Sambajon vs. Suing

A lawyer who fails to exercise ordinary diligence in protecting a client's interest by verifying the identity of parties executing quitclaims, and who attempts to influence a witness's testimony during an IBP investigation, is guilty of negligence and gross misconduct warranting suspension.

Complainants were among the employees who filed and won an illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice case against Microplast, Inc., which was represented by respondent Atty. Jose A. Suing. After the decision became final and a writ of execution was issued, individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly signed by seven complainants were presented before the Labor Arbiter, prompting the dismissal of the case against those seven. Four of the seven complainants denied signing the documents or receiving any consideration, alleging that respondent colluded with his clients to present spurious documents to obstruct the writ of execution.

• The Labor Case: Complainants filed a case for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against Microplast, Inc., represented by respondent. Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos declared the employer guilty of unfair labor practice, ordered reinstatement, and awarded backwages. The decision became final and executory, and a Writ of Execution was issued on September 2, 2003.
• The Questioned Quitclaims: On February 27, 2004, individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly signed by seven complainants were presented before Labor Arbiter Santos in the presence of respondent. Relying on these documents, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case against the seven complainants on March 9, 2004.
• The Disavowal: Herein complainants (four of the seven) denied signing the quitclaims or receiving any payment. They filed a disbarment complaint against respondent for deceit, malpractice, and violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as a criminal complaint for Falsification.
• The IBP Investigation: During the clarificatory hearing, respondent admitted he was requested by his client to witness the signing and verify the identities of the signatories. However, he confessed he did not know the complainants, did not verify their identities, did not ask about the payment, and merely relied on his client's assurance and a prior settlement "precedent." The Labor Arbiter had also expressed doubts about the signatories' identities, which respondent ignored. Furthermore, respondent attempted to coach his client, Manuel Rodil, during the latter's testimony before the IBP Commissioner to prevent answers that might incriminate respondent or contradict his claims.

• Deceit and Collusion: Petitioners maintained that respondent colluded with his clients to present spurious Release Waiver and Quitclaims, thereby frustrating the implementation of the Writ of Execution.
• Falsification: Petitioners argued that respondent was involved in the falsification of the questioned documents, prompting the filing of a criminal complaint for Falsification against him and his clients.

• Lack of Familiarity: Respondent argued he was not familiar with the complainants because they did not attend the hearings before the Labor Arbiter, making identity verification impossible.
• Reliance on Client and Precedent: Respondent maintained that he merely followed his client's instruction to be present and relied on a prior 1998 settlement where no issues arose despite his non-participation in the discussions.
• Labor Arbiter's Primacy: Respondent contended that the Labor Arbiter had the primary duty to ascertain the true identities of the persons executing the quitclaims, invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

• Negligence: Whether respondent is liable for negligence for failing to verify the identity of the individuals executing the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.
• Gross Misconduct: Whether respondent is liable for gross misconduct for attempting to coach or influence the testimony of his client during the IBP investigation.

• Negligence: Respondent was found guilty of negligence. He conceded that his purpose in going to the Labor Arbiter's office was to ensure the documents were properly signed and the signatories properly identified. Knowing that the Labor Arbiter entertained doubts about the identities of the signatories, respondent was obligated to exercise vigilance to protect his client's interest. Instead, he merely relied on his client's assurance and failed to verify the identities or inquire about the payment. This failure violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which require a lawyer to owe fidelity to the client's cause and serve with competence and diligence.
• Gross Misconduct: Respondent was found guilty of gross misconduct. His attempts to coach his client Manuel Rodil during the IBP hearing—by interjecting and suggesting answers to avoid incriminating himself or contradicting his claims—constituted an act that obstructed and impeded the administration of justice. IBP proceedings are part of a judicial proceeding, and any act that tends to obstruct or impede such proceedings constitutes misconduct.

• Ordinary Diligence in the Practice of Law — The practice of law requires only ordinary diligence (diligentia), the degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias, not extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia). A lawyer must owe entire devotion to the client's interest and exert utmost learning, skill, and ability. The Court applied this to hold respondent liable for failing to exercise even ordinary diligence in verifying the identities of the quitclaim signatories.
• Gross Misconduct in Disciplinary Proceedings — Any act by a lawyer that tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. This extends to proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which are part of a judicial proceeding. The Court applied this to find respondent guilty of gross misconduct for attempting to coach his client's testimony during the IBP investigation.

• "Diligence is 'the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence.' ... The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that 'extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias."
• "As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct."

• Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., A.C. No. 6589, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 443 — Followed. Cited as a precedent where a lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for attempting to delay and obstruct an IBP investigation, resulting in a one-month suspension.
• Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 406 — Followed. Cited for the definition of ordinary diligence required in the practice of law.

• Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires a lawyer to owe fidelity to the cause of his client and be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Applied to emphasize respondent's failure to protect his client's interest regarding the quitclaims.
• Canon 18 and Rule 18.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence, prohibiting the neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him. Applied to hold respondent liable for negligence in verifying the identities of the signatories.

Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr.