Salvosa vs. IAC

A teacher or head of a school is liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code only for so long as the student is "at attendance in the school," including recess time; mere enrollment in, or presence on the premises of, the school without more does not place the student in the school's protective and supervisory custody, and recess does not include dismissal. Accordingly, a student who was working at his AFP post as ROTC armorer after class hours was outside the school's custody, and the school and its officers cannot be held solidarily liable for his tort.

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution that also advertises itself as an institution of arts and trades; its brochure shows a full-fledged technical-vocational department offering Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician courses as well as Electronics Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics courses. Within its premises operates the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, which is under the control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; by way of accommodation to the AFP, and pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and Culture, BCF provides the unit an office and an armory at the basement of its main building. Jimmy B. Abon served as the unit's duly appointed armorer, receiving his appointment and salary from the AFP and his orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant; Abon was at the same time a commerce student of BCF. Petitioner Benjamin Salvosa was the President and Chairman of the Board of BCF.

Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution that also maintains a technical-vocational department, and within its premises operates an ROTC Unit under the control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. By way of accommodation to the AFP, pursuant to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the Department of Education and Culture, BCF provided the unit an office and an armory at the basement of its main building. Jimmy B. Abon was the unit's duly appointed armorer; he received his appointment and his salary from the AFP, not from BCF, and took orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the BCF ROTC Unit and an officer of the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of BCF, whose class schedule ran from 7:30 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

On March 3, 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm which Abon had taken from the armory of the BCF ROTC Unit. Castro died as a result, and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of, homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.

Thereafter, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Abon, Ungos, Benjamin Salvosa, Jesus Salvosa, Libertad D. Quetolio, and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc. as defendants. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment sentencing Abon, Salvosa, and BCF jointly and severally to pay the heirs, as damages for the death of Napoleon Castro: (a) P12,000.00 for the death, (b) P316,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual damages, and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs; it absolved the other defendants and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed with modification, reducing the loss-of-earning-capacity award from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate damages and increasing the death indemnity from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00. In holding Abon to have been in BCF's protective and supervisory custody at the time of the shooting, the respondent Court reasoned that since Abon was employed as armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, "he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter," placing the interval "safely within the 'recess time'" envisioned in the Palisoc case.

• Solidary Liability under Art. 2180: Petitioners sought the reversal of the Intermediate Appellate Court's decision insofar as it affirmed the trial court's holding that they were solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, for Abon's tortious act.
• Academic vs. Technical-Vocational Programs: Petitioners raised that, under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, a school which offers both academic and technical/vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic program.

• Vicarious Liability of the School: Whether petitioners can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of his tortious act.
• Custody of the Student: Whether Abon was "at attendance in the school" and within the protective and supervisory custody of BCF at the time of the shooting.
• Scope of Art. 2180: Whether a school offering both academic and technical/vocational courses may be held liable under Art. 2180 for a tort committed by a student enrolled only in its academic program.

• Vicarious Liability of the School: No. Petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon under Art. 2180 because Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro.
• Custody of the Student: No. A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"; recess does not include dismissal, and mere enrollment or presence on school premises without more does not constitute protective and supervisory custody.
• Scope of Art. 2180: Not passed upon. The SC deemed it unnecessary to resolve this issue, Abon not having been in BCF's custody when he committed the act.

• Vicarious Liability of the School: Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale is that, while the student remains in the teacher's custody, the teacher "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis" and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the student's conduct. Because Abon was not in BCF's custody when he shot Castro, the requisite custody was absent, and petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with him for damages resulting from his acts.
• Custody of the Student: The phrase "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. The respondent Court reasoned that Abon, as armorer, must have been attending night classes, so 8:00 p.m. was about dismissal time or soon thereafter, placing the interval within "recess time" under Palisoc. The SC rejected this: a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. Recess contemplates a temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted; recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Mere enrollment or presence on school premises without more does not constitute "attending school" or the protective and supervisory custody contemplated by the law. The record further shows that before the shooting, Commandant Ungos had instructed Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded" — a circumstance that negates any finding that Abon was under the school's custody and shows instead that he was working in the armory under definite instructions from his superior, the AFP ROTC Commandant, when he shot Castro.
• Scope of Art. 2180: Petitioners' contention that a school offering both academic and technical/vocational courses cannot be liable under Art. 2180 for a tort by a student enrolled only in its academic program was not resolved. Because the SC already held that Abon was not in BCF's custody when he shot Castro, it deemed it unnecessary to pass upon this other issue. In a footnote, the ponente nonetheless manifested concurrence with the view expressed in Justice J.B.L. Reyes' dissent in Exconde — concurred in by Justices S. Padilla and A. Reyes — that there is no sound reason for limiting the teacher-liability provision to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones.

• Custody under Art. 2180 ("so long as they remain in their custody") — The liability of teachers and heads of establishments of arts and trades for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices attaches only for as long as the students remain in the school's protective and supervisory custody, that is, for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. The SC applied this by holding that Abon, shot at 8:00 p.m. while at his armory post, was not at attendance and hence not in BCF's custody.
• Recess vs. dismissal — Recess contemplates a temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises or the area within which the school activity is conducted; recess by its nature does not include dismissal. The SC used this distinction to reject the respondent Court's characterization of the 8:00 p.m. interval as "recess time."
• Mere enrollment or presence is not custody — The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school, without more, does not constitute "attending school" or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school as contemplated by the law. Abon's enrollment as a commerce student of BCF therefore did not by itself place him in the school's custody at the time of the shooting.
• In loco parentis rationale — The basis of a teacher's liability under Art. 2180 is that, while the student remains in the teacher's custody, the teacher stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the student's conduct. Where no such supervisory relationship exists at the time of the tort, the liability cannot attach.

• "A 'recess,' as the concept is embraced in the phrase 'at attendance in the school,' contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal." — This passage defines the temporal scope of a school's custody under Art. 2180 and is the decisive ground for reversing the solidary liability of petitioners.
• "Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute 'attending school' or being in the 'protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law." — This ruling forecloses liability premised solely on a student's enrollment or physical presence on campus, the argument that sustained the courts below.
• "Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.'" — This states the statutory rule applied and its limiting condition, anchoring the entire analysis of the case.

• Palisoc vs. Brillantes, L-29025, Oct. 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 548 — Controlling precedent followed; the source of the doctrine that a school's custody over students covers their attendance in the school, including recess time, which the SC applied and clarified by holding that recess does not include dismissal.

• Article 2180, Civil Code — The penultimate paragraph makes teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The SC applied this provision to determine whether petitioners could be solidarily liable for Abon's killing of Castro, and held the custody requisite absent because Abon was not at attendance in the school when the tort occurred.