Sampayan vs. Daza

A petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify a member of the House of Representatives becomes moot and academic once the term of office sought to be challenged has expired. Jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members belongs exclusively to the House Electoral Tribunal, not to the Supreme Court in an original action for prohibition. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated, and a de facto public officer's acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer, entitling him to emoluments for actual services rendered.

Petitioners were residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar. Respondent Raul Daza was the incumbent congressman of the same district. The case arose against the backdrop of Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), which governs disqualification of candidates, and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which addresses public officers' accountability. The Constitution also provides, under Section 17, Article VI, that the House Electoral Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members.

Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar, filed a petition for prohibition on February 18, 1992, seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office. Petitioners alleged that Daza was a greencard holder and lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974, and that he had not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

To support their charge, petitioners presented a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), dated November 5, 1991, which stated: "Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know subject (sic) still has his greencard. No he has not applied for citizenship."

Respondent Daza, in his comment filed on April 10, 1992, denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He admitted that he was accorded permanent residency status on October 8, 1980, as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service in Los Angeles, but claimed that he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.

On April 2, 1992, petitioners filed a separate petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Daza from running in the May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (SPC 92-084). Petitioners clarified that the instant petition before the Supreme Court concerned the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. Respondent Daza, reacting to the COMELEC petition, asked the Court to direct the COMELEC to dismiss SPC No. 92-084, hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become moot should the Court find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was granted a US non-immigrant visa.

• Disqualification for Permanent Residency: Petitioners insisted that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising the functions of his office, being a permanent resident alien of the United States at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 elections, citing the case of Caasi vs. Court of Appeals.
• Violation of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions: Petitioners alleged that Daza's failure to renounce his status as permanent resident violated Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
• Scope of the Petition: Petitioners clarified that the instant petition was concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992, while the COMELEC petition concerned his disqualification from running in the May 11, 1992 elections.

• Denial of Permanent Residency: Respondent Daza denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States, admitting that although he was accorded permanent residency status on October 8, 1980, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985.
• Position of Public Respondents: Public respondents Sabio, Tuaño, Medina, and the Commission on Audit contended that if indeed Congressman Daza is a greencard holder and permanent resident of the United States, then he should be removed from his position as Congressman; however, they opined that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and correct status, and until he files his comment, petitioners' prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted.

• Mootness: Whether the petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Daza from exercising the functions of his office had become moot and academic given that his term of office had already expired.
• Jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal: Whether jurisdiction over the case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal, which under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.
• Propriety of the Writ of Prohibition: Whether a writ of prohibition can be issued against respondent Daza when his term has already expired, given that a writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
• Status as De Facto Officer: Whether respondent Daza, as a de facto public officer, can be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office.

• Mootness: Yes. The case was already moot and academic because petitioners sought to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992, which term had already expired.
• Jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal: Yes. Under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members; the appropriate remedy should have been a petition to cancel respondent's certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten days after proclamation.
• Propriety of the Writ of Prohibition: No. A writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired; a writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
• Status as De Facto Officer: No. As a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer, and he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

• Mootness: The Court found that the petition had become moot and academic. Petitioners themselves manifested that the instant petition was concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. Since that term had already expired by the time the Court resolved the petition, there was no longer any live controversy to adjudicate. The Court could no longer grant the relief sought — unseating respondent from a term of office that had already ended.

• Jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal: The Court held that jurisdiction over the case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members. Since petitioners challenged the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Daza's proclamation, pursuant to Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (1991).

• Propriety of the Writ of Prohibition: The Court ruled that a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term had already expired. Citing Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court noted that a writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.

• Status as De Facto Officer: The Court held that respondent, as a de facto public officer, cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office. A de facto officer is one acting under color of a known appointment or election, void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such as ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public. The acts of a de facto officer are as valid as those of a de jure officer, and as such, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered, citing Cantillo vs. Arrieta.

• Doctrine of Mootness — A case becomes moot and academic when the controversy no longer presents a justiciable controversy or when the relief sought can no longer be granted. The Court applied this doctrine where petitioners sought to unseat respondent from a term of office that had already expired, rendering the petition incapable of producing any practical result.

• Jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal — Under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members. The Court held that challenges to a congressman's qualifications must be brought before the House Electoral Tribunal, not through an original action before the Supreme Court.

• De Facto Officer Doctrine — A de facto officer is one acting under color of a known appointment or election, void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such as ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public. The acts of a de facto officer are as valid as those of a de jure officer, and he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

• "We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992." — This passage states the primary ground for dismissal: the petition had become moot because the term of office sought to be challenged had already expired.

• "Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members." — This passage articulates the constitutional basis for the House Electoral Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving House members.

• "Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated." — This passage explains why the writ of prohibition was an improper remedy under the circumstances.

• "Fourth, as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered." — This passage establishes the de facto officer doctrine as applied to respondent's entitlement to emoluments and immunity from reimbursement.

• Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 229 — Cited by petitioners to buttress their contention that respondent should be disqualified for being a permanent resident alien of the United States; the Court did not reach the merits of this citation because the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.
• Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 67195, 78618, 78619-20, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581 — Cited for the proposition that a writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated.
• Cantillo vs. Arrieta, G.R. No. L-31444, November 13, 1974, 61 SCRA 55 — Cited for the proposition that a de facto officer is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

• Section 68, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — The provision governing disqualification of candidates, which petitioners alleged respondent violated by being a permanent resident alien of the United States.
• Section 18, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — The provision on public officers' accountability, which petitioners alleged respondent violated.
• Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — The provision establishing the House Electoral Tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of House members; the Court applied this provision to hold that jurisdiction over the case rightfully pertained to the House Electoral Tribunal.
• Section 78, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — The provision allowing a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein is false; the Court noted this as the appropriate remedy before the election.
• Rule 17, Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (1991) — The rule governing quo warranto contests against a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, which must be filed by any voter within ten days after the proclamation of the winner; the Court noted this as the appropriate remedy after proclamation.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concurred. Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and Feliciano, JJ., were on leave. Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., took no part.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the case text.