Salendab vs. Dela Peña

A Rule 45 petition may raise only questions of law; factual issues are outside the Supreme Court’s review, and the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive. A motion for reconsideration is not pro forma where it bona fide points out erroneous findings and excessive awards and shows no intent to delay, and it tolls the period to appeal. A petition for certiorari sent by registered mail is deemed filed on the date of mailing as shown by the registry receipt, not on the date the court receives it.

Florence Case Dela Peña owned two parcels of land situated at Midtungok, Senator Ninoy Aquino, Sultan Kudarat. She engaged petitioners Datu Camaro Salendab and Bai Jolly Salendab to sell her lands to Land Bank of the Philippines under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Their agreement was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement dated August 15, 2003, under which Dela Peña agreed to compensate petitioners 15% of the total proceeds of the sale, exclusive of certain expenses, and to sell to petitioners all her Land Bank bonds forming part of the proceeds. The Memorandum of Agreement expressly provided that it would not be subject to revocation, cancellation, amendment, or modification without the written consent of both parties.

Florence Case Dela Peña owned two parcels of land situated at Midtungok, Senator Ninoy Aquino, Sultan Kudarat. She engaged petitioners Datu Camaro Salendab and Bai Jolly Salendab to sell her lands to Land Bank of the Philippines under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme of the Department of Agrarian Reform. On August 15, 2003, Dela Peña and petitioners signed a Memorandum of Agreement under which she agreed to compensate petitioners 15% of the total proceeds of the sale, exclusive of certain expenses, and to sell to petitioners all her Land Bank bonds forming part of the proceeds. The Memorandum of Agreement explicitly provided that it would not be subject to revocation, cancellation, amendment, or modification without the written consent of both parties.

Notwithstanding the approval of Dela Peña’s Voluntary Offer to Sell application, petitioners claimed that she evaded her obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement and refused to compensate them P1,221,000.00, representing 15% of the total proceeds of the sale. She also reneged on agreeing with petitioners on the price of the Land Bank bonds she had promised to sell. On December 29, 2005, she executed an Affidavit unilaterally revoking the Memorandum of Agreement absent any reason and in violation of its provisions. Petitioners thereafter filed a Complaint dated January 30, 2006 for Specific Performance, Collection of Sum of Money, and Damages against Dela Peña, Land Bank of the Philippines, and the Registry of Deeds for Sultan Kudarat Province with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City.

In her Answer, Dela Peña neither denied the genuineness and due execution of the Memorandum of Agreement nor petitioners’ asseveration that she unilaterally revoked it. She argued that she was the one who actually secured the documents herself and that the Memorandum of Agreement she entered into with petitioners was a contract of adhesion.

The Regional Trial Court found that no evidence was presented by Dela Peña that her consent was vitiated by coercion, intimidation, or fraud, and concluded that she signed the contract voluntarily. The Memorandum of Agreement’s provisions contained the law that governed the contractual relations between the parties and had to be respected, particularly the provisions on compensation and on requiring written consent from the other party should either seek to revoke, amend, or modify the agreement. Because Dela Peña failed to seek petitioners’ written consent in unilaterally revoking the Memorandum of Agreement, the Regional Trial Court rendered her Affidavit of Revocation without legal effect.

• Timeliness of Notice of Appeal: Petitioners argued that when respondents received notice that the Motion for Reconsideration was declared pro forma, they knew that appealing beyond fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Decision would be futile; respondents nevertheless filed a notice of appeal beyond the reglementary period despite prior notice that it would be ruled as filed out of time.
• Timeliness of Petition for Certiorari: Petitioners argued that because respondents were assailing the Order dated June 4, 2009 in their petition for certiorari, they had sixty (60) days from receipt of that Order, or until August 5, 2009, within which to file the petition; since the petition was belatedly filed with the Court of Appeals only on October 20, 2009, it should have been dismissed for being filed out of time.
• Finality of June 4, 2009 Order: Petitioners insisted that the Court of Appeals should not have put into issue the June 4, 2009 Order denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, as the period to assail the same had already lapsed and the Order had become final.
• Undue Liberality: Petitioners questioned the undue and excessive liberality of the Court of Appeals toward respondents in granting the Motion for Reconsideration and setting the case anew for hearing in its Resolution dated February 24, 2011.

