San Juan, Jr. vs. Cruz

The heirs of a deceased party may be substituted for the deceased in pending proceedings without requiring the prior appointment of an executor or administrator of the estate, and the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is reckoned from notice of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, whether the assailed order is final or interlocutory.

Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees. Upon Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 98-36118. Epifanio San Juan, Jr. appeared as oppositor in the probate proceedings. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999, giving rise to the question of who could properly substitute for him as devisee in the probate case.

Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 98-36118. Epifanio San Juan, Jr. appeared as oppositor in the probate proceedings.

While the probate petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The law firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as counsel for Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative. On August 14, 2002, the probate court denied the entry of appearance of the law firm, ruling that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee and thus could not be substituted as representative under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On November 22, 2002, the court directed Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa so that the appointee could be substituted in lieu of the deceased.

On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator," signed by nine persons surnamed Casa, designating Federico Casa, Jr. as administrator of the property to be inherited by Oscar Casa in the will of Loreto San Juan. San Juan filed a motion to declare the appointment inadequate, maintaining that the heirs should present a court-appointed administrator of Oscar Casa's estate as representative. Aquino replied that under Section 16, Rule 3, the heirs may be substituted without need for appointment of an administrator or executor.

On December 2, 2003, the RTC denied San Juan's motion, reversing its earlier position and holding that no appointment of an administrator or executor was necessary — it was enough that a representative be appointed under Section 16, Rule 3. San Juan received a copy of this Order on December 15, 2003 and filed a motion for reconsideration on December 30, 2003, citing Lawas vs. Court of Appeals for the proposition that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased and that a prior determination of the rightful heirs is required before substitution. This motion was denied on February 27, 2004; San Juan received the denial on March 18, 2004.

San Juan then filed a second motion for reconsideration on May 7, 2004, reiterating his arguments and citing Torres, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals for the due process rationale behind the rule on substitution. The RTC denied this on June 11, 2004, citing Montañano vs. Suesa and Riera vs. Palmanori for the proposition that a legatee is not an indispensable or necessary party in probate. San Juan filed a further motion for reconsideration on July 23, 2004, which the RTC denied on September 8, 2004, sustaining Aquino's argument that it was a prohibited third motion for reconsideration under Section 3, Rule 37.

On November 22, 2004, San Juan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking nullification of the RTC orders. The CA dismissed the petition on December 1, 2004, holding it was filed beyond the 60-day period reckoned from notice of the February 27, 2004 Order, declaring the second motion for reconsideration pro forma. The CA denied San Juan's motion for reconsideration on February 24, 2005. San Juan then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.

• Reckoning of the 60-Day Period: Petitioner argued that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, reckoned from notice of denial of the first motion for reconsideration, applies only to judgments, final resolutions, or final orders — not to interlocutory orders. Since the assailed RTC orders were interlocutory, a second or third motion for reconsideration was not prohibited, and the 60-day period should be reckoned from the denial of the subsequent motions.
• Interlocutory Nature of the Orders: Petitioner maintained that the RTC orders dated December 2, 2003, February 27, 2004, June 11, 2004, and September 8, 2004 were interlocutory because they dealt solely with the proper substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa and did not terminate or finally dispose of the case, nor did they go into the merits of the probate case.
• Invalidity of Substitution by Purported Heirs: Petitioner averred, citing Lawas vs. Court of Appeals and Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, that priority must be given to the legal representative (executor or administrator) of the deceased, and that the heirs may be substituted only in case of unreasonable delay in appointment or where they resort to extrajudicial settlement. He argued that a prior determination by the probate court of who the rightful heirs are is required, and that the purported heirs' self-appointment of a representative was contrary to the rules and could be used as an instrument for fraud.
• Probate Court's Broader Role: Petitioner insisted that the probate court is charged not only with determining the validity of the will but also with ascertaining the rightful heirs, legatees, and devisees for the purpose of settling the estate of the testator.

• Pro Forma Motion: Respondent Aquino argued that San Juan's July 23, 2004 motion for reconsideration was in fact a third motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Substitution Without Administrator: Aquino stated that under Section 16, Rule 3, the heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor, and that the court is enjoined to require the representative to appear and be substituted within the prescribed period.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Whether the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is reckoned from notice of denial of the first motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order even though second and third motions for reconsideration of the same interlocutory order were filed and later denied.
• Validity of Substitution by Heirs: Whether a person nominated as "administrator" by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a will under probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite not being the court-appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased devisee or legatee.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: Yes, the petition was time-barred. The 60-day period was reckoned from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2004, expiring on May 17, 2004; the petition was filed only on November 22, 2004. While the CA erred in calling the second motion pro forma (the pro forma proscription applies only to final orders), the second motion was nonetheless a mere rehash and could not toll the period.
• Validity of Substitution by Heirs: Yes, the substitution was valid. Under Section 16, Rule 3, the heirs may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. The heirs stepped into the shoes of the deceased devisee upon his death and acquired his rights, making prior appointment of an administrator unnecessary.

