Sales vs. Adapon

The investigating prosecutor's dismissal of a criminal complaint solely on the ground of the complainant's non-appearance at the clarificatory hearing constitutes grave abuse of discretion where the records already contain sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The personal presence of the complainant is not indispensable in a preliminary investigation because the real party in interest in criminal proceedings is the State, and the complainant acts merely as a witness for the prosecution; moreover, the investigating prosecutor's discretion to set a clarificatory hearing is not unbounded, as the rule provides that such hearing may be set only "if there are such facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness."

Aurora A. Sales, a US immigrant residing in that country since 1980, and respondents Benjamin D. Adapon and Teofilo D. Adapon are among the eleven siblings of the late Spouses Pedro H. Adapon and Severina Dimaano-Adapon; respondent Ofelia C. Adapon is the spouse of Benjamin. Upon the demise of the spouses, they left a parcel of land in Rosario, Batangas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6905 with a total area of 1,352,961 square meters. The dispute arose in the context of the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses and the subsequent subdivision and distribution of their property among the heirs.

Aurora A. Sales, a US immigrant residing in that country since 1980, and respondents Benjamin D. Adapon and Teofilo D. Adapon are among the eleven siblings of the late Spouses Pedro H. Adapon and Severina Dimaano-Adapon; respondent Ofelia C. Adapon is the spouse of Benjamin. Upon their demise, the spouses left a parcel of land in Rosario, Batangas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6905 with a total area of 1,352,961 square meters.

On May 25, 2001, Sales, represented by her son Adelfo A. Sales, filed a complaint against her siblings, including the respondents and other heirs, for nullification of various certificates of title emanating from TCT No. T-6905 and recovery of properties covered by the void certificates, docketed as Civil Case No. RY2K1-095 before the RTC of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87. In her complaint, Sales alleged that during her absence and without her knowledge and consent, the subject property was subdivided several times and most of it was parceled out among the defendants in varying areas and registered in their names. She also averred that she never agreed to an arrangement for the subdivision of the property, nor did she recall any extra-judicial settlement of the estate of her parents, much less a judicial partition thereof.

On June 20, 2001, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the civil case, attaching a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs purportedly executed in Makati City on November 5, 1990, by and among the eleven children of the late spouses, including Sales. Thereafter, on September 4, 2002, Sales executed an affidavit subscribed and sworn to before Vice-Consul Maria Lourdes C. Legaspi in New York City, USA, claiming that the deed of extra-judicial settlement attached to the motion to dismiss is a falsified document. She claimed that she did not sign the subject deed, disowned the purported signature appearing on top of her name, and stated that she was in the United States on November 5, 1990 when the document was supposedly executed and could not have appeared before the notary public in Makati City. Sales authorized Jerico B. Sales, her son-in-law, to institute the criminal proceedings against the respondents.

On June 21, 2002, the respondents filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss or to Suspend Preliminary Investigation, alleging that in the execution of the deed of extra-judicial partition, Sales was represented by her daughter Victoria Adapon Sales-Santiago. They claimed that during meetings to discuss the partition, it was Victoria who represented Sales, and they relied on Victoria's assurance that she had authority to represent her mother. The respondents contended that they could not be charged for use of falsified documents since they had no knowledge of the alleged falsity of the deed, and they never intended to cause damage or prejudice when they presented the deed in support of their motion to dismiss.

On September 9, 2002, Prosecutor Cuevas recommended the dismissal without prejudice of the complaint on the ground that the affidavit was not sworn to by Sales before a fiscal, state prosecutor, or government official authorized to administer oath as required by Rule 112, Sec. 3(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, upon manifestation that Sales was submitting her affidavit sworn to before a Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General of New York City, the case was reopened. On March 27, 2003, Prosecutor Cuevas issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was impossible to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the appearance of Sales, who would be subjected to clarificatory questions on certain matters. Sales' motion for reconsideration was denied on May 14, 2003, and she filed an Appeal or Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on June 4, 2003.

On December 14, 2004, the DOJ reversed and set aside the March 27, 2003 Resolution and ordered the filing of the corresponding information against the respondents. The DOJ pointed out that the dismissal on the sole basis of the non-attendance of Sales at the clarificatory hearing was erroneous because, firstly, the investigating prosecutor did not state the matters that still needed to be clarified; and secondly, the totality of the evidence presented already established probable cause to indict the respondents. The respondents moved for reconsideration, which was denied on February 8, 2005. The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which granted the petition on October 19, 2005, declaring that the DOJ was guilty of grave abuse of discretion because the investigating prosecutor was bound to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses, and that the continuous absence of the complainant from the clarificatory hearing had effectively prevented the determination of probable cause.

