Samson vs. Court of Appeals

A person charged with willful falsification of a commercial document may be convicted of falsification through reckless imprudence under the variance rule, the greater offense being deemed to include the lesser offense of criminal negligence, even though criminal negligence is a distinct quasi-offense under the Revised Penal Code.

Rufino T. Samson was a lieutenant in the Philippine Army. Amado L. Cruz was a former classmate of Samson who sought his assistance in securing the release of war-death benefit checks payable to the family of the late Felipe Lascaño, a USAFFE lieutenant who died during the Second World War. The checks were drawn against the Philippine National Bank and issued by the Philippine Ryukyus Command (PHILRYUCOM). The claim papers had been filed with the Red Cross Chapter in Sorsogon in early 1946 by Espiridion Lascaño, Felipe's father, and Rosalina Paras, Felipe's widow, who were the legitimate surviving heirs.

On October 2, 1948, Amado L. Cruz asked his former classmate Rufino T. Samson, a lieutenant in the Philippine Army, for help in securing the release of war-death benefit checks for two claimants who were with Cruz at Camp Murphy. Cruz assured Samson that he had known the claimants for a long time, and Samson was assured twice of their identity. After examining the residence certificates attached to the claim papers, Samson, accompanied by Cruz and the supposed claimants, approached Lt. Manuel Valencia and requested him to act as guarantor to secure the claimants' checks. Relying on Samson's representations, Valencia accompanied the party to the Deceased Check Delivery Section, Finance, AFP, where PNB Check No. 754497J for P6,417.11 in favor of Rosalina Paras and PNB Check No. 754498J for P6,417.10 in favor of Espiridion Lascaño were released.

The party then proceeded to the Bureau of Treasury, Finance Building, where Samson's acquaintance with the teller Rosario Mallari facilitated the cashing of the checks. Rosalina Paras, not knowing how to write or sign, was required to thumbmark the back of her check, with Samson and Francisco Ordoñez signing as witnesses below the thumbmark. Espiridion Lascaño, who could sign his name, did so on the back of his check, with Samson signing below as the last indorser. The proceeds were counted and delivered to the supposed claimants by Cruz, who had signed as Francisco Ordoñez. The group then lunched at the Aristocrat Restaurant with about eleven others, Vergara paying P60 and giving Samson P300, supposedly for the officers who helped secure the checks, plus P10 for taxi fare. Samson left to meet a friend at a movie theater.

Two days later, on October 4, while at Camp Murphy, Samson was informed by Severino Anda, one of those present during the cashing, that the checks had been delivered to the wrong parties. Worried, Samson left for Sorsogon the following day to locate the real claimants. On the train he observed an old couple casting furtive glances at him, whom he suspected to be the fake claimants. Upon arriving in Sorsogon, he reported the matter to the police and caused the couple's fingerprints, names, and address to be taken. On October 6, he visited the Lascaño residence and found Espiridion Lascaño too old and weak to leave the house; he then saw Rosalina at the school where she taught and inquired whether she had received any check from Camp Murphy, to which she answered in the negative. Samson returned to Manila on October 7 and on October 8 reported the matter to Sgt. Luis Balignasan, G-2 PC, who took his affidavit and promised to investigate, and to whom Samson submitted a copy of the suspects' fingerprints.

The Court of Appeals found that Samson had no knowledge that the supposed claimants were impostors, his subsequent conduct corroborating this conclusion. It was deemed unbelievable that a co-conspirator in a fraud exceeding P12,000 would accept only P310 as his share. However, the appellate court held that Samson acted with reckless imprudence by taking no precaution whatsoever to verify the identity of persons personally unknown to him, merely relying on Cruz's assurances and residence certificates, which are tax receipts and not reliable means of establishing identity. His endorsement of the checks constituted a written representation that the true payees participated in the indorsement and cashing, when in fact they had no direct intervention in the proceedings.

• Sufficiency of Acts for Gross Imprudence: Petitioner contended that the acts found by the Court of Appeals do not constitute gross imprudence.
• Non-Existence of the Offense Charged: Petitioner argued that there is no such offense as estafa through falsification by negligence, and that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence, such that the alleged imprudent act cannot be deemed necessarily included in the offense charged in the information.
• Denial of Motion for New Trial: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new trial, which sought to introduce newly discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of one Emiliano Salangsang-Salazar.

• Gross Imprudence: Whether the acts found by the Court of Appeals constitute gross imprudence on the part of the petitioner.
• Existence of the Offense: Whether there is such an offense as estafa through falsification by negligence or imprudence under the Revised Penal Code.
• Variance Between Allegation and Proof: Whether an accused charged with willful falsification may be convicted of falsification through reckless imprudence under the variance rule in Section 4, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
• Motion for New Trial: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petitioner's motion for new trial.

