Saludo vs. American Express International, Inc.

For purposes of venue, "resides" means the personal, actual, or physical habitation of a person, which is a less technical and stringent standard than "domicile"; thus, one who satisfies the constitutional residency requirement to be a congressman—which equates to domicile—necessarily satisfies the venue requirement of residence in that district.

Petitioner Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr., the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, held an American Express (AMEX) credit card and a supplementary card issued to his daughter. After the cards were dishonored in the United States and Japan due to the alleged unilateral suspension of his account for non-payment, and subsequently canceled, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against AMEX and its officers in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, contending that none of the parties resided in Southern Leyte and pointing to petitioner's community tax certificate issued in Pasay City as proof of his actual residence.

• The Credit Card Dishonor: Petitioner held an AMEX credit card and a supplementary card for his daughter. In April 2000, the supplementary card was dishonored in the United States, and the principal card was dishonored in Tokyo, Japan, while petitioner was attending a Congressional Recognition event. The dishonors stemmed from respondents' unilateral suspension of the account for non-payment of the March 2000 balance. Petitioner denied receiving the statement of account, was wrongfully charged a late fee in June 2000, and had his cards canceled on July 20, 2000.
• The Complaint: Petitioner filed a complaint for actual, moral, and exemplary damages in the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged that he was a Filipino citizen, a member of the House of Representatives, and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. Respondent AMEX was a corporation with office address in Makati City, and respondents Fish and Mascrinas were AMEX officers based in Makati City.
• The Venue Challenge: Respondents sought dismissal based on improper venue, arguing that none of the parties resided in Southern Leyte. They highlighted that petitioner's community tax certificate—used for the verification and certification of non-forum shopping—was issued in Pasay City, and that his law office and counsel were also based there. Petitioner countered that as the incumbent congressman of Southern Leyte, his residency was undeniable and could be judicially noticed; he explained his community tax certificate was obtained by an office messenger in Pasay City where he also maintained an office.

• Judicial Notice of Residency: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of his incumbency as the congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, a fact that inherently establishes his residency in the district.
• Improper Dismissal Based on Judicial Admission: Petitioner maintained that the appellate court erred in treating his community tax certificate issued in Pasay City as a conclusive judicial admission negating his Southern Leyte residency, asserting that a community tax certificate is not determinative of residence and that a person may have multiple residences.
• Misapplication of Precedents: Petitioner contended that the appellate court ignored applicable Supreme Court decisions distinguishing residence from domicile for venue purposes.
• Absence of Forum Shopping: Petitioner argued that the appellate court erred in speculating that filing the complaint in Maasin City was intended to vex respondents or constituted a species of forum shopping, as the Rules of Court explicitly grant the plaintiff the option to file in the plaintiff's place of residence.

• Improper Venue: Respondents countered that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties resided in Southern Leyte, emphasizing that petitioner's community tax certificate and law office were located in Pasay City, which constituted judicial admissions of his actual residence.
• Distinction of Residency: Respondents argued that petitioner's congressional status did not automatically equate to actual residence in Southern Leyte for venue purposes, asserting that mere intent to return without actual physical presence was insufficient under the standard set forth in Koh v. Court of Appeals.

• Venue: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid because the petitioner was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing the complaint.
• Judicial Notice: Whether the trial court correctly took judicial notice of the petitioner's residency based on his incumbency as the congressman of Southern Leyte.

• Venue: The appellate court committed reversible error. For purposes of venue, "resides" means the personal, actual, or physical habitation of a person, signifying physical presence and actual stay—a less technical and stringent standard than "domicile," which requires bodily presence plus the intention to remain permanently. Because the Constitution requires a congressman to be a resident of his district for at least one year preceding the election—a standard synonymous with domicile for election law purposes—a congressman necessarily satisfies the less stringent venue requirement of actual residence. A person may have multiple residences; thus, a community tax certificate issued in Pasay City does not preclude residence in Southern Leyte.
• Judicial Notice: The trial court correctly took judicial notice of the petitioner's residency. Courts are mandated to take judicial notice of the law in force in the Philippines, including the Constitution, which requires congressmen to be residents of their districts. The fact of the petitioner's incumbency and consequent residency was a matter of public knowledge in the local community where the trial court sits, making the introduction of evidence unnecessary.

• Residence vs. Domicile for Venue Purposes — For venue of personal actions, "resides" connotes actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It means the personal, actual, or physical habitation of a person, signifying physical presence and actual stay. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence plus the intention to make it one's domicile. A man can have but one domicile at a time, but may have numerous places of residence.
• Residence in Election Law vs. Venue — For election law, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Because the election law standard is more stringent, one who satisfies the constitutional residency requirement to be a congressman (domicile) necessarily satisfies the venue requirement of residence in that district.
• Judicial Notice of Constitutional Qualifications — Courts are bound to take judicial notice of the Constitution and the official acts of the legislative department. The fact that a person is the duly elected representative of a district, and thus meets the constitutional residency requirement for that office, is a matter of common knowledge in the local community that can be judicially noticed without the introduction of evidence.

• "Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence."
• "Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions."
• "[I]t would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law."

• Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795 (1977) — Followed. Established that for venue purposes, "resides" means actual or physical habitation, distinct from domicile, and that a person may have numerous places of residence but only one domicile.
• Koh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40428 (1976) — Distinguished. The appellate court relied on Koh to dismiss the complaint, but the Supreme Court distinguished it because, unlike the plaintiff in Koh who lacked actual presence in the venue, petitioner Saludo possessed actual presence in Southern Leyte as its incumbent congressman.
• Fule v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40502 (1976) — Followed. Laid down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile for application of venue statutes.

• Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court — Governs the venue of personal actions, providing that they may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Applied to determine that petitioner, as a resident of Southern Leyte, properly filed the complaint in Maasin City.
• Section 6, Article VI, 1987 Constitution — Sets the qualifications for Members of the House of Representatives, including being a registered voter and a resident of the district in which the member shall be elected for not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Applied to establish that petitioner's constitutional qualification inherently proves his residency for venue purposes.
• Section 1 and Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Governs mandatory and discretionary judicial notice. Applied to support the trial court's taking of judicial notice of petitioner's congressional status and residency, as courts shall take judicial notice of the Constitution and may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge in the local community.

Artemio V. Panganiban (Chief Justice), Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Minita V. Chico-Nazario