Salvador dela Fuente vs. Marilyn E. Gimenez

In illegal dismissal cases where the employer raises resignation as a defense, the employer bears the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary through clear, positive, and convincing evidence; the employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence, and if the evidence is in equipoise, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employee. A resignation letter and quitclaim executed through a deceptive scheme of having the employee sign blank papers are not voluntary and cannot defeat a claim for illegal dismissal.

SM Seafood Products (SSP) is a sole proprietorship engaged in exporting processed crab meat, owned by Salvador dela Fuente and managed by Manuel Sarraga. Marilyn E. Gimenez was employed by SSP as a sorter of crab meat beginning 12 November 2000. SSP operated a main plant in Madridejos, Cebu and satellite plants in various provinces, to which sorters were assigned on rotation. The dispute concerns Gimenez’s claims for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and labor standard benefits under the Labor Code.

Marilyn E. Gimenez began working as a sorter of crab meat for SM Seafood Products (SSP) on 12 November 2000. SSP was a sole proprietorship engaged in exporting processed crab meat, owned by Salvador dela Fuente and managed by Manuel Sarraga. Gimenez alleged that work began at 8:00 a.m. and continued until 10:00 p.m. at the earliest, or 12:00 midnight at the latest; lunch break lasted about an hour or less; and overtime dinner break lasted only 15 to 30 minutes. In 2002, satellite plants were opened in Igbon, Iloilo City and Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, and sorters including Gimenez were assigned to these plants on a two-week rotation. In 2004, plants were opened in Gindakpan, Bohol and Hinigaran, Negros Occidental; in 2005, another plant was opened in Catbalogan, Samar, and the rotation assignment lasted one month at a time. Gimenez claimed that she and her co-workers were not furnished pay slips; were made to sign blank papers acknowledging receipt of salary and blank payrolls every year; worked during holidays except Christmas Day, New Year, All Saints Day, and Good Friday; worked half a day on Holy Thursday and the Madridejos fiesta without holiday pay; received less than the legally mandated 13th month pay; and were paid below the minimum wage, with a sorter receiving P150.00 per day and an additional allowance of P60.00 per day from 2002 to 2003, later increased to P80.00 per day, for work outside Madridejos, Cebu.

Gimenez claimed that she was illegally suspended at least three times. In 2002, while assigned at Igbon Island, Iloilo, she and two other sorters stopped to eat lunch at around 1:45 p.m. Sarraga berated them and told them they should have finished their work before eating. Although they explained that Dela Fuente had given them permission to stop and eat so long as the crab meat was covered in ice, Sarraga suspended them for two weeks without notice or hearing. Every year on December 8, the main feast in Madridejos, Cebu, workers were required to render half-day work starting at 4:00 p.m. until 12:00 midnight. On 7 December 2003, Sarraga held a meeting and warned that those absent on December 8 would be suspended. Gimenez arrived late on December 8 because the first trip of the passenger vehicle from Bantayan, which usually left at 6:30 a.m., was delayed. Despite her pleas, Sarraga suspended her for two weeks.

From 18 May to 18 June 2005, Gimenez was assigned at the Masbate plant. On June 18, she was informed that she had to report to Bantayan on June 19 and immediately started work. On June 22, while at the Madridejos plant, she was instructed to report to Igbon, Iloilo on June 23. She pleaded to be allowed to report to Iloilo on June 26 instead so that she could attend the burial of her cousin on June 25. On June 23, workers at the Madridejos plant were given cash advances; Gimenez’s cash advance amounted to P4,500.00. On June 25, she attended the burial. When she returned to work, she asked her supervisor about her Iloilo assignment but was informed that Sarraga had suspended her for two months due to her refusal to be assigned to Iloilo. She had received no notice or hearing on the suspension; when she inquired from Sarraga, he confirmed it. She accepted the suspension and waited until her return to work on 25 August 2005.

On 14 August 2005, Gimenez met some of her co-workers by chance, and they asked if she was returning to work because petitioners had required them to pay for her cash advance. It had been standard practice at SSP that once the cash advance of a worker was required to be paid by co-workers, that worker was deemed terminated. When she sought confirmation, Sarraga informed her that she was indeed terminated because, according to her co-worker Melissa Rubio, Gimenez’s children did not like her being assigned to other plants outside Madridejos. Gimenez refuted this and told Sarraga that she wanted to continue working. Sarraga agreed to reinstate her on the condition that she pay her cash advance in full. When Gimenez explained that she could not pay without being reinstated and could only do so through salary deductions, Sarraga refused to reinstate her. She was not paid her P150.00 per day salary from 19 to 23 June 2005, and her P80.00 per day allowance for two days for being assigned outside Madridejos. She thus filed the complaint.