• Gross Imprudence: Yes. Samson acted with reckless imprudence in assuring Lt. Valencia and the cashier of the identity of the supposed claimants without taking adequate precautions, ordinary prudence requiring verification by all proper means given the sizeable amount involved.
• Existence of the Offense: Yes. Falsification of a mercantile document through reckless imprudence is a recognized offense, punishable under Article 172 in relation to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and the law does not require intent to cause damage in falsification of public or mercantile documents because what is repressed is the prejudice to public confidence in these documents.
• Variance Between Allegation and Proof: Yes. Under the variance rule in Section 4, Rule 116, an accused charged with willful falsification may be convicted of falsification through reckless imprudence, the greater offense being deemed to include the lesser, notwithstanding that criminal negligence is a distinct quasi-offense.
• Motion for New Trial: No. The proffered newly discovered evidence would only be corroborative in nature and would not alter the result of the case.

• Gross Imprudence: Samson was or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount totaling over twelve thousand pesos. Ordinary prudence required that he satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of persons personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former classmate was not satisfactory identification for the disbursement of such a large amount. Residence certificates are tax receipts, not means of establishing identity, and Samson as an Army lieutenant was sufficiently intelligent to foresee that they could be forged or stolen. His acceptance of only P310 supported the finding that he was not a co-conspirator, but his failure to take any precaution constituted reckless imprudence.

• Existence of the Offense: Samson's acts of endorsing the checks by way of identification of the payees' signatures constituted a written representation that the true payees participated in the indorsement and cashing, when in fact they had no direct intervention. Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to his official duties, he would be liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Supreme Court of Spain recognize the juridical standing of falsification by imprudence, because in falsifying public or mercantile documents, intent to cause damage is not required — what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to public confidence in these documents. An act executed without malice but with carelessness, negligence, or lack of precaution, which causes harm, should be classified as reckless negligence or simple imprudence, and the person responsible is liable for results that could have been anticipated.

• Variance Between Allegation and Proof: Section 4, Rule 116 provides that when there is variance between the offense charged and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. While criminal negligence is a distinct quasi-offense, as held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, conviction for the lesser negligent offense can be had under an information exclusively charging the willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser. The information alleged acts charging willful falsification, but the evidence showed the acts were not willful but negligent. Section 5, Rule 116 does not require that all essential elements of the offense charged be proved; it suffices that some of said elements constitute the crime proved. This conclusion is strengthened by Section 9, Rule 113, under which Samson could no longer be prosecuted for the negligent offense were he acquitted on the technical theory of variance. The deficiency in the information — the absence of an allegation of imprudence — was supplied by the evidence submitted by Samson himself, and the result proved beneficial to him, as it reduced his penalty.

• Motion for New Trial: The affidavit of Emiliano Salangsang-Salazar, if admitted, would only be corroborative in nature and would not have the effect of altering the result of the case. The motion was therefore properly denied.

• Variance Rule — Greater Offense Includes the Lesser — Under Section 4, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, when there is variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. Section 5 defines the relationship: an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter. The Court applied this rule to hold that an accused charged with willful falsification may be convicted of falsification through reckless imprudence, the willful offense being the greater and the negligent offense the lesser.

• Falsification Through Imprudence as a Recognized Offense — Falsification of public or mercantile documents through reckless imprudence is a recognized offense under Philippine law, drawing from both local jurisprudence and Spanish Supreme Court decisions applying the equivalent provisions of the Spanish Penal Code. In falsification of such documents, intent to cause damage is not required because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to public confidence in these documents. The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172, No. 1, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000, which is a correctional penalty; if committed through reckless imprudence, the penalty is reduced to arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods under Article 365.

• Principal by Cooperation (Article 17, Revised Penal Code) — A person who cooperates in the commission of an offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished is a principal. The Court found that Samson's cooperation — vouching for the identity of the impostors and endorsing the checks — was indispensable to the perpetration of the fraud. However, his liability was for falsification through reckless imprudence rather than willful estafa through falsification, because the Court of Appeals found no criminal intent on his part.

• "While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the variance issue, reconciling the distinct nature of quasi-offenses with the greater-includes-lesser doctrine.

• "The mere assurance of a former classmate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount if the funds belonged to appellant; and we see no justification for him treating government fund is with less care and diligence than if they were his own." — This passage defines the standard of care expected of a person handling government funds and establishes the factual basis for the finding of reckless imprudence.

• "In falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to cause damage is not required because what the law, seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents." — This passage states the rationale for punishing falsification through imprudence even absent intent to defraud, emphasizing the protection of public confidence in official and commercial documents.

• "The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him." — This passage addresses the procedural objection regarding the absence of an imprudence allegation in the information, holding that the deficiency was cured by the evidence and worked to the accused's benefit by reducing his penalty.

• Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, 97 Phil. 342 (1955) — Cited for the proposition that criminal negligence is a distinct crime and quasi-offense under the Revised Penal Code, not a mere modality of a willful crime. The majority acknowledged this holding but distinguished it by applying the greater-includes-lesser doctrine to permit conviction for the lesser negligent offense under a charge of willful falsification. The dissent relied on the same case to argue the opposite conclusion.