• Rule 45 Scope: Whether the issues raised in the Rule 45 petition—timeliness of the certiorari petition, propriety of appreciating the June 4, 2009 Order, and the Court of Appeals’ liberality—are factual and evidentiary in nature and therefore outside the Supreme Court’s scope of review.
• Timeliness of Petition for Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found the Petition for Certiorari timely filed when it was sent by registered mail on October 9, 2009, although the Court of Appeals received it on October 20, 2009.
• Propriety of June 4, 2009 Order: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in passing upon the propriety of the June 4, 2009 Order denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.
• Pro Forma Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the Regional Trial Court correctly declared Dela Peña’s Motion for Reconsideration pro forma and consequently denied her Notice of Appeal as filed out of time.
• Undue Liberality: Whether the Court of Appeals extended undue and excessive liberality toward respondents in granting the Motion for Reconsideration and setting the case anew for hearing.

• Rule 45 Scope: No. The issues are factual and evidentiary, outside the Supreme Court’s Rule 45 review; factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal.
• Timeliness of Petition for Certiorari: Yes. The Petition for Certiorari was timely filed; under Rule 13, Section 3, filing by registered mail is deemed filed on the date of mailing as shown by the registry receipt, here October 9, 2009, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the July 27, 2009 Order on August 10, 2009.
• Propriety of June 4, 2009 Order: Yes. Because the Petition for Certiorari was timely and assailed the July 27, 2009 Order, the Court of Appeals did not err in passing upon the propriety of the June 4, 2009 Order.
• Pro Forma Motion for Reconsideration: No. The Motion for Reconsideration was not pro forma; it bona fide pointed out erroneous findings and excessive awards, showed no intent to delay, and tolled the appeal period, making the Notice of Appeal timely.
• Undue Liberality: No. Petitioners were given an equal opportunity to be heard, having filed a Comment-Opposition and having been furnished notices; no undue prejudice was shown.

• Rule 45 Scope: Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari; the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. Consequently, findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. The issues raised by petitioners—the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari, the propriety of appreciating the June 4, 2009 Order, and the exercise of liberality by the Court of Appeals—hinged on a re-evaluation and recalibration of the records below. Moreover, review under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons; the petition raised no substantial issues that had not already been passed upon and considered by the Court of Appeals.
• Timeliness of Petition for Certiorari: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order, or resolution. Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed either personally or by registered mail; in the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt, whereas in the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt. The records disclosed that the Petition for Certiorari was filed via registered mail, as reflected in the Affidavit of Service and Explanation by Dela Peña’s counsel, Atty. Michael A. Ignes. Although the Court of Appeals received the petition on October 20, 2009, it was actually filed on October 9, 2009 via registered mail, the date indicated in the registry receipt attached to the petition. Petitioners therefore misread the Rules in claiming that the petition was belatedly filed on October 20, 2009. Further, the petition assailed the Order dated July 27, 2009, not the Order dated June 4, 2009. Having received the July 27, 2009 Order on August 10, 2009, Dela Peña had sixty (60) days, or until October 9, 2009, within which to file her petition; having been filed by registered mail on the last allowable day, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for giving due course to the petition.
• Propriety of June 4, 2009 Order: Petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the June 4, 2009 Order was anchored on the supposed failure of Dela Peña to file a petition for certiorari within the reglementary period. Because the petition was found to be timely filed, the argument was rendered baseless. The Court of Appeals was therefore not in error for passing upon the propriety of the June 4, 2009 Order.
• Pro Forma Motion for Reconsideration: The Court was guided by the ruling in Marine Properties Corporation vs. Court of Appeals that where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings, and the motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate arguments in a different light, the courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. A careful review of the records revealed that the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 27, 2009 adequately pointed out the conclusions that Dela Peña regarded as erroneous and contrary to law, particularly the findings of the Regional Trial Court that the Memorandum of Agreement should be upheld. The Motion explicitly referred to certain amounts awarded to petitioners and Land Bank of the Philippines, as well as amounts representing attorney’s fees, exemplary damages, and moral damages, as both excessive and unconscionable. No showing of an intent to delay the proceedings appeared; on the contrary, the Motion revealed a bona fide effort to present arguments and issues worth the Regional Trial Court’s time to reconsider. The Motion for Reconsideration therefore effectively tolled the prescriptive period to file an appeal. The Notice of Appeal filed on June 15, 2009, upon receipt of the denial of the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on June 5, 2009, was timely filed and should have been given due course by the Regional Trial Court. As emphasized in a catena of cases, the approval of the notice of appeal, if timely filed, becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court.
• Undue Liberality: Petitioners’ last argument had been previously raised and passed upon by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated March 31, 2015. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion that the Court of Appeals extended excessive and undue liberality toward Dela Peña by granting the Motion for Reconsideration and setting the case anew for hearing, the records bore out that petitioners were likewise given an equal opportunity to be heard, having filed a Comment-Opposition to the Motion; both parties were likewise duly furnished with notices from the Court of Appeals prior to the issuance of the Decision on July 30, 2014. Petitioners were not unduly prejudiced by the Court of Appeals’ actions, having been afforded the same opportunity to ventilate their position as allowed by law.