In their defense, petitioners denied that Gimenez was illegally suspended or illegally dismissed. Dela Fuente maintained that he did not authorize anyone, even Sarraga, to suspend or dismiss Gimenez; Sarraga could only recommend action but could not suspend or dismiss employees. He claimed that Gimenez had been absent from work without notice or permission since 24 June 2005. Later, Dela Fuente discovered a resignation letter dated 23 June 2005 signed by Gimenez. Upon receiving a copy of the complaint, Dela Fuente inquired from Gimenez what happened, and she merely replied that she was very sorry. When asked to return to work, Gimenez said she was ashamed to report back. Dela Fuente further alleged that despite irregular supplies and delivery, Gimenez and her co-workers were paid their daily wage and allowance; workers were paid P163.00 per 8-hour work day regardless of whether they worked the full eight hours, plus P80.00 daily allowance. He claimed that he had paid all salaries and wages due to Gimenez and that she had no more claims against him. Due to the numerous vouchers and payrolls duly signed by Gimenez, only representative payrolls for April 2005 until 23 June 2005 could be presented. Petitioners submitted the resignation letter and a Quitclaim and Release, both dated 23 June 2005. Gimenez insisted that she did not sign said documents and that they were probably obtained by using the blank documents SSP’s employees were made to sign.

The Labor Arbiter found that Gimenez was illegally suspended in 2002, in December 2003, and in June 2003; petitioners failed to furnish her the written charge of her violation, so she was suspended without due process, and petitioners’ denial was not substantiated. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Gimenez was illegally or constructively dismissed as proven by her resignation letter, which stated her reasons for resigning: her assignment to far places, which exposed her to the risks of travel, and Sarraga’s continual harassment and insult of SSP’s employees. Based on the payroll and Daily Time Records submitted by Dela Fuente, the Labor Arbiter granted Gimenez’s claim for Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave, but denied the claim for Premium Pay for Holiday, Rest Day, and Night Shift for lack of specifics, and deducted P25,000.00 from the monetary awards for unpaid indebtedness. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove the voluntariness of Gimenez’s resignation, noted several infirmities with the resignation letter and quitclaim, and concluded that the documents were not voluntarily signed by Gimenez. It also found that Gimenez immediately filed an illegal dismissal complaint when it became apparent that she would no longer be employed, which contradicted petitioners’ claim of voluntary resignation. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the P25,000.00 should not be deducted because it was undisputed that Gimenez owed only P4,500.00 and that said cash advance had already been paid by her co-workers.

• No Illegal Dismissal; Voluntary Resignation: Petitioners denied that Gimenez was illegally suspended or illegally dismissed and maintained that she voluntarily resigned, as evidenced by a resignation letter and a Quitclaim and Release both dated 23 June 2005.
• Lack of Authority: Dela Fuente maintained that he did not authorize anyone, including Sarraga, to suspend or dismiss Gimenez; Sarraga could only recommend action but could not suspend or dismiss employees.
• Absence Without Leave: Petitioners claimed that Gimenez had been absent from work without notice or permission since 24 June 2005.
• Payment of Wages and Benefits: Dela Fuente claimed that all salaries and wages due to Gimenez had been paid; workers were paid P163.00 per 8-hour work day regardless of whether they worked the full eight hours, plus P80.00 daily allowance, and only representative payrolls for April 2005 until 23 June 2005 could be presented due to numerous vouchers and payrolls signed by Gimenez.
• Quitclaim as Defense: Petitioners submitted the resignation letter and quitclaim as proof that Gimenez voluntarily severed her employment and had no remaining claims.