• People vs. Faller, 67 Phil. 529 — Cited in the concurring opinion of Felix, J., for the view that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but a way of committing it, determining a lower degree of criminal liability. This older doctrine was questioned in Quizon but invoked by the concurrence to support the majority's result.

• People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 — Cited as illustrative of the variance rule: a defendant charged with forcible abduction may be convicted of illegal detention if the evidence does not show lewd designs.

• U.S. vs. Birueda, 4 Phil. 229; People vs. Rivera, 54 Phil. 578 — Cited for the proposition that theft is necessarily included in robbery, permitting conviction for the former on a charge of the latter.

• U.S. vs. Solis, 7 Phil. 195 — Cited for the proposition that a public official charged with malversation may be found guilty of estafa.

• People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571 — Cited in the dissent for the principle that to cooperate as a principal presupposes knowledge of the ultimate criminal purpose and a common will, which cannot exist between one who acts maliciously and another who acts negligently.

• U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 — Cited in the dissent for the principle that concurrence of wills and unity of action and purpose are the bases of joint criminal responsibility, and that simultaneity of acts alone does not establish such concurrence.

• People vs. Oso, 62 Phil. 271 — Cited in the dissent as illustrative of the limitation on the variance rule: a conviction for abduction with rape was quashed where the information charged only plain abduction and carnal knowledge through violence did not appear in the accusation, demonstrating that an element not alleged cannot be supplied to constitute the offense proved.

• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Defines principals, including those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished. Applied to hold Samson a principal by cooperation, his endorsement and identification acts being indispensable to the fraud.

• Article 171, Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification by a public officer or employee. Cited to characterize Samson's endorsement of the checks as a written representation of the payees' participation in the indorsement and cashing.

• Article 172, Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification by a private individual. Applied to hold Samson liable even if his indorsement and identification were extraneous to his official duties, the penalty being prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Governs criminal negligence (quasi-offenses), prescribing that when the offense committed through reckless imprudence corresponds to a correctional penalty, the penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applied to reduce Samson's penalty to 4 months of arresto mayor in each case.

• Section 4, Rule 116, Rules of Court — The variance rule: when there is variance between the offense charged and that proved, and one is included in or necessarily includes the other, the defendant shall be convicted of the included offense. Applied to permit conviction for falsification through reckless imprudence under a charge of willful falsification.

• Section 5, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Defines when an offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense proved, requiring that some essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter. Applied to support the conviction notwithstanding the absence of an imprudence allegation.

• Section 9, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Cited to reinforce the variance ruling: an acquittal on the technical theory of variance would bar subsequent prosecution for the negligent offense under the rule against double jeopardy.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, and Endencia, JJ., concurred. Reyes, A., J., concurred in the result.

Felix, J., filed a separate concurring opinion addressing the dissent's argument regarding multiplicity of charges. Felix reasoned that there is no multiplicity of accusations but rather a charge included in another that becomes inoperative for lack of supporting evidence; the accused was already warned by Section 4, Rule 116 that he could be convicted of any included offense upon variance, and thus could not claim surprise. Felix also invoked People vs. Faller for the view that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but a way of committing it, determining a lower degree of criminal liability, and that the allegation that the appellant acted "unlawfully and criminally" includes the charge that he acted with negligence.

• Reyes, J.B.L. (with Concepcion, J., concurring) — The dissent argued that intentional falsification and falsification through negligence are not merely different in seriousness but in essence; they are two different offenses altogether. Criminal negligence is a distinct quasi-offense under the Revised Penal Code, as held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. The essential element of the negligent offense — criminal negligence or carelessness — is not merely absent from the elements of the willful offense charged; it is excluded by incompatibility, because malice or intent cannot co-exist with negligence. Intent presupposes that the offender visualized and determined to commit the act; negligence implies that the offender should have foreseen but did not actually anticipate the consequences. The dissent further argued that Samson could not be held a co-principal under Article 17(3) because to cooperate presupposes knowledge of the ultimate criminal purpose and a common will, which cannot exist between one who acts maliciously and another who acts negligently, citing People vs. Aplegido and U.S. vs. Magcomot. On the procedural side, the dissent contended that Section 5, Rule 116 requires that the elements of the offense proved must also be alleged in the information; the crime of falsification through negligence cannot be constituted by merely striking out elements of the willful offense charged, because the distinctive element of imprudence is not alleged and must be supplied from outside the information. The dissent warned that the majority ruling would compel every accused charged with a willful offense to defend against three possibilities — the willful act, reckless negligence, and simple imprudence — simultaneously, which is incompatible with fair play. Finally, the dissent noted that Samson was convicted of criminal negligence on appeal, when he could no longer seek a reopening of trial to introduce evidence against such a charge, and argued that the proper course would have been to acquit him of the charge and remand him to answer for the proper offense.