• Rule 45 limited to questions of law — Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, which is not a trier of facts. Its jurisdiction in such a proceeding is limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts; findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. The Court applied this doctrine by denying the petition because the issues raised were factual and evidentiary in nature and required re-evaluation of the records.
• Filing by registered mail — Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt; in the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt. The Court applied this rule in holding that the Petition for Certiorari was filed on October 9, 2009, the date of mailing indicated in the registry receipt, even though the Court of Appeals received it on October 20, 2009.
• Pro forma motion for reconsideration — A motion for reconsideration is not pro forma where the circumstances do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings and the motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate arguments in a different light; courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Dela Peña’s Motion for Reconsideration, which pointed out erroneous findings and excessive awards and showed no intent to delay, was not pro forma and tolled the period to appeal.
• Ministerial duty to give due course to timely notice of appeal — The approval of a notice of appeal, if timely filed, becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that because the Motion for Reconsideration tolled the appeal period, the Notice of Appeal was timely and the Regional Trial Court should have given it due course.
• Rule 45 review is discretionary — Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons. The Court applied this doctrine in denying the petition, finding no substantial issues that had not already been passed upon and considered by the Court of Appeals.

• "Under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari before this Court as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction in such a proceeding is limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. Consequently, findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal." — This passage states the ratio for denying the Rule 45 petition: the issues raised were factual and evidentiary and therefore outside the Supreme Court’s review.
• "Moreover, under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt, whereas in the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt." — This passage defines the registered-mail filing rule applied to hold the Petition for Certiorari timely despite the Court of Appeals receiving it later than the mailing date.
• "where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay the proceedings, and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma." — This passage states the canonical standard for determining whether a motion for reconsideration is pro forma, which the Court applied to Dela Peña’s Motion for Reconsideration.
• "the approval of the notice of appeal, if timely filed, becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court." — This passage states the rule that supported the Court of Appeals’ directive for the Regional Trial Court to give due course to the Notice of Appeal.

• Mangahas, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 588 Phil. 61, 77 (2008) — Cited for the rule that under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari; the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal.
• Marine Properties Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 705, 717 (1998) — Cited for the rule that where the circumstances do not show an intent to merely delay the proceedings and the motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate arguments in a different light, courts should be slow to declare the motion outright as pro forma.
• Oro vs. Judge Diaz, 413 Phil. 416, 426 (2001) — Cited, together with Mateo, for the rule that the approval of a notice of appeal, if timely filed, becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court.
• Mateo vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, 273 Phil. 507 (1991) — Cited, together with Oro, for the rule that the approval of a timely filed notice of appeal is the ministerial duty of the trial court.

• Rule 45, Section 6, Rules of Court — Review under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons. The Court applied this provision in denying the petition, finding no substantial issues that had not already been passed upon and considered by the Court of Appeals.
• Rule 65, Section 4, Rules of Court — A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order, or resolution. The Court applied this provision in holding that the Petition for Certiorari, mailed on October 9, 2009, was filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of the July 27, 2009 Order on August 10, 2009.
• Rule 13, Section 3, Rules of Court — Pleadings may be filed either personally or by registered mail; in the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt, while in the second case, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt is considered the date of filing. The Court applied this provision in holding that the Petition for Certiorari was filed on October 9, 2009, not October 20, 2009.
• Rule 37, Section 1, Revised Rules of Court — The Regional Trial Court relied on this provision in declaring Dela Peña’s Motion for Reconsideration pro forma for failure to assert the prescribed grounds. The Supreme Court found this declaration erroneous because the Motion was not pro forma.
• Rule 37, Section 2, Revised Rules of Court — The Court of Appeals found Dela Peña’s Motion for Reconsideration compliant with the requirements of this provision, having specifically pointed out the findings and conclusions she found erroneous and contrary to law. The Supreme Court agreed that the Motion was proper under the rules.
• Rule 17, Section 3, Revised Rules of Court — The Court of Appeals initially dismissed the petition for failure of counsel and Dela Peña to appear despite due notice under this provision. The dismissal was later reconsidered and set aside.

Leonen, Hernando, Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.