Sambalilo vs. Spouses Llarenas

In a forcible entry case, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of the specific property allegedly invaded; where the structures complained of were erected on the defendant's own lot, no forcible entry is committed, and the complaint must fail. The action protects only the person who had prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered and usurped possession.

Spouses Pablo and Fe Llarenas acquired two parcels of land in Barrio Matobato, Calbayog City, from Zoilo Sambalilo, the late husband of petitioner Loreta Sambalilo, the remaining portions of whose estate passed to Loreta and her children Salvador, Zoilo, Jr., and Renante. The parcels formed part of a larger residential lot, Lot No. 2692, CAD 422, along the Maharlika Highway, which Zoilo and Loreta had sold off in portions to various buyers, including Tiburcio Chan, Bonifacio Ignacio, and the Llarenas spouses, and which was thereafter subdivided into eight parcels designated Lots 2692-A through 2692-H. The remaining portion retained by the Sambalilos was designated Lot 2692-G, where Loreta's residential house stood, and a pathway traversed the lot from the highway to the seashore.

Spouses Pablo and Fe Llarenas claimed ownership of a 120-square-meter parcel in Barrio Matobato, Calbayog City, which they had acquired by a deed of sale dated April 17, 1972 from Zoilo Sambalilo, the late husband of Loreta Sambalilo. The lot was bounded on the north by the remaining portion of Zoilo, on the east by the land of Ricardo Delgado, on the south by the seashore, and on the west by the remaining portion of Zoilo. On November 23, 1981, the spouses acquired a second parcel of 176 square meters from the same vendor, bounded on the north by the provincial road, on the east by the lands of Conrado Ignacio and Jurado Sarmiento, on the south by the seashore, and on the west by the land of Tiburcio Chan. According to the spouses, they immediately occupied both parcels and introduced improvements — a septic tank, a piggery building, a house rented to Spouses Cabuenas, the house of their caretaker, a steel gate, a fence of coco lumber, and another house where their daughter stayed.

The Sambalilos told a different story. Loreta was the widow of Zoilo, and Salvador, Zoilo, Jr., and Renante were their children. Zoilo and Loreta had owned a residential lot of about 640 square meters designated as Lot No. 2692, CAD 422, along the Maharlika Highway. During Zoilo's lifetime, portions of Lot 2692 were sold to various buyers, among them Tiburcio Chan, Bonifacio Ignacio, and the Llarenas spouses, and the lot was subsequently subdivided into eight parcels, Lots 2692-A to 2692-H. The portion bought by Bonifacio became Lot 2692-E; the two portions purchased by the Llarenas spouses became Lots 2692-C and 2692-F; and the remaining portion retained by the Sambalilos became Lot 2692-G, where Loreta's residential house stood. The Sambalilos also maintained that a pathway had been allowed to cross Lot 2692 from the Maharlika Highway to the Samar Sea, used by the public for ingress and egress and by Loreta to reach her house.

A barangay conciliation proceeding was held before the officials of Barangay Matobato, Calbayog City, headed by Barangay Captain Sisenio Santiago, upon Loreta's complaint that Pablo had installed a gate shutter on a steel gate constructed across the pathway, obstructing passage from the highway to the seashore and toward her house. During that proceeding, Loreta and Pablo agreed that the lots would be relocated by a geodetic engineer at equally shared expense and that the barangay officials would remove the gate shutter. The shutter was eventually removed with the help of barangay officials and in Pablo's presence. The Sambalilos further asserted that Lots 2692-C and 2692-F were distinct and separate from Lot 2692-G; that the Llarenas spouses never stayed on or occupied these lots, residing instead at their house along Umbria Street, Barangay Balud, Calbayog City; and that only Loreta had a residential house in Lot 2692-G, where she had lived openly up to the present.

On August 20, 2004, according to the Llarenas spouses, the petitioners entered their property under the pretext of inspecting their septic tank, forcibly removed the steel gate from its concrete mounting, and with the assistance of several helpers began constructing a concrete fence within the premises. The Sambalilos denied this account, maintaining that Loreta had always been in possession of the area where the concrete fence and the framework of a future house were erected, because that area lay within the unsold portion of their land where her residential house had stood.

