Salgado vs. Court of Appeals

A probation order may validly require the offender to pay the adjudged civil liability in monthly installments during probation without modifying the final judgment; the Section 10 conditions are not exclusive, but the payment condition must consider the offender’s needs and capacity, and the balance may be enforced after the probation period lapses.

Agustin Salgado and Francisco Lukban, Jr. were the accused and the offended party, respectively, in a criminal case for serious physical injuries. The statutory backdrop is the Probation Law of 1976, Presidential Decree No. 968, which allows suspension of sentence and probation on terms and conditions the court may deem best, and the Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, which permit a program of payment of civil liability.

Agustin Salgado was charged with serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 86; Francisco Lukban, Jr. was the victim. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment on October 16, 1986 finding Salgado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious physical injuries under paragraph 3, Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and no intention to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion sentenced him to four months and twenty days, with accessories, and ordered him to indemnify Lukban P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as damages for Lukban’s incapacity to pursue and engage in his poultry business.

On October 17, 1986, Salgado filed an application for probation with the trial court. The application was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987, which imposed, among others, the condition that he indemnify Lukban in a monthly installment of P2,000.00 every month during the entire period of his probation. For May, June, July, August, September, and October 1987, Salgado complied by paying P2,000.00 monthly in checks through City Probation Officer Perla Diaz Alonzo; Lukban voluntarily accepted the checks and encashed them.

On September 19, 1987, Lukban filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability adjudged in the criminal case. Salgado opposed the motion. On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, and on December 22, 1987 it denied Salgado’s motion for reconsideration.

Salgado filed directly with the SC a petition for review of the trial court’s order granting the writ of execution; the SC referred the petition to the CA in a resolution dated April 13, 1988. On March 16, 1989, the CA rendered a decision affirming the trial court’s order, and on August 3, 1989 it denied Salgado’s motion for reconsideration. Salgado then filed a petition for review with the SC on September 26, 1989.

• Modification of the Civil Aspect: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in holding that the April 15, 1987 probation order had not modified the October 16, 1986 decision as far as the civil aspect was concerned.
• Validity of the Probation Condition: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in holding that the condition in the probation order modifying or altering his civil liability was unauthorized and not sanctioned by law.

• Enforcement of Civil Liability: Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability adjudged in his favor in the criminal case.
• Probation Affects Only Criminal Aspect: Private respondent submitted that under Budlong vs. Apalisok, probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case.

• Modification of Final Judgment: Whether the April 15, 1987 probation order, by requiring monthly payment of P2,000.00 during probation, altered or modified the final October 16, 1986 decision on civil liability.
• Probation Condition on Civil Liability: Whether the trial court may impose, as a condition of probation, a program for payment of the offender’s civil liability during the probation period.
• Writ of Execution During Probation: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC order granting a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability while the probation order fixed installment payments during probation.

• Modification of Final Judgment: No. The probation order did not increase or decrease the civil liability; it merely provided the manner of payment during probation.
• Probation Condition on Civil Liability: Yes. Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 allows probation on terms and conditions the court may deem best, and Section 10’s list is not exclusive; Section 26(d) of the Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures permits a program of payment of civil liability.
• Writ of Execution During Probation: No, not on the present record. The installment condition validly governed during probation; the balance could be enforced only after the probation period lapsed, and the records did not allege that lapse.

• Modification of Final Judgment: The October 16, 1986 judgment became final and executory because Salgado’s application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, and no appeal was taken from the civil liability. Under Samson vs. Montejo, a final judgment cannot be lawfully altered or modified even by the court that rendered it. The April 15, 1987 probation order, however, did not increase or decrease the civil liability of P126,633.50 and P50,000.00; it merely provided the manner of payment—P2,000.00 monthly during the probation period. Hence, it did not amend the final judgment.

• Probation Condition on Civil Liability: The grant of probation suspends execution of the sentence but does not extinguish civil liability; Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code keeps the offender obliged to satisfy it. Budlong vs. Apalisok’s statement that probation affects only the criminal aspect should not be read literally; the issue there was survival of civil liability, not the power to fix payment terms during probation. Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 authorizes probation “upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best,” and Section 10’s enumeration is not exclusive. Baclayon vs. Mutia held that courts may impose practically any condition not violating constitutional rights, provided it is realistic, purposive, and geared to rehabilitation. Section 26(d) of the Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures expressly allows a program of payment of civil liability. The condition must consider the offender’s needs and capacity from the post-sentence investigation. In this case, absent contrary showing, the trial court is presumed to have imposed the P2,000.00 monthly condition based on the probation officer’s recommendation and as “deemed best” under the circumstances.

• Writ of Execution During Probation: The probation order took effect on April 15, 1987, the date of its issuance under Section 11 of P.D. No. 968. The P2,000.00 monthly payment condition was expressly limited to the period of probation. Counting from April 15, 1987, the probation period must have lapsed by the time of the SC decision, and the installment order must have lapsed with it. If so, there would be no more obstacle for Lukban to enforce the balance of the civil liability by execution. The records, however, are bereft of allegations that the probation period had lapsed. The CA therefore erred in affirming the RTC’s order granting the writ of execution on the record before it.

• Probation affects only the criminal aspect; civil liability survives — A grant of probation suspends execution of the sentence but does not extinguish the offender’s civil liability. Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code keeps the obligation alive notwithstanding service or non-service of sentence by reason of probation or other causes. In this case, the SC clarified Budlong vs. Apalisok: the phrase is not literal; the civil liability remains and may be the subject of a probation condition on payment.
• Non-exclusivity of probation conditions — Section 10 of P.D. No. 968 lists mandatory and discretionary conditions but is not exclusive. Under Section 4, courts may impose “such terms and conditions as it may deem best,” limited only by the probationer’s constitutional rights. Special conditions must be realistic, purposive, and geared to rehabilitation; they may include a program of payment of civil liability under Section 26(d) of the Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, provided the condition addresses the offender’s needs and capacity as shown in the post-sentence investigation.
• Final judgment rule and probation payment condition — A final and executory judgment cannot be altered or modified by the court that rendered it. But a probation order that fixes installment payment of an already-adjudged civil liability during probation does not modify the judgment; it merely provides the manner of payment during probation.
• Enforcement of civil liability after probation — The installment condition operates during the probation period. Once the probation period lapses, the offended party may enforce the balance of the civil liability by execution, absent any other obstacle.

• “The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting the application for probation and providing as one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but merely provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil liability during the period of probation.” — This is the core holding that the probation condition did not modify the final judgment.
• “The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the probationer’s constitutional rights are not jeopardized.” — This supports the SC’s ruling that Section 10’s conditions are not exclusive.
• “The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the order granting probation ‘as it may deem best.’ As already stated, it is not only limited to those listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law.” — This states the statutory basis for discretionary probation conditions.
• “Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation which under the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation period must have lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify the private respondent in the amount of P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation must have also lapsed. If such were the case, there would therefore, be no more obstacle for the private respondent to enforce the execution of the balance of the civil liability of the petitioner.” — This explains the timing for enforcing the balance of the civil liability after probation.

• Samson vs. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 419, 422-423 — Relied on for the rule that once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it cannot lawfully alter or modify it.
• Budlong vs. Apalisok, No. 60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935 — Cited by private respondent; the SC clarified that its statement that probation affects only the criminal aspect should not be taken literally, since probation does not extinguish civil liability.
• Florentino L. Baclayon vs. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al., G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148 — Relied on for the rule that the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law are not exclusive and courts may impose other conditions not violating constitutional rights.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) — Authorizes the court to suspend execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation “for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best”; also cited by the SC for the rule that filing an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Applied to uphold the installment payment condition and to explain the finality of the judgment.
• Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 968 — Enumerates mandatory and special or discretionary probation conditions; the SC held that the enumeration is not exclusive.
• Section 11, Presidential Decree No. 968 — Provides that the date of issuance of the order granting probation is the date of its effectivity; used to count the probation period.
• Section 26, paragraph (d), Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures — Allows the probation order to require the probationer to comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the victim or heirs; applied to validate the installment condition.
• Article 113, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the offender remains obliged to satisfy civil liability notwithstanding service of sentence or non-service by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation, or any other reason; cited to show that probation does not extinguish civil liability.

• Justice Cruz (Concurring) — Concurred in the result because the issue had become moot and academic. He reserved on the majority’s holding that the probation condition was valid and within the trial court’s discretion; he viewed the final civil damages award as a vested property right enforceable immediately and in full, and the installment condition as a void amendment ab initio that the victim’s acceptance of payments did not validate.