Salientes vs. Abanilla

Habeas corpus is available to a parent deprived of the right to see his minor child, even when the child is under seven years of age and in the mother's custody, because both parents jointly exercise parental authority until a court adjudicates custody, and a trial court's order directing production of the minor is a proper interlocutory step precedent to full inquiry into the custody issue.

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. The couple resided with Marie Antonette's parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Marie Antonette works as an international flight stewardess, a circumstance relevant to the question of who should have custody during her absences abroad. Due to conflicts with his in-laws, Loran suggested that he and Marie Antonette transfer to their own house; when she refused, he left the Salientes residence alone and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son.

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived together at the residence of Marie Antonette's parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to problems with his in-laws, Loran suggested to Marie Antonette that they transfer to their own house, but she refused. Loran left the Salientes residence alone. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Loran, in his personal capacity and as representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued an order directing petitioners to produce and bring the minor before the court on January 31, 2003, and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the court denied on February 24, 2003.

Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the petition on November 10, 2003, holding that the January 23, 2003 Order did not award custody to any party but was simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained persons, and that the trial court was still to conduct a full inquiry on the cause of the minor's detention and the matter of his custody. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 2004, prompting the present petition.

• Article 213 (Tender Years Rule): Petitioners contended that the trial court's order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintained that Loran had the burden of showing compelling reasons but failed to present even prima facie proof thereof.
• Unavailability of Habeas Corpus: Petitioners asserted that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insisted there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother, and thus no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her own child.
• Proper Remedy: Petitioners posited that even assuming compelling reasons existed, the proper remedy for private respondent was an action for custody, not habeas corpus.
• Sombong vs. CA: Petitioners argued that the Sombong vs. CA case supports rather than negates their position, contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling.
• Summary Proceeding vs. Tender-Years Rule: Petitioners contended that summary proceeding does violence to the tender-years rule.
• New Rules on Custody: Petitioners maintained that the New Rules on Custody suffice as a remedy for private respondent.

• Article 213 Applies Only to Custody Adjudication: Respondent countered that petitioners' argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding custody of his son, and does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son.
• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Respondent asserted that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minor's right to see his father and vice versa.
• Petition Filed for Delay: Respondent averred that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the trial court's orders.
• Shared Custody and Parental Authority: Respondent maintained that under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleged that when Marie Antonette is out of the country as required by her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents.

• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Whether habeas corpus is available to a father seeking to enforce his right to see his minor child who is under seven years of age and in the custody of the mother.
• Validity of the Trial Court's Order: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003 orders directing petitioners to produce the minor and show cause.
• Applicability of Article 213: Whether Article 213 of the Family Code bars a father from seeking habeas corpus to see his child under seven years of age in the absence of compelling reasons showing maternal unfitness.
• Propriety of the CA's Dismissal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's interlocutory orders.

• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Yes. Habeas corpus is available to private respondent, as his cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child, and both parents jointly exercise parental authority and custody until a court adjudicates otherwise.
• Validity of the Trial Court's Order: No grave abuse of discretion. The January 23, 2003 Order was a proper interlocutory order that merely directed production of the minor pending full inquiry, consistent with Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC.
• Applicability of Article 213: No, Article 213 does not bar the father's petition. Article 213 deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody; it does not disallow a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
• Propriety of the CA's Dismissal: No error. The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, the trial court's interlocutory orders having been issued without grave abuse of discretion.

• Availability of Habeas Corpus: Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases where rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody had yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. Private respondent's cause of action was the deprivation of his right to see his child, as alleged in his petition. Accordingly, the remedy of habeas corpus was available to him.

• Validity of the Trial Court's Order: The January 23, 2003 Order did not grant custody of the minor to any party but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent was prevented from seeing his child. This was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court's full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending. Under Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable, but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided grave abuse of discretion is shown. Petitioners failed to demonstrate such grave abuse. The order was in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC, which requires the court to issue an order requiring the respondent to present the minor before the court within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer.

• Applicability of Article 213: Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners could raise it as a counter-argument for private respondent's petition for custody. However, it is not a basis for preventing the father from seeing his own child. Nothing in the provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age. The tender-years rule governs the ultimate award of custody, not the preliminary step of producing the child for inquiry.

• Propriety of the CA's Dismissal: The trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari against those orders, having been issued in accordance with law and the applicable rules on custody of minors and habeas corpus. The child's welfare is the supreme consideration in all questions regarding care and custody, as provided in Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603).

• Joint Parental Authority — Under Article 211 of the Family Code, the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. In the absence of a judicial order awarding custody to one parent, both parents remain entitled to custody. The Court applied this principle to hold that private respondent, as the father, had a right to see his child and could invoke habeas corpus when that right was withheld, notwithstanding the child's tender age and residence with the mother.

• Habeas Corpus in Custody Disputes — Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The Court held that the writ is available not only against strangers but also against a parent who withholds the child from the other parent, where joint parental authority subsists and no court has yet adjudicated custody.

• Paramount Welfare of the Child — Under Article 8 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603), in all questions regarding the care and custody of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The Court invoked this principle to uphold the trial court's order requiring production of the minor, as a necessary step toward determining the child's best interests.

• Interlocutory Orders and Certiorari — Under Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable; the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, but must show that the lower court gravely abused its discretion. The Court held that the trial court's order directing production of the minor was interlocutory and was issued without grave abuse of discretion, as it was mandated by Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC.

• Tender-Years Rule (Article 213, Family Code) — No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court clarified that this provision governs the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody; it does not prevent a father from seeking to see or visit his child under seven, nor does it bar a habeas corpus proceeding preliminary to a custody determination.

• "Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto." — This passage states the controlling rule on the availability of habeas corpus in custody disputes, anchoring the Court's conclusion that the father's petition was proper.

• "In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent's cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him." — This is the ratio decidendi on the availability of habeas corpus, tying joint parental authority under Article 211 to the father's standing to invoke the writ.

• "Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent's petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age." — This passage delineates the scope of the tender-years rule, distinguishing custody adjudication from the right of access, and is the key resolution of petitioners' principal argument.

• Sombong vs. CA — Petitioners argued that this case supported their position, contrary to the Court of Appeals' reliance on it. The decision text references the case but does not elaborate on the Court's treatment of it beyond noting petitioners' contention. The Court did not sustain petitioners' reading.

• Article 211, Family Code — Provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. The Court relied on this provision to establish that both parents are entitled to custody in the absence of a judicial adjudication, thereby giving the father standing to seek habeas corpus.
• Article 213, Family Code — Provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court held that this provision governs the judicial adjudication of custody and does not bar a father from seeking to see his child under seven.
• Rule 102, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines the scope of habeas corpus as extending to cases where rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The Court applied this provision to uphold the availability of the writ to the father.
• Rule 41, Section 1, Rules of Court — Provides that an interlocutory order is not appealable, but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The Court applied this provision to characterize the trial court's order as interlocutory and to require a showing of grave abuse of discretion for certiorari to lie.
• Section 9, A.M. 03-04-04-SC (Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors) — Directs the court, within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, to issue an order requiring the respondent to present the minor before the court. The Court found that the trial court's January 23, 2003 Order was exactly what this rule prescribes.
• Article 8, Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The Court invoked this principle to uphold the trial court's order requiring production of the minor as a step toward determining the child's best interests.

Carpio, Carpio Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.