During the hearing on the application for injunction, the Llarenas spouses presented a sketch plan showing the location of the properties described in the complaint and photographs of the structures erected by the Sambalilos. In their position papers, the spouses attached the tax declarations of their properties and those of the adjoining owners, while the Sambalilos appended the sketch plan of Lot 2692 of the Calbayog Cadastre prepared by Geodetic Engineer Joel S. Ungab; the joint affidavit of Barangay Captain Santiago and Barangay Kagawad Manuel Caber, Jr.; the minutes of the barangay conciliation proceeding; and the affidavit of Primitiva Ignacio, daughter of the late Bonifacio Ignacio, owner of Lot 2692-E. Primitiva affirmed that her house was adjacent to the Llarenas house and that across it stood Loreta's house in Lot 2692-G; she and the barangay officials narrated that the steel gate had been removed by the barangay officials upon the parties' voluntary agreement, in the presence of the petitioners and Pablo.

The MTCC found that the Llarenas spouses had proven prior physical possession and that the Sambalilos were guilty of forcible entry by removing the steel gate and constructing concrete fences, and it gave no credence to the conciliation proceedings because these were conducted after the commission of the forcible entry. The RTC, on the other hand, found from the parties' respective sketch plans a consensus that the alleged illegal structures were located on the western side of the pathway when facing the seashore; that the concrete fences were built on Lot 2692-G, where Loreta's house was located, and not on Lot 2692-C; that the area occupied by the Llarenas spouses on the western side of the pathway did not reach the seashore because Lots 2692-H and 2692-G intervened; and that the steel gate had been removed pursuant to the parties' voluntary agreement as reflected in the barangay minutes. The CA, for its part, found that the Llarenas spouses had established prior physical possession of Cadastral Lot 2692-F, gave more credence to their photographs, and held that even if the removal of the steel gate had been agreed upon, nothing excused the Sambalilos from erecting concrete fences within the premises possessed by the spouses.

• Location of the Structures: Petitioners argued that the CA committed reversible error in finding that the controversy arose in Lot 2692-F, declared in the respondents' names, when the evidence — as correctly found by the RTC — indubitably showed that the improvements they made were on their own Lot 2692-G.
• Prior Physical Possession: Petitioners maintained that the CA erred in holding that they had no prior physical possession of the lot where the improvements were made.
• Removal of the Steel Gate: Petitioners contended that the CA erred in finding that they forcibly removed the respondents' steel gate, disregarding evidence showing that the respondents had voluntarily agreed to its removal by the barangay authorities.
• Scope of the Controversy: In their Reply, petitioners stressed that they never contested the respondents' purchase of two parcels from Zoilo or their prior possession of those parcels, Lots 2692-C and 2692-F; what was contested was the actual area where those lots were located, petitioners insisting that the area improved on August 20, 2004 was their Lot 2692-G.
• Exception to Rule 45: Petitioners acknowledged that only questions of law are allowed in a Rule 45 petition but argued that the case fell within the exception because the CA's findings were contrary to those of the RTC and contradicted by the evidence on record, and its judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts.

• Preponderance of Evidence: Respondents asserted that they had established by preponderance of evidence the identities of the two parcels they bought from Zoilo and Loreta, measuring 120 and 176 square meters, respectively.
• Prior Physical Possession: Respondents argued that their testimonies and those of their witnesses clearly and preponderantly established their prior physical possession of the same parcels up to August 20, 2004, when the petitioners forcibly entered the land.
• Forcible Entry by Strategy and Stealth: Respondents contended that forcible entry was committed not only with the use of force but also by means of strategy and/or stealth, because the petitioners had convinced their daughter to let them in on the pretext of merely inspecting the land and the septic tank, and that this conclusion of fact by the MTCC could not be overturned by the RTC.

• Disturbance of Possession: Whether the improvements, specifically the concrete fence and the framework of a future house, introduced by the petitioners disturbed the respondents' possession of the land in question.

• Disturbance of Possession: No. The structures were erected on Lot 2692-G, registered in the petitioners' names, and not on the respondents' Lots 2692-C or 2692-F; the respondents therefore failed to prove the prior physical possession and deprivation by force or stealth essential to forcible entry.