• Illegal Suspensions: Gimenez claimed she was illegally suspended at least three times: for two weeks in 2002, another two weeks in December 2003, and two months from June to August 2005, all without notice or hearing.
• Illegal Dismissal/Constructive Dismissal: She claimed she was terminated when petitioners required her co-workers to pay her cash advance, a standard practice indicating termination; Sarraga confirmed her termination, and he refused to reinstate her unless she paid the cash advance in full.
• Invalid Resignation and Quitclaim: She insisted she did not sign the resignation letter and quitclaim and that these were probably obtained by using the blank documents SSP employees were made to sign.
• Nonpayment and Underpayment: She claimed she was not furnished pay slips, was made to sign blank payrolls and papers, did not receive holiday pay, received less than the legally mandated 13th month pay, was paid below minimum wage, and was not paid her P150.00 daily salary from 19 to 23 June 2005 and her P80.00 per day allowance for two days of assignment outside Madridejos.
• Due Process: She argued that no notice or hearing was given before her suspensions.

• Illegal Dismissal vs. Voluntary Resignation: Whether Gimenez was illegally dismissed or voluntarily resigned from her employment with SSP.
• Propriety of Factual Review: Whether the Court may review the factual findings of the labor tribunals when the findings below are conflicting.
• Liability of Sarraga and Dela Fuente: Whether Sarraga, as SSP’s manager, is solidarily liable with Dela Fuente, the sole proprietor, for the monetary awards.
• Monetary Awards and Deductions: Whether Gimenez is entitled to backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, holiday pay, service incentive leave, wages for illegal suspension, attorney’s fees, and legal interest, and whether the P25,000.00 deduction should be made.

• Illegal Dismissal vs. Voluntary Resignation: No. Gimenez was illegally dismissed; the employer failed to prove voluntary resignation with clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and the resignation letter and quitclaim were not voluntarily executed.
• Propriety of Factual Review: Yes. Review is proper because the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals were conflicting.
• Liability of Sarraga and Dela Fuente: Sarraga is not solidarily liable. Dela Fuente, as sole proprietor, is personally liable because a sole proprietorship has no separate juridical personality.
• Monetary Awards and Deductions: Gimenez is entitled to full backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, holiday pay and service incentive leave for three years, wages for illegal suspension, attorney’s fees, and legal interest; the P25,000.00 deduction is not allowed.

• Illegal Dismissal vs. Voluntary Resignation: Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of service and who has no other choice or is compelled to dissociate from employment. It is a formal relinquishment of office, must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied by the act of relinquishment or abandonment, and must be unconditional. Voluntariness is essential; it must result from the employee’s own will. To determine intent, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation and the totality of circumstances must be considered. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause; even if the employer claims resignation, it still bears the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary, with clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. Here, Gimenez specifically denied the authenticity and due execution of the resignation letter and quitclaim, shifting to petitioners the burden of proving otherwise, which they failed to do. The Court of Appeals found several infirmities: the resignation letter was typewritten while the quitclaim was a printed document; the resignation letter was neatly done without corrections on a typewriter despite being a personal matter of a penurious and uneducated person; the reason for the purported resignation coincided with Sarraga’s hearsay reason; the quitclaim was a pro-forma printed document. The signatures appeared at the very bottom of the documents, several inches from the last printed or typewritten line, at the extreme lower right corner, and over handwritten names, suggesting the names were written after the signatures. The handwritten names appeared to have been written by different persons; the middle initial “E” was missing; and the family name in the resignation letter was misspelled “Giminez” while she spelled it “GIMENEZ” in all other documents. The quitclaim was in English, which the Court doubted Gimenez knew or understood, and although it stated that she had been “sworn to in accordance with law,” it was not notarized. These infirmities supported Gimenez’s contention that she had previously signed blank papers and that petitioners caused the words to be printed after her signature had been procured. The practice of compelling Gimenez and her co-workers to sign blank papers was not controverted. Gimenez also immediately filed her complaint with the NLRC on 6 October 2005 when it became apparent that she would no longer be employed; voluntary resignation is difficult to reconcile with the filing of an illegal dismissal complaint. Thus, Gimenez’s intention to leave SSP and her act of relinquishment were not established; the element of voluntariness was missing. Resignation letters with quitclaims, waivers, or releases are generally looked upon with disfavor, contrary to public policy, ineffective, and meant to bar claims to a worker’s legal rights. They cannot bar employees from demanding benefits legally due or from contesting the legality of dismissal. The burden of proving that Gimenez voluntarily entered into the agreement lay with petitioners. The required contents of a valid quitclaim or waiver were absent: a fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement; the benefits employees are giving up, if possible with corresponding amounts; a statement that the employer clearly explained in English, Filipino, or the dialect known to the employee that by signing the waiver or quitclaim they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive benefits due under law; and a statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, fully understood its contents, and gave consent freely without threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence. Since Gimenez’s resignation was forced upon her through petitioners’ deceptive scheme, she was deemed illegally dismissed. At any rate, she was not dismissed under any of the causes in Article 279 [282] of the Labor Code and was not validly informed of the causes of her dismissal. Denials are weak defenses when not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Having based their defense on resignation, petitioners had the burden to prove voluntariness, which they failed to discharge. If the evidence of the employer and employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employee, consistent with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to labor.
• Propriety of Factual Review: The issue of whether Gimenez voluntarily resigned or was illegally dismissed involves a question of fact, which the Court generally does not pass upon, and it generally accords great weight to the factual findings of labor officials. However, the Court is not precluded from making its own factual determination when the factual findings of the tribunals below are conflicting, as in this case.
• Liability of Sarraga and Dela Fuente: In a sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the business because a sole proprietorship does not possess any juridical personality separate and apart from the personality of the owner. Dela Fuente, as sole proprietor, is liable to Gimenez for backwages and separation pay. Strictly speaking, he is the proper party and the one liable to Gimenez, since SSP has no juridical personality to defend the suit. Sarraga, being merely SSP’s manager, cannot be held solidarily liable with SSP.
• Monetary Awards and Deductions: The consequences of a finding of illegal dismissal are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable, separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative, in addition to backwages. Reinstatement is no longer feasible when the former position of the illegally dismissed employee no longer exists, the employer’s business has closed down, the employer-employee relationship has already been strained as to render reinstatement impossible, or considerable time has lapsed between dismissal and resolution. Considerable time includes a lapse of eight years or more from filing of the complaint up to resolution. About sixteen years had passed from the time Gimenez filed her complaint on 6 October 2005, so reinstatement was no longer practicable. Instead of reinstatement, the Court granted separation pay of one month for every year of service until finality, with a fraction of a year of at least six months counted as one whole year. She was also entitled to full backwages, including allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to finality. In cases involving non-payment of monetary claims, the employer has the burden of proving that employees did receive their wages and benefits and that these were paid in accordance with law; the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances, and similar documents are in the employer’s custody and control. Gimenez alleged illegal suspensions three times: two weeks in 2002; another two weeks in December 2003; and two months from June to August 2005. Suspension from work is a prima facie deprivation of the right to work and must be reasonable to meet the constitutional requirement of due process; it must be based on just or authorized causes, and the employer bears the burden of showing lawful cause. The employee must be given notice and the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Petitioners did not give Gimenez notice or an opportunity to defend herself before she was suspended, and no rules were in place to guide employees as regards proper conduct in SSP. The best evidence to prove that Gimenez had not been suspended on the supposed dates was the payroll covering those periods or the daily time records showing her presence; these documents were in petitioners’ possession, and their failure to present them gave rise to the presumption that the records would be adverse to them if produced. Thus, Gimenez was entitled to wages corresponding to the period of illegal suspension. The grant of Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave was affirmed because petitioners did not refute the claim and did not present payroll and daily time records to counter it. The P25,000.00 deduction was not allowed: Sarraga’s affidavit stated that Gimenez owed P4,500.00 and that it had been paid by her co-workers; Gimenez had no more obligation to petitioners. The promissory note appeared to make Gimenez liable to Sarraga personally and not to SSP; even assuming it was an advance from SSP, it could not be automatically deducted. No employer shall make any deduction from wages except in particular cases under Article 113 of the Labor Code, none of which was present. The denial of Gimenez’s claim for underpayment of premium pay for Holiday, Rest Day, and Night Shift Differential was affirmed for lack of specifics; she should have specified the dates she had not been paid said benefits. The award of ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees was proper since Gimenez was forced to litigate to protect her rights. Following Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, backwages including allowances and benefits or their monetary equivalent earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time these were withheld until 30 June 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from 1 July 2013 until finality; all monetary awards earn six percent (6%) per annum from finality until fully paid. The computation of backwages must be from the time of illegal dismissal on 23 June 2005 until finality, and separation pay at one month pay for every year of service reckoned from November 2000 until finality.

• Burden of proof in illegal dismissal and resignation — In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause. When the employer raises resignation, it still bears the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary, with clear, positive, and convincing evidence; it cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. If the evidence of the employer and employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice tilt in favor of the employee, consistent with the State’s policy to afford greater protection to labor.
• Voluntariness of resignation — Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who believes personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of service and has no other choice or is compelled to dissociate from employment. It is a formal relinquishment of office, must be made with intention to relinquish, accompanied by the act of relinquishment or abandonment, and must be unconditional. Voluntariness is essential; intent is determined from the totality of circumstances and the employee’s acts before and after the alleged resignation.
• Invalid quitclaims and waivers — Resignation letters with quitclaims, waivers, or releases are generally looked upon with disfavor, contrary to public policy, ineffective, and meant to bar claims to a worker’s legal rights. They cannot bar employees from demanding benefits legally due or contesting the legality of dismissal. To be valid, they should contain: (1) a fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement; (2) the benefits employees are giving up, if possible with corresponding amounts; (3) a statement that the employer clearly explained in English, Filipino, or the dialect known to the employee that by signing the waiver or quitclaim they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive benefits due under law; and (4) a statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, fully understood its contents, and gave consent freely without threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence. These requirements were absent.
• Sole proprietorship liability — A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner. The sole proprietor is personally liable for all debts and obligations of the business. Thus Dela Fuente, as sole proprietor, was liable for backwages and separation pay, while Sarraga, as mere manager, could not be held solidarily liable.
• Reinstatement and separation pay in illegal dismissal — The consequences of illegal dismissal are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of backwages from the time compensation was withheld up to actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable, separation pay equivalent to one month’s salary for every year of service is awarded as an alternative, in addition to backwages. Reinstatement is nonfeasible when the former position no longer exists, the business has closed, the employer-employee relationship is strained, or considerable time has lapsed, including eight years or more from filing to resolution. A fraction of at least six months is counted as one whole year.
• Employer’s burden to prove payment of monetary claims — Once the employee sets out with particularity the labor standard benefits allegedly unpaid, the employer bears the burden to prove payment, because the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances, and similar documents are in the employer’s custody and control. Failure to present payrolls and daily time records gives rise to the presumption that the records would be adverse if produced.
• Illegal suspension and due process — Suspension from work is a prima facie deprivation of the right to work and must be reasonable to meet the constitutional requirement of due process. It must be based on just or authorized causes, and the employer bears the burden of showing lawful cause. The employee must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Here, no notice or hearing was given, and no rules guided employee conduct.
• Deductions from wages — Under Article 113 of the Labor Code, no employer shall make any deduction from wages except in specified cases: insurance with the worker’s consent; union dues where check-off is recognized or authorized in writing; and cases authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. None was present, so the P25,000.00 deduction was not allowed.
• Legal interest on monetary awards — Following Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, backwages including allowances and benefits earn legal interest of 12% per annum from the time withheld until 30 June 2013, and 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until finality. All monetary awards earn 6% per annum from finality until fully paid.

• "In illegal dismissal cases, when an employer raises the defense of resignation, the burden to establish the voluntariness of such resignation rests on the employer. Through the present case, this Court reiterates that the evidence thereon must be clear, positive and convincing. The employer cannot simply rely on the weakness of the employee's evidence. Further, when the pieces of evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. This is in line with the policy of the State to afford greater protection to labor." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the employer’s burden of proof and the equipoise rule in illegal dismissal cases involving resignation.
• "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice or is otherwise compelled to dissociate oneself from employment." — This passage defines resignation and emphasizes that voluntariness is essential to its validity.
• "In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following: 1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement; 2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount; 3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees — that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and 4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person." — This passage provides the canonical requirements for a valid quitclaim or waiver, which the Court found absent in this case.
• "A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court." — This passage is the basis for holding Dela Fuente personally liable as sole proprietor and for dismissing the complaint against Sarraga.