• Timeliness of Certiorari Petition: The Court clarified that the proscription against pro forma motions applies only to final resolutions or orders, not to interlocutory ones, and that the ruling in University of Immaculate Concepcion vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment involved a final order of the NLRC. The December 2, 2003 Order was interlocutory because it did not finally dispose of the case but indicated that other things remained to be done. However, while the second motion for reconsideration was not pro forma, it was a mere rehash of grounds already passed upon and resolved. Under Section 4, Rule 65 as amended, the 60-day period is counted from notice of the denial of a timely filed motion for reconsideration. Petitioner received the denial of his first motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2004, giving him until May 17, 2004 to file his certiorari petition. The period should not be reckoned from the denial of the second motion, otherwise indefinite delays would ensue. The petition filed on November 22, 2004 was thus beyond the reglementary period.
• Validity of Substitution by Heirs: The second paragraph of Section 16, Rule 3 is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. The Court expressly abandoned the doctrine in Lawas vs. Court of Appeals that priority is given to the legal representative and that heirs may be substituted only in cases of unreasonable delay or extrajudicial settlement. Relying on Gochan vs. Young, the Court held that the Rules do not prohibit heirs from representing the deceased, and when no administrator has been appointed, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as proper representatives. The heirs of Oscar Casa stepped into his shoes upon his death and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of Loreto San Juan. A prior appointment of an administrator or executor is not necessary for the heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate; they may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.

• Substitution of Heirs Without Appointment of Administrator — Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased party may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. The heirs step into the shoes of the deceased upon death and acquire his rights, making prior court appointment of an administrator unnecessary for purposes of substitution. The earlier doctrine in Lawas vs. Court of Appeals giving priority to the legal representative was expressly abandoned in favor of the ruling in Gochan vs. Young.
• Pro Forma Motions and Interlocutory Orders — The proscription against pro forma motions applies only to final resolutions or orders, not to interlocutory ones. A second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not prohibited by the Rules, though it may be denied as a mere rehash. The 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is reckoned from notice of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, whether the assailed order is final or interlocutory, to avoid indefinite delays.

• "The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased." — Quoted from Gochan vs. Young, this passage articulates the controlling doctrine that heirs may represent the deceased estate without a court-appointed administrator, forming the ratio decidendi on the substitution issue.
• "The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan." — This statement applies the Gochan doctrine to the facts, confirming that substitution by heirs is valid upon death of the devisee without prior administrator appointment.
• "The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioner's receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial court's denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue." — This passage establishes the rule for reckoning the certiorari period when multiple motions for reconsideration of an interlocutory order are filed.

• Lawas vs. Court of Appeals, 230 Phil. 261 (1986) — Previously held that priority is given to the legal representative (executor or administrator) in substitution of parties, with heirs allowed only in cases of unreasonable delay or extrajudicial settlement. Expressly abandoned by the Court in this decision as no longer true.
• Gochan vs. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001, 354 SCRA 207 — Controlling precedent followed. Held that the Rules do not prohibit heirs from representing the deceased, and when no administrator has been appointed, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as proper representatives. The Court relied on this case to overrule the Lawas doctrine.
• University of Immaculate Concepcion vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 143557, June 25, 2004, 432 SCRA 601 — Cited by the CA for the pro forma motion doctrine; distinguished by the Court as involving a final order of the NLRC, not an interlocutory order.
• Torres, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 348 (1997) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that substitution of parties protects due process rights; not relied upon by the Court in its ruling.
• Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-41107, Feb. 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 695 — Cited by petitioner for the rule that proceedings without valid substitution cannot be accorded validity; not relied upon by the Court in its ruling.
• Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909) — Cited by the RTC for the proposition that a legatee is not an indispensable or necessary party in probate; petitioner argued it was irrelevant to the substitution issue.
• Riera vs. Palmanori, 40 Phil. 105 (1920) — Cited by the RTC alongside Montañano; same relevance questioned by petitioner.
• Speed Distributing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 691 — Cited in support of the proposition that heirs step into the shoes of the deceased upon death.

• Section 16, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs death of a party and substitution. The second paragraph expressly allows the heirs of the deceased to be substituted without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. The Court held this provision to be plain and explicit, and applied it to validate the substitution of the heirs of Oscar Casa for the deceased devisee.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court (as amended by Bar Matter No. 00-2-03-SC) — Provides that a petition for certiorari shall be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, and that where a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the 60-day period is counted from notice of the denial thereof. Applied to determine that the petition was time-barred.
• Section 3, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Prohibits second motions for reconsideration of final orders. The Court clarified that this proscription applies to final orders; the RTC erred in treating San Juan's motion as a prohibited third motion for reconsideration of a final order when the assailed order was interlocutory.
• Article 1058, New Civil Code — Cited by petitioner in relation to the determination of rightful heirs; not directly applied by the Court.
• Section 6, Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court — Cited by petitioner regarding the appointment of an administrator; not directly applied by the Court.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, JJ., concurred.