• Disturbance of Possession: Because the CA and the RTC arrived at different factual findings, the Court departed from the general rule that only errors of law may be raised under Rule 45 and reviewed the evidence. For forcible entry to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove (a) prior physical possession of the property; (b) deprivation of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) filing of the action within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of the deprivation. The only purpose of the suit is to protect the person who had prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered and usurped possession; thus the respondents had to establish that the improvements introduced by the petitioners dispossessed them of the land they owned. It was undisputed that the petitioners constructed the concrete fence and the framework of a future house as the direct result of the alleged intrusion. The Court agreed with the RTC that the evidence showed the structures were introduced on the lot west of the pathway when facing the seashore, and that this was Lot 2692-G under the petitioners' name, not Lot 2692-F as the CA found; neither were the constructions on Lot 2692-C. The parties' sketch plans shared a common consensus that the illegal structures were on the western side of the pathway adjacent to the seashore, and that area was Lot 2692-G/Lot 2692-H, covered by the petitioners' Tax Declaration Nos. 99 01016 00929 and 99 01016 00928. The respondents' Lot 2692-F, covered by Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00478, lay along the eastern side of the pathway, while their Lot 2692-C, covered by Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00406, though on the western side, was bounded on the south not by the seashore but by Lots 2692-G and 2692-H. The RTC correctly gave more credence to the petitioners' sketch plan, which showed an existing pathway (Lot 2692-I) traversing the entire Lot 2692 from the Maharlika Highway to the seashore, consistent with the barangay officials' joint affidavit; the respondents' sketch plan was limited and did not depict the adjoining properties after the subdivision, nor did it identify the exact location of Lots 2692-C and 2692-F. The respondents' theory that their two lots were adjoining, and that entry to Lot 2692-F was made through Lot 2692-C, was belied by their own deeds of absolute sale and tax declarations, which showed the two portions were not adjacent. On the question of actual physical possession, the MTCC had relied on the instruments of sale, but it overlooked that after the sale the area occupied by the respondents on the western side of the pathway did not reach the seashore where the structures stood, because Lots 2692-H and 2692-G intervened; Tax Declaration No. 99 01016 00406 indicated that the adjoining boundary on the south toward the Samar Sea was Lots 2692-H and 2692-G, not the seashore. The respondents' explanation that the boundaries in the tax declarations were altered by the Office of the City Assessor failed to persuade, since they neither filed an action nor protested before the City Assessor's Office from the time they discovered the alteration; their long acquiescence indicated conformity to the declared boundaries. Their declaration before the City Assessor's Office as to the extent of the area they actually occupied was an admission against interest, based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless it were true. The tax declaration enjoyed the presumption of regularity and had to be respected absent contrary evidence, which the respondents failed to adduce. Even setting aside the tax declarations, the deeds of sale marked as the respondents' own exhibits likewise failed to show that the two lots were adjacent. The petitioners' position that they had a house in Lot 2692-G where they had lived until the present, and that the improvements were made thereon, was bolstered by the affidavit of their neighbor Primitiva and the joint affidavit of Barangay Captain Santiago and Barangay Kagawad Caber, who narrated that the steel gate along the pathway was dismantled and removed by the barangay officials upon the parties' voluntary agreement, and not by the petitioners alone as the respondents falsely claimed. Aside from their self-serving assertions, the respondents adduced no evidence of actual possession of the disputed area; the persons they claimed occupied their lots executed no corroborative affidavits, and only their daughter was presented as a witness. Their own documentary exhibits belied their claim. Having established that the improvements were made on Lot 2692-G, the testimonies of the respondents as to their physical possession of Lots 2692-C and 2692-F became irrelevant, and the CA erred in affirming the MTCC finding that the petitioners had no prior physical possession of the lot where the improvements were made. On forcible entry, the respondents' sole witness was their daughter, whose claim of stealthy intrusion and forcible removal of the steel gate was debunked by the minutes of the conciliation meeting and the joint affidavit of the barangay officials. The burden of proof rested on the respondents as the parties asserting, and they failed to carry it because even their own evidence belied their assertions.

• Requisites of Forcible Entry — For a forcible entry case to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. The Court applied the first two requisites and found them wanting because the respondents neither possessed the specific area invaded nor were deprived of it by the petitioners' acts.
• Purpose of a Forcible Entry Suit — The only purpose of a forcible entry suit is to protect the person who had prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered the property and usurped possession. Because the action is confined to possession de facto, the Court limited its ruling to material possession and expressly left the question of ownership open.
• Tax Declaration as Admission Against Interest — A party's declaration before the City Assessor's Office as to the extent of the area it actually occupied, made the basis for the issuance of the corresponding tax declaration, is an admission against interest, founded on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration were true. The respondents' tax declaration for Lot 2692-C, which listed Lots 2692-H and 2692-G as the southern boundaries instead of the seashore, was treated as such an admission and weighed against their claim.
• Presumption of Regularity of Tax Declarations — A tax declaration enjoys the presumption of regularity and must be respected unless rebutted by contrary evidence. The respondents failed to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption, and their unexplained failure to protest the alleged alteration of boundaries before the City Assessor's Office indicated acquiescence.
• Burden of Proof Rests on the Party Asserting — The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts, not upon him who denies, because by the nature of things the one who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of it. The burden to prove prior physical possession and deprivation by force or stealth lay with the respondents, who failed to discharge it.
• Exception to the Rule 45 Limitation to Questions of Law — Although only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court may review the evidence where the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the RTC and contradicted by the evidence on record, or where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. The divergence between the CA and the RTC findings justified the Court's departure from the general rule.

• "For a forcible entry case to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property." — This passage states the canonical three-element test for forcible entry, the framework against which the Court measured the respondents' evidence and found it insufficient.
• "The only purpose of a forcible entry suit is to protect the person who had prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered the property and usurped possession." — This defines the narrow protective scope of the action and supplies the rationale for the Court's closing caveat that its ruling covers only possession de facto and does not settle ownership.
• "As correctly pointed out by the RTC, respondents' declaration before the City Assessor's Office on the extent of the area they actually occupied, as the basis for the issuance of the corresponding tax declaration of the property, was an admission against their interest. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true." — This articulates the admission-against-interest doctrine as applied to tax declarations, a recurring evidentiary principle in land disputes.
• "On a final note, the Court cautions that the ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of possession de facto or material possession. This adjudication is not a final determination on the issue of ownership and, thus, without prejudice to any party's right to file action on the matter of ownership." — This caveat delimits the preclusive effect of the judgment and is frequently cited for the proposition that ejectment judgments bind only on the question of possession.

• MOF Company, Inc. vs. Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, 623 Phil. 424, 433 (2009) — Cited to support the Court's departure from the general rule that only errors of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition, where the CA's factual findings conflict with those of the RTC.
• Mangaser vs. Ugay, G.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014, 744 SCRA 13, 23-24, citing Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 539 Phil. 158, 170 (2006) — The source of the three requisites of forcible entry applied by the Court in assessing the respondents' cause of action.
• Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. vs. Spouses Sison, G.R. No. 191132, January 27, 2016 — Cited for the principle that the only purpose of a forcible entry suit is to protect the person who had prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered and usurped possession.
• Manila Electric Company vs. Heirs of Spouses Deloy, 710 Phil. 427, 441 (2013), citing Heirs of Bernardo Ulep vs. Ducat, 597 Phil. 5, 16 (2009), citing Rufina Patis Factory vs. Alusitain, 478 Phil. 544, 558 (2004) — Cited for the rule that a declaration against interest is presumed true and that a tax declaration enjoys the presumption of regularity.
• C.I.C.M Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc. vs. Perez, G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017, citing Acabal vs. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528, 541 (2005) — Cited for the basic evidentiary rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts, not upon him who denies.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for the petition for review on certiorari, which ordinarily permits only questions of law. The Court invoked the recognized exception and reviewed the evidence because the CA's findings were contrary to the RTC's and contradicted by the record.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional basis for the certification by the Chief Justice, upon the Division Acting Chairperson's attestation, that the conclusions in the Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Antonio T. Carpio (On Official Leave)
• Diosdado M. Peralta (Acting Chairperson)
• Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (On Leave)
• Samuel R. Martires