale, and the occupation court had jurisdiction over the parties in an in personam action.
• Distinction Between Actions In Personam and Quasi In Rem — An action in personam has for its object a judgment against the person, based on jurisdiction over the person, although it may involve rights to specific property. An action quasi in rem is one where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject his interest in property to an obligation or lien. An action for the resolution of a contract of sale of real property is in personam because its object is to enforce personal rights and obligations under the contract, not to subject the property to a lien.

• "This contention is premised on the wrong assumption that the action for the resolution of a contract of sale of a real property is an action quasi in rem. The action instituted by the appellees to resolve the contract of sale of said parcels of land, is in personam and not quasi in rem." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the nature of the action, directly rejecting the appellants' jurisdictional argument.
• "In view of the foregoing facts set forth in the decision Exhibit A and not contradicted or denied by the appellants, which show that the absence from the trial of the appellants was due to their own fault, appellants' contention that they were deprived of their day in court is untenable." — This passage disposes of the due process issue, grounding the conclusion in the uncontradicted record of the prior proceedings.

• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 1 Off. Gaz. 779 (75 Phil. 113) — Controlling precedent on the validity of judgments rendered by courts during the Japanese occupation. Appellants did not contest this ruling but sought to distinguish it; the Court found the distinction untenable because the action was in personam.
• Grey Alba vs. Dela Cruz, 17 Phil. 61 — Followed for the definition of an action in personam, quoting Tyler vs. Judges to the effect that an action is in personam when its object is to establish a claim against a particular person, even if it concerns rights to tangible property.
• Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 — Followed for the definition of an action quasi in rem, distinguishing it from a true action in rem by the circumstance that an individual is named as defendant and the purpose is to subject his interest in property to an obligation or lien.

• Due Process Clause, Philippine Constitution — Appellants invoked the due process clause to challenge the validity of the prior judgment rendered during the Japanese occupation. The Court found no violation, as the record showed the appellants had been given opportunity to be heard but failed to appear through their own fault.

Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concurred.

• Perfecto, J. — Dissented on the ground that the appealed decision should be reversed and the lower court ordered to proceed with the case and render judgment on the merits, relying on the reasons stated in his opinion in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh.