Salva vs. Makalintal

Only COMELEC decisions, orders, or rulings rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers are subject to exclusive Supreme Court review on certiorari under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution; a COMELEC resolution issued merely as an incident of its inherent administrative or ministerial functions over the conduct of plebiscites may be questioned in an ordinary civil action before the Regional Trial Court, including by injunction. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, which only provided rules for the plebiscite required by Ordinance No. 05, was of the latter character.

Petitioners are officials and residents of barangay San Rafael in Calaca, Batangas, seeking to preserve their barangay against legislated abolition and merger with barangay Dacanlao in the same municipality. Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, govern the abolition, merger, and creation of barangays, requiring compliance with statutory indicators certified by the Department of Finance, National Statistics Office, and Land Management Bureau and approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC. Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution separately provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each Constitutional Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Petitioners Elpidio M. Salva and others are officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, municipality of Calaca, Batangas. On June 23, 1997, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas enacted Ordinance No. 05 declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao in Calaca and instructing the COMELEC to conduct the plebiscite required under Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. The governor of Batangas vetoed the ordinance as ultra vires for failure to show compliance with the essential requirements under Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, particularly the attestations or certifications of the Department of Finance, National Statistics Office, and Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Thereafter, through Resolution No. 345 dated August 4, 1997, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05 and overrode the governor's veto.

Pursuant to the ordinance and resolution, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987 on February 10, 1998, providing the rules and regulations governing the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998 to decide the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao. On February 23, 1998, petitioners filed a class suit before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, docketed as Civil Case No. 3442, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, simultaneously moving ex parte to enjoin enforcement of the three enactments.

In its Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the injunctive relief sought was directed only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 and that any petition questioning an act, resolution, or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. Without filing a motion for reconsideration and invoking the immediacy of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite, petitioners filed the instant petition on February 27, 1998. The plebiscite was conducted as scheduled on February 28, 1998, while the Supreme Court on March 10, 1998 directed maintenance of the status quo prevailing at filing.

• Single Cause of Action and Multiplicity of Suits: Petitioner argued that directing the injunction plea to the Supreme Court while the annulment of the underlying ordinance remained with the trial court encourages multiplicity of suits and splits a single cause of action contrary to Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was issued only pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 and its propriety depends on their validity, whose adjudication by the trial court was undisputed.
• Ministerial Character of Plebiscite Conduct: Petitioner maintained that only COMELEC acts in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code are exclusively reviewable by the Supreme Court, while purely ministerial acts are subject to Regional Trial Court scrutiny, and that conducting the plebiscite in obedience to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 was merely ministerial or administrative, not adjudicatory.
• Non-Mootness Despite Holding of Plebiscite: Petitioner argued that the actual holding of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite did not validate an otherwise invalid ordinance and resolution, that substantial matters remained for resolution, that the status quo order preserved the controversy, and that a question capable of repetition yet evading review may still be decided even if technically moot.

• Exclusive Supreme Court Review of COMELEC Acts: Respondent COMELEC countered that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 belongs solely to the Supreme Court, invoking the need to avoid chaos if courts of first instance could disregard, suspend, or contradict COMELEC orders and citing Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, Luison vs. Garcia, Macud vs. COMELEC, and Aratuc vs. COMELEC.
• Immunity of Constitutional Body from RTC Writs: Respondent COMELEC argued that if a Regional Trial Court lacks jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies such as the former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public Service Commission, and others, a fortiori it cannot exercise such jurisdiction over the COMELEC, an independent constitutional body clothed with quasi-judicial functions.
• Mootness: Respondent COMELEC argued that the temporary restraining order sought had been rendered moot and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined.

• Jurisdiction over Ministerial COMELEC Resolution: Whether the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its Resolution No. 2987, series of 1998, providing rules for the February 28, 1998 plebiscite on the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, pending determination of Civil Case No. 3442 for annulment of Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
• Mootness: Whether the petition was rendered moot and academic by the actual conduct of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite sought to be enjoined.

• Jurisdiction over Ministerial COMELEC Resolution: Yes. The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction because COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was issued in the exercise of administrative, ministerial functions over plebiscites, not quasi-judicial power, and is therefore not a final order exclusively reviewable by the Supreme Court under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
• Mootness: No. The controversy was not rendered moot because the validity of the underlying ordinance and the deferral of the plebiscite result remained for adjudication in Civil Case No. 3442, with execution of the plebiscite result made dependent on its outcome.