• Torreda vs. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229881 (2018) — Cited for the rule that the act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered, and that if the employer introduces a document purportedly executed by the employee as proof of voluntary resignation and the employee denies its authenticity and due execution, the employer bears the burden to prove due execution and genuineness.
• Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 601 (2017) — Cited for the employer’s burden to prove voluntary resignation with clear, positive, and convincing evidence; for the principle that voluntary resignation is difficult to reconcile with the filing of an illegal dismissal complaint; and for the disfavor toward quitclaims.
• Jacob vs. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951 (2021) — Cited for the definition of resignation, the requirement that quitclaims contain specified statements, and the rule that the employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.
• Pascua vs. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. Nos. 191460 & 191464 (2018) — Cited for the rule that the employer bears the burden of proving that resignation was voluntary.
• LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Palco, G.R. No. 217101 (2020) — Cited for the principle that voluntariness is essential to resignation and that it must result from the employee’s own will.
• Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) vs. Rebesencio, 750 Phil. 791 (2015) — Cited for the voluntariness requirement and for the rule on separation pay in lieu of reinstatement where reinstatement is no longer feasible.
• Big AA Manufacturer vs. Antonio, 519 Phil. 30 (2006) — Cited for the rule that a sole proprietorship has no juridical personality separate and distinct from the owner, who is personally liable for the business’s obligations.
• Moll vs. Convergys Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 253715 (2021) — Cited for the consequences of illegal dismissal and for the propriety of attorney’s fees.
• JS Unitrade Merchandise, Inc. vs. Samson, Jr., G.R. No. 200405 (2020) — Cited for the rule that reinstatement is no longer feasible when the employer-employee relationship is strained or when considerable time has lapsed.
• Sta. Ana vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., 805 Phil. 887 (2017) — Cited for the rule that a lapse of eight years or more supports separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and for the employer’s burden to prove payment of monetary claims.
• Heirs of Ridad vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, 703 Phil. 531 (2013) — Cited for the rule that the employer bears the burden of proving payment of labor standard benefits because the pertinent records are in its custody and control.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Cited for the applicable legal interest rates on monetary awards.
• Montinola vs. Philippine Airlines, 742 Phil. 487 (2014) — Cited for the rule that suspension from work must meet due process and be based on just or authorized causes.
• Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., G.R. No. 207354 (2018) — Cited for the principle that denials are weak defenses when unsubstantiated and that equipoise tilts in favor of labor.
• Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. Nos. 236807 & 236810 (2021) — Cited for the rule that a sole proprietorship has no separate juridical personality and the sole proprietor is personally liable.
• Jacob vs. First Step Manpower Int’l. Services, Inc., G.R. No. 229984 (2020) — Cited for the rule that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of an illegal dismissal complaint and for the burden on the employer regarding quitclaims.
• Carolina’s Lace Shoppe vs. Maquilan, G.R. No. 219419 (2019) — Cited for the requirements of a valid quitclaim or waiver.
• Asentista vs. JUPP & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 229404 (2018) — Cited for the employer’s burden to prove payment of monetary claims.
• Dumapis vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No. 204060 (2020) — Cited for separation pay and the employer’s burden to prove payment.
• Angono Medics Hospital, Inc. vs. Agabin, G.R. No. 202542 (2020) — Cited for the application of Nacar interest.

• Article 279 [282], Labor Code — Lists the just causes for termination. The Court noted that Gimenez was not dismissed under any of these causes and was not validly informed of the causes of her dismissal; thus, her dismissal was illegal.
• Article 113, Labor Code — Prohibits an employer from making any deduction from wages except in specified cases: (1) where the worker is insured with consent and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the premium paid; (2) for union dues where the right to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the worker; and (3) where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. None of these was present, so the P25,000.00 deduction was not allowed.
• Rule VIII, Book 3, Section 10(b), Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code — Allows deductions on wages if the employer received a written authorization from the employee for payment to a third person, valid only when the employer did not receive any pecuniary benefit directly or indirectly from the transaction. No valid authorization or basis for deduction was shown.
• Section 3(e), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court — Provides the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. Applied to petitioners’ failure to present payrolls and daily time records that would show Gimenez was present during the alleged suspension dates or that benefits were paid.
• Constitutional requirement of due process of law (as referenced in the decision) — The Court stated that suspension from work is a prima facie deprivation of the right to work and must be reasonable to meet the constitutional requirement of due process; it must be based on just or authorized causes, with notice and opportunity to be heard. No specific constitutional article was cited in the text.

Justice Leonen (Chairperson), Justice Carandang, Justice Rosario, and Justice Dimaampao concurred.