Saldariega vs. Panganiban

A provisional dismissal of a criminal case with the express consent of the accused does not operate as an acquittal, and the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. The dismissal must be distinguished from a dismissal with prejudice, which would bar further prosecution.

Petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article 2 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in two separate Informations filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The cases were raffled to Branch 227 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban. The prosecution's principal witness, PO2 Nelson Villas, one of the arresting officers, failed to attend scheduled hearings, prompting the defense to invoke the accused's right to speedy trial.

Petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article 2 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in two Informations filed on November 8, 2011 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-11-173055 and Q-11-173056. The cases were raffled to Branch 227 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban.

Court hearings were set for the cases, but the prosecution's principal witness, PO2 Nelson Villas, one of the arresting officers, failed to attend the scheduled hearings on October 22, 2012 and October 25, 2012. During the May 16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge issued an Order provisionally dismissing the cases with the express consent of the accused-petitioner. The Order noted that PO2 Villas had testified partially on direct examination on December 10, 2012, but failed to appear for the March 26, 2013 continuation of his testimony despite notice in open court. The other prosecution witness, PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan, never appeared despite notice, and only the Forensic Chemist had testified on September 13, 2012, but without personal knowledge of the source of the evidence she examined or the facts and circumstances affecting the arrest. The defense counsel invoked the accused's right to speedy trial, and the Public Prosecutor did not object to the dismissal, provided it was only provisional.

On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against petitioner, explaining that his failure to appear was due to the untimely death of his father-in-law. He further averred that PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan had been transferred to the Batasan Police Station since November 2012 and thus could not have received his subpoena directed at his former place of assignment. In the disputed Order dated June 14, 2013, respondent Judge granted the motion and ordered the re-opening of the cases, setting them for continuation of hearing.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases is considered an acquittal and that PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion to re-open the case. In an Order dated February 18, 2014, respondent denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The trial court stated that the Public Prosecutor, in her Comment/Objection, disagreed with petitioner's position, primarily on the ground that double jeopardy had not set in because the provisional dismissal was with the express consent of the accused. The court further noted that although the Motion to Re-open was filed by the witness without securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, the prosecutor had in effect conformed to the re-opening because she found that the witness's failure to appear was due to the death of his father-in-law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May 12, 2013, as substantiated by Certificates of Death.

• Personality of the Witness to File Motion: Petitioner argued that PO2 Villas, as a mere witness, had no personality to file the motion to re-open the case, as it should have been filed by the public prosecutor who controls the trial.
• Procedural Defect in the Motion: Petitioner argued that the Branch Clerk of Court had no right to receive a motion to re-open that did not contain a notice of hearing and a showing that the other party was given a copy thereof.
• Authority of the Judge: Petitioner argued that respondent Judge had no authority to act favorably upon the motion to re-open.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner argued that the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases with her consent but predicated on failure to prosecute, which violates the right to speedy trial, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that its revival would constitute double jeopardy.
• Waiver of Witness Appearance: Petitioner argued that the absence of the prosecution's principal witness for four consecutive hearings should be considered a waiver pursuant to A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated June 14, 2013 and February 18, 2014.
• No Express Objection: The OSG argued that petitioner did not expressly object to the motion to revive the criminal cases.

• Personality to File Motion to Reopen: Whether witness PO2 Nelson Villas can file a motion to reopen a provisionally dismissed case without the participation of a public prosecutor.
• Receipt of Defective Motion: Whether the Branch Clerk of Court has the right to receive a motion to re-open that does not contain a notice of hearing and a showing that the other party was given a copy thereof.
• Authority of the Judge: Whether respondent Judge has the authority to act favorably upon the motion to re-open.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-11-173055-56 with the consent of the accused but predicated on failure to prosecute, which violates the right of the accused to speedy trial, is not equivalent to an acquittal, such that its revival would constitute double jeopardy.
• Waiver of Witness Appearance: Whether the absence of the prosecution's principal witness PO2 Nelson Villas for four consecutive hearings had been considered waiver pursuant to A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC.

• Personality to File Motion to Reopen: No. Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one to file the motion to revive because the prosecutor controls the trial, but the defect, if any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration by filing her Comment/Objection thereto.
• Receipt of Defective Motion: No. The Court did not directly rule on this procedural issue, as the petition was dismissed primarily for violation of the hierarchy of courts and for failure to establish grave abuse of discretion.
• Authority of the Judge: Yes. Respondent Judge had the authority to act favorably upon the motion to re-open, as the case was provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and could be revived by the State within the periods provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal was made with the express consent of the accused; thus, there is no double jeopardy.
• Waiver of Witness Appearance: No. The delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the provisional dismissal on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay contemplated under the law as to violate the accused's right to speedy trial, especially when the cause of the delay is valid.