• Error in Dismissal Based on Non-Appearance: Petitioner argued that the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint because of her failure to appear at the clarificatory hearing set by the investigating prosecutor, given that the records already contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
• Non-Indispensability of Personal Presence: Petitioner maintained that her personal presence at the clarificatory hearing was excusable because of her advanced age and the distance of her place of residence in New York, USA from the Province of Batangas, and that she was represented by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for the purpose of pursuing the criminal case.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the totality of the evidence presented, including her sworn affidavit and the affidavit of her agent, already established probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondents insisted that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the investigating prosecutor's dismissal of the complaint.
• Requirement of Personal Examination: Respondents argued that under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the investigating prosecutor was bound to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses, and that the continuous absence of the complainant from the clarificatory hearing had effectively prevented the investigating prosecutor from determining the existence of probable cause.
• Lack of Knowledge of Falsity: Respondents contended that they could not be charged for use of falsified documents since they had no knowledge of the alleged falsity of the deed, having relied on the representation of Victoria Adapon Sales-Santiago that she had authority to represent her mother.
• Absence of Intent to Damage: Respondents argued that they never intended to cause damage or prejudice to another person when they presented the deed in support of their motion to dismiss the civil case.

• Propriety of Dismissal for Non-Appearance: Whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint because of the petitioner's failure to appear at the clarificatory hearing set by the investigating prosecutor.
• Indispensability of Complainant's Personal Presence: Whether the personal presence of the complainant at the clarificatory hearing is indispensable to the determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation.
• Existence of Probable Cause: Whether the records contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to charge the respondents with violation of Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Propriety of Dismissal for Non-Appearance: Yes, the CA erred. The investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the criminal complaint solely because of the petitioner's non-appearance at the clarificatory hearing, where the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which probable cause could be found.
• Indispensability of Complainant's Personal Presence: No. The personal presence of the complainant is not indispensable in a preliminary investigation because the real party in interest in criminal proceedings is the State, and the complainant acts merely as a witness for the prosecution; the term "complainant" in Section 4, Rule 112 is not of the same import as "plaintiff" in civil procedure.
• Existence of Probable Cause: Yes. The totality of the evidence presented, including the petitioner's sworn affidavit and the affidavit of her agent, established probable cause to indict the respondents for violation of Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Propriety of Dismissal for Non-Appearance: The Court held that the investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the criminal complaint simply because of the petitioner's non-appearance at the clarificatory hearing. The Court enumerated several grounds: (1) her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced age and the distance of her place of residence in New York, USA from the Province of Batangas; (2) the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the investigating prosecutor could make a finding of probable cause; (3) she was represented in the proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of pursuing the criminal case, and being her agent expressly authorized for that special purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the investigating prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a manner legally binding on her; (4) had the investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal presence as absolutely necessary, he should have granted her request to have her deposition taken instead, such power being within his discretion; and (5) the investigating prosecutor's requiring her personal presence was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of his failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified. The Court noted that although it was discretionary on the part of the investigating prosecutor to call for a clarificatory hearing considering that Section 4(e) of Rule 112 uses the word "may," the discretion was not unbounded because the rule precisely stated that the clarificatory hearing was to be set only "if there are such facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness."

• Indispensability of Complainant's Personal Presence: The Court rejected the CA's restrictive reading of the term "complainant" as used in Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The Court explained that such term is not of the same import as the term "plaintiff" used in civil procedure to describe the party in interest initiating the civil suit. In criminal proceedings, the real party in interest is the State, and the complaint or information is always brought in the name of the People of the Philippines, it being sufficient that the complainant is named in the information or complaint as the offended party. The petitioner as the complainant would be a mere witness for the Prosecution at the trial, subject to her right to intervene by counsel in the criminal prosecution because the criminal action would entail civil liability. The offense of falsification complained of was a public offense, the charges for which could be initiated by anyone, as opposed to a private crime whose institution could be made only by particular individuals. This distinction validated the non-indispensability of the personal presence of the petitioner as the complainant in the proceedings to determine the existence of probable cause against the respondents.

• Existence of Probable Cause: The Court adopted the DOJ's discussion of the justification for the finding of probable cause. The elements of the crime penalized under Article 172, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code were all present: (1) the document is false; (2) the offender had knowledge that such document was false; and (3) the offender introduced in evidence in any judicial proceeding such false or falsified document. The Court noted that when a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his signature therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome. The respondents' alleged reliance upon the authority of Victoria Adapon Sales-Santiago to represent the complainant could not overcome the prima facie case of falsification created by the complainant's denial of her purported signature on the subject deed, which she could not have executed as she was then in the United States where she permanently resides. The authenticity of the complainant's signature and her due execution of the subject document could not be presumed from Victoria's alleged authority, more so since no special power of attorney was ever presented, and the respondents failed to present Victoria to corroborate their claim. The factual backdrop of the execution of the subject deed also negated the respondents' claim of lack of knowledge of the falsity of the complainant's signature, as the parties were closely related, and whether or not the complainant was in the Philippines on November 5, 1990 would have been known to the respondents. The Court also noted that the respondents' lack of intent to cause damage was immaterial, as it is when the falsified document is used in a proceeding which is not judicial that intent to cause damage is required. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects, and such quantum of evidence was sufficiently met in the instant case.

• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent, who is probably guilty thereof, should be held for trial. It is a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case, and its purpose is not only to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, but also to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the investigating prosecutor's dismissal of the complaint solely on the basis of the complainant's non-appearance was erroneous because the records already contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

• Definition of Probable Cause — Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean actual or positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether or not there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the totality of the evidence presented established probable cause against the respondents.

• Prima Facie Case of Falsification — When a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his signature therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the respondents' alleged reliance upon the authority of Victoria Adapon Sales-Santiago could not overcome the prima facie case of falsification created by the complainant's denial of her purported signature on the subject deed.

• Non-Interference with Executive Determination of Probable Cause — It is a sound judicial policy for the courts to refrain from interfering in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and to leave to the DOJ the ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of offenders. Courts do not review and reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings and conclusions on probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion, that is, when the Secretary of Justice has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the DOJ's executive determination of probable cause in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• "It is error to dismiss a criminal complaint for falsification if the records already contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to charge the respondents therewith on the basis alone that the complainant, already residing abroad, did not herself submit to the clarificatory hearing, and the investigating prosecutor did not state the matters that still required clarification." — This opening statement articulates the core ruling of the case and the standard for evaluating dismissals based on non-appearance at clarificatory hearings.

• "A preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair; the officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused." — This passage, quoted from Ang-Abaya v. Ang, defines the nature and purpose of preliminary investigation and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute." — This statement, quoted from Ang-Abaya v. Ang, emphasizes the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system and supports the Court's ruling that the investigating prosecutor erred in dismissing the complaint.

• "In criminal proceedings, the real party in interest is the State, and the complaint or information is always brought in the name of the People of the Philippines, it being sufficient that the complainant is named in the information or complaint as the offended party." — This passage establishes the doctrinal basis for the non-indispensability of the complainant's personal presence in preliminary investigations.

• Ang-Abaya vs. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 129 — Cited as the source of the exposition on the nature and purposes of preliminary investigation, including the characterization of the right to preliminary investigation as a substantive right forming part of due process in criminal justice.
• Yusop vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001, 353 SCRA 587 — Cited for the definition of preliminary investigation as an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
• Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 180165, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 631 — Cited for the definition of probable cause and the proposition that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether or not there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
• De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 71 — Cited for the definition of probable cause and the proposition that the clarificatory hearing is geared towards the determination of the existence of probable cause.
• Villanueva vs. Ople, G.R. No. 165125, November 28, 2005, 475 SCRA 539 — Cited for the proposition that the investigating prosecutor had the discretion to grant the request for deposition.
• Callo-Claridad vs. Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 185 — Cited for the sound judicial policy of refraining from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigation and leaving to the DOJ the ample latitude of discretion in determining probable cause.
• Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Reynado, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as the exercise of discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner.
• Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 — Cited for the proposition that a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects.
• US vs. Viloria, 1 Phil 682 — Cited for the doctrine that when a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his signature therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must overcome.
• People vs. Villafranca, [CA] 40 O.G. 4622 — Cited for the same doctrine as US vs. Viloria regarding prima facie case of falsification.
• People vs. Facundo, [CA], 43 O.G. 5088 — Cited for the element of knowledge that the document was false in the crime of use of falsified documents.
• Salazar vs. People, G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 598 — Cited for the proposition that the complainant in a criminal case would be a mere witness for the prosecution at trial.

• Article 172, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing the crime of use of falsified documents, which was the offense charged against the respondents. The Court found that all elements of the crime were present: the document is false, the offender had knowledge that such document was false, and the offender introduced in evidence in any judicial proceeding such false or falsified document.
• Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court — The provision governing the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and its review, requiring the investigating prosecutor to certify under oath that he or an authorized officer has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses. The Court interpreted the term "complainant" restrictively, holding that it is not of the same import as "plaintiff" in civil procedure, and that the personal presence of the complainant is not indispensable in preliminary investigations.
• Section 4(e), Rule 112, Rules of Court — The provision stating that the investigating officer may set a hearing "if there are such facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness." The Court held that the discretion to set a clarificatory hearing is not unbounded, as the rule precisely stated that such hearing was to be set only if there are facts and issues to be clarified.
• Section 2, Rule 110, Rules of Court — The provision requiring that the complaint or information be in writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines, supporting the Court's ruling that the real party in interest in criminal proceedings is the State.
• Section 12, Rule 110, Rules of Court — The provision requiring the complaint or information to state the name and surname of the offended party, supporting the Court's ruling that it is sufficient that the complainant is named in the information or complaint as the offended party.
• Section 16, Rule 110, Rules of Court — The provision allowing the offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court — The provision stating that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor, supporting the Court's ruling on the role of the State in criminal proceedings.
• Section 3(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure — The provision requiring that the complaint be sworn to before a fiscal, state prosecutor, or government official authorized to administer oath, which was the initial ground for the dismissal of the complaint before the case was reopened.

Sereno, C.J., on official business. Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concurred.

N/A — The case text does not indicate any dissenting opinion.