• Jurisdiction over Ministerial COMELEC Resolution: What is contemplated by final orders, rulings, and decisions reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court are only those rendered in actions or proceedings taken cognizance of by the COMELEC in the exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, with COMELEC powers otherwise classified as administrative and sometimes ministerial. After ascertaining the ordinance and resolution abolishing barangay San Rafael, issuance of Resolution No. 2987 calling the plebiscite pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160 involved no discretionary adjudication of rights and duties of litigants relative to elections, but only a ministerial duty enjoined by law. As a mere incident of inherent administrative functions, the resolution may be questioned in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts, and the cases cited for exclusive Supreme Court review were distinguished as involving enforcement of election laws, nullification of certificates of candidacy, or canvass disputes falling within quasi-judicial final orders.
• Mootness: The appeal was treated as meritorious notwithstanding the holding of the plebiscite, the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 and of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 having remained pending in Civil Case No. 3442. Relief was shaped to preserve that adjudication by ordering the trial court to proceed with dispatch and deferring execution of the February 28, 1998 plebiscite result depending on the outcome of the annulment action.

• COMELEC powers as quasi-judicial vs. administrative-ministerial — Powers vested by the Constitution and law in the COMELEC are classified either as adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions or as inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial functions. In this case, calling and regulating the barangay abolition-merger plebiscite under Republic Act No. 7160 was placed in the second category, involving obedience to the ordinance without resolving a controversy defining rights and duties of party-litigants.
• Scope of Supreme Court certiorari review under Section 7, Article IX-A — Only final orders, rulings, and decisions rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers are reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Applied here, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 on plebiscite rules was not such a final order and was therefore cognizable by the Regional Trial Court in an ordinary civil action for annulment and injunction.
• Ministerial duty in barangay plebiscites under the Local Government Code — Upon issuance of a local ordinance and resolution for abolition and merger, the COMELEC's issuance of plebiscite rules pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160 is a ministerial duty enjoined by law and part of its administrative functions. The validity of that issuance was thus properly made dependent on the trial court's determination of the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.

• "What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." — States the controlling delimitation of exclusive Supreme Court review that excludes administrative plebiscite resolutions.
• "It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character." — Provides the canonical classification used to hold that plebiscite administration is reviewable by the trial courts.
• "It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence." — Reproduces the COMELEC's rejected argument for absolute immunity from trial court interference, distinguished as inapplicable to ministerial acts.

• Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 (1985) — Followed as authority for the dual classification of COMELEC powers and for limiting Supreme Court certiorari review to quasi-judicial final orders, rulings, and decisions.
• Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996) — Followed to hold that trivial administrative questions, as opposed to adjudicatory determinations, are best ventilated before the Regional Trial Court exercising original jurisdiction over cases not within exclusive jurisdiction of bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
• Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, 23 SCRA 533 (1968) — Distinguished; cited by COMELEC for exclusive COMELEC authority to enforce and administer election laws, but held not in point because petitioners did not contest that enforcement authority.
• Luison vs. Garcia, 101 Phil. 1218 (1957) — Distinguished; involved review of an administrative decision nullifying a certificate of candidacy, unlike the ministerial plebiscite rules here, and fell within quasi-judicial final orders.
• Macud vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 224 (1968) — Distinguished; involved elevation of a canvass dispute to the COMELEC and then to the Supreme Court, constituting a quasi-judicial final order unlike the plebiscite resolution.

• Section 7, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution — Provides that any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari; construed to cover only COMELEC acts in the exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, thus permitting trial court jurisdiction over ministerial plebiscite Resolution No. 2987.
• Sections 9 and 10, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Govern abolition and merger of barangays and the required plebiscite; Ordinance No. 05 invoked these sections to abolish barangay San Rafael and merge it with barangay Dacanlao, while the veto questioned non-compliance with Section 9 in relation to Section 7 certification requirements.
• Section 52, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) — Cited for COMELEC quasi-judicial functions whose exercise triggers exclusive Supreme Court review, contrasted with the purely ministerial conduct of the plebiscite in obedience to the provincial ordinance and resolution.
• Section 3, Rule 2, Rules of Court — Prohibits more than one suit for a single cause of action; invoked by petitioners to argue that splitting injunction relief to the Supreme Court from the annulment action in the trial court would improperly divide the controversy over the interdependent ordinance and COMELEC resolution.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Pardo, J., took no part, having been COMELEC Chairman at the time, and Ynares-Santiago, J., was on leave.