• Personality to File Motion to Reopen: The Court acknowledged that generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. However, in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto. The trial court stated that the Public Prosecutor begged to disagree with petitioner's position primarily on the ground that double jeopardy has not set in because the provisional dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the accused. The court further noted that although the Motion to Re-open was filed by the witness without securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor had conformed to the re-opening of the case because she found that the failure of the witness to appear was due to the death of his father-in-law and the death of his aunt, as substantiated by Certificates of Death. Moreover, the accused was charged with a public crime, which is a victim-less crime, and there was no particular private offended party who could file the motion to revive. The Court also noted that in drug-related cases, arresting officers are usually required to explain to their superiors when a case is provisionally dismissed due to their failure to appear during trial, and thus, they file the motion to revive to exonerate themselves from possible administrative and criminal liability.

• Receipt of Defective Motion: The Court did not separately address this procedural issue, as the petition was dismissed for violation of the hierarchy of courts and for failure to establish grave abuse of discretion. The Court noted that while the petition was to be treated as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it was still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts, as direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed only if there are special, important, and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which were not present in this case.

• Authority of the Judge: The Court held that when a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The Order dated May 16, 2013 stressed in no uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. There was nothing in the records showing the accused's opposition to the provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law.

• Double Jeopardy: The Court held that the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. The general rule requires the following requisites for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. There are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking, considering that the dismissal was merely provisional and done with the express consent of the accused-petitioner. Neither does the case fall under any of the exceptions because the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established. Likewise, the Court found no unreasonable delay in the proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.

• Waiver of Witness Appearance: The Court emphasized that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Petitioner failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings. The delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the provisional dismissal of the case on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay contemplated under the law as to violate the accused's right to speedy trial, especially when the cause of the delay is valid. The Court also noted that the Order dated May 16, 2013 was categorical in stating that the dismissal of the complaint was provisional with the express consent of the accused and her counsel, and the court merely stated what transpired during the proceedings, not that the dismissal was based on the accused's right to speedy trial.

• Provisional Dismissal and Revival — A criminal case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, and there is no violation of due process as long as the revival was made within the time-bar provided under the law.

• Double Jeopardy — The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. The requisites for double jeopardy to attach are: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express consent. Two exceptions allow double jeopardy to attach even if the dismissal was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.

• Speedy Trial — "Speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings, balancing the following factors: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice, as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner should establish that the court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.

• Hierarchy of Courts — Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed only if there are special, important, and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition.

• "When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure." — This passage states the controlling rule on revival of provisionally dismissed criminal cases and is central to the Court's rejection of petitioner's double jeopardy claim.

• "The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal was made with the express consent of the accused, thus, there is no double jeopardy." — This is the ratio decidendi on the double jeopardy issue, articulating the distinction between provisional dismissal with consent and acquittal.

• "This Court has emphasized that 'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept." — This passage introduces the flexible standard for determining violations of the right to speedy trial, which the Court applied in finding no violation in this case.

• "In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner should establish that the court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." — This passage defines the standard for grave abuse of discretion that must be shown for a petition for certiorari to prosper.

• Macapagal vs. People, G.R. No. 193217, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA 425 — Cited for the rule that direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed only if there are special, important, and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which were not present in this case.

• Condrada vs. People, 446 Phil. 635 (2003) — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy and the two exceptions to the rule that double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused.

• William Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products, G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014 — Cited for the factors to balance in determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated: duration of the delay, reason therefor, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by such delay.

• People vs. Rama, 403 Phil. 155 (2001) — Cited for the principle that unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.

• Tan vs. Spouses Antazo, 659 Phil. 400 (2011) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

• Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party, and that the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the second paragraph of this section. The Court applied this provision in holding that the revival of the provisionally dismissed cases was proper.

• Sections 5 and 11, Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) — The provisions under which petitioner was charged with violations, forming the basis of the criminal cases that were provisionally dismissed and subsequently revived.

• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner, which the Court dismissed for violation of the hierarchy of courts and for failure to establish grave abuse of discretion.

• A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC — Cited by petitioner in arguing that the absence of the prosecution's principal witness for four consecutive hearings should be considered a waiver, though the Court did not find the delay violative of the accused's right to speedy trial.

• Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson)
• Mendoza
• Reyes
• Leonen

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.