Samala vs. Court of Appeals

A one-day delay in filing a notice of appeal, caused by the illness of the person entrusted with its filing and without any intent to delay the administration of justice, constitutes excusable negligence warranting relief from the order denying the appeal.

Romulo Ocampo was riding as a passenger on a Yamaha motorcycle along Panamitan Highway, Kawit, Cavite, when a Super Saint Bus sideswiped the motorcycle, causing him serious physical injuries to his neck and left leg. The bus was owned by Ildefonso Samala and driven by Benjamin Babista, who fled the scene without rendering assistance. Ocampo was confined at Perpetual Help Hospital for three days and underwent several months of treatment. On December 20, 1990, Ocampo filed a complaint for damages against Babista and Samala before the Regional Trial Court, Cavite, Branch 15, Naic, docketed as Civil Case No. NC-346.

On October 19, 1990, at about 8:00 p.m., a Super Saint Bus bearing plate number NKJ 468 and body number 975 sideswiped a Yamaha motorcycle with plate number MCGB 5256 along Panamitan Highway, Kawit, Cavite. Romulo Ocampo was riding as a passenger at the back of the motorcycle driver. The impact threw Ocampo several meters away, causing him to land on a concrete highway and sustain serious physical injuries to his neck and left leg. He was confined at the Perpetual Help Hospital for three days and underwent several months of treatment. After hitting the motorcycle, the bus sped away; the driver, Benjamin Babista, did not render assistance to the victim and left him on the highway.

On December 20, 1990, Ocampo filed a complaint for damages against Babista and the bus owner, Ildefonso Samala, before the Regional Trial Court, Cavite, Branch 15, Naic, docketed as Civil Case No. NC-346. After trial, on May 15, 1995, the court rendered judgment in favor of Ocampo, ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally ₱11,000 as actual damages, ₱30,000 as consequential damages, ₱78,192 as loss of earning capacity, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱40,000 as exemplary damages, ₱15,000 as attorney's fees, and ₱3,000 as litigation expenses, plus costs of suit.

Petitioners received a copy of the decision on September 29, 1995. The last day for filing a notice of appeal fell on Friday, October 13, 1995. Petitioners entrusted the filing of the notice to Jose Samala, Jr., who suffered from stomach pains on October 11 to 12, 1995, preventing him from leaving the house. Believing in good faith that the period had not lapsed, Jose Samala, Jr. filed the notice on Monday, October 16, 1995 — one day late, excluding Saturday and Sunday. On October 17, 1995, the trial court denied the appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. On November 24, 1995, petitioners filed a petition for relief from the order denying the appeal, explaining the illness of Jose Samala, Jr. as the cause of the delay. The trial court denied the petition for relief on February 21, 1996, finding no compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1996, the trial court granted Ocampo's motion for a writ of execution. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on July 1, 1996. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which was denied on September 17, 1996. Their motion for reconsideration was denied on March 7, 1997, prompting the present petition.

• Excusable Negligence: Petitioners argued that the failure to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period was due to excusable negligence, the notice having been entrusted to Jose Samala, Jr., who suffered from diarrhea on October 11 to 12, 1995, could not leave the house, and filed the notice only on Monday, October 16, 1995, in the good-faith belief that the period had not yet lapsed.
• Denial of the Writ of Execution: Petitioners prayed for the denial of the writ of execution and for the records of the case to be elevated to the Court of Appeals for review.

• Excusable Negligence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to grant petitioners' relief from the order denying their appeal, specifically whether the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal constituted excusable negligence.

• Excusable Negligence: Yes. The one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal, caused by the illness of the person entrusted with filing and without any intent to delay the administration of justice, constituted excusable negligence warranting relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Excusable Negligence: Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court is an equitable remedy available to a person against whom a decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, allowed in exceptional cases when no other adequate remedy is available. The last day for filing the notice of appeal fell on Friday, October 13, 1995. Petitioners entrusted the filing to Jose Samala, Jr. on October 11, 1995, but he suffered stomach pains lasting until the following days and filed the notice on the next business day, Monday, October 16, 1995. The delay was one day, Saturday and Sunday being excluded. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; their strict and rigid application, especially on technical matters that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify the appeal's denial. The Court drew parallel support from United Airlines vs. Uy, where a two-day delay was excused due to the unique facts and serious questions of law involved. The real purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to forestall unreasonable delay and put an end to controversies; that purpose is not served by penalizing a one-day, good-faith delay.

• Excusable Negligence in Filing Appeals — Relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy available against a decision or order entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, allowed in exceptional cases when no other adequate remedy exists. A one-day delay in filing a notice of appeal, caused by the illness of the person entrusted with filing and unattended by any intent to delay the administration of justice, falls within excusable negligence.
• Liberal Application of Procedural Rules — Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, not to hinder or delay it. Their strict and rigid application, especially on technical matters that tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts. It is far better to dispose of a case on the merits — the primordial end — than on technicality that may result in injustice.

• "The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided." — This passage articulates the controlling rationale for relaxing procedural rules in favor of substantial justice, the principle upon which the Court reversed the CA.
• "Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts." — A frequently cited formulation of the Court's stance against the elevation of technicality over substance, drawn from Aguam vs. Court of Appeals and its antecedents.
• "Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their appeal's denial." — This sentence states the ratio decidendi directly: the absence of intent to delay, combined with a minimal one-day delay, renders denial of the appeal unwarranted.

• Samoso vs. CA, 178 SCRA 654 (1989) — Cited to elucidate the nature of relief from judgment under Rule 38 as an equitable remedy available against decisions entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, allowed in exceptional cases when no other adequate remedy exists.
• United Airlines vs. Uy, 318 SCRA 576 (1999) — Cited as a parallel instance where the Court gave due course to an appeal filed two days late, notwithstanding counsel's failure to explain the delay, due to the unique facts and serious questions of law involved.
• Maunlad Savings and Loan Association vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114942, November 27, 2000 — Cited for the proposition that the general aim of procedural law is to facilitate the application of justice to rival claims, and that procedural rules are created to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
• Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 784 (2000) — Cited for the principle that technicality, when it becomes a hindrance to justice, deserves scant consideration, and that the law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice.

• Rule 38, Revised Rules of Court (1964 Revision) — Governs petitions for relief from judgment. The Court applied this rule to determine whether the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal constituted excusable negligence, concluding that it did and that relief was warranted.

Kapunan, J., and Ynares-Santiago, J., concurred.

• Davide, Jr., C.J. (with Puno, J., joining) — The dissent voted to dismiss the petition on five grounds. First, the notice of appeal was undisputedly filed beyond the reglementary period, and the reason given — diarrhea of one Jose Samala, Jr., whose relationship to petitioner Ildefonso Samala was unexplained — was too flimsy and possibly contrived; even if true, the illness lasted only until October 12, 1995, leaving October 13 (Friday) available for filing. Second, since petitioners were represented by counsel, it was counsel's duty to file the notice of appeal, not that of an unexplained third party. Third, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional (citing Garcia vs. NLRC, 264 SCRA 261 [1996]); only the Supreme Court may suspend the rule, and the instant case does not fall under any of the instances where tardy appeals were accommodated (citing Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 304 [1995]). Fourth, the case may have been rendered moot by the execution of the trial court's judgment. Fifth, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 was improperly availed of, as it is an alternative remedy that presupposes the party failed to appeal — yet petitioners did in fact attempt to appeal, rendering Rule 38 